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Abstract
Symmetric cryptographic primitives such as block and stream ciphers are the building blocks in
many cryptographic protocols. Having such blocks which provide provable security against various
types of attacks is often hard. On the other hand, if possible, such designs are often too costly to
be implemented and are usually ignored by practitioners. Moreover, in RFID protocols or sensor
networks, we need lightweight and ultra-lightweight algorithms. Hence, cryptographers often search
for a fair trade-off between security and usability depending on the application. Contrary to public
key primitives, which are often based on some hard problems, security in symmetric key is often
based on some heuristic assumptions. Often, the researchers in this area argue that the security is
based on the confidence level the community has in their design. Consequently, everyday symmetric
protocols appear in the literature and stay secure until someone breaks them. In this thesis, we
evaluate the security of multiple symmetric primitives against statistical and algebraic attacks.
This thesis is composed of two distinct parts:
In the first part, we investigate the security of RC4 stream cipher against statistical attacks.
We focus on its applications in WEP and WPA protocols. We revisit the previous attacks on RC4
and optimize them. In fact, we propose a framework on how to deal with a pool of biases for RC4
in an optimized manner. During this work, we found multiple new weaknesses in the corresponding
applications. We show that the current best attack on WEP can still be improved. We compare
our results with the state of the art implementation of the WEP attack on Aircrack-ng program and
improve its success rate. Next, we propose a theoretical key recovery and distinguishing attacks on
WPA, which cryptographically break the protocol. We perform an extreme amount of experiments
to make sure that the proposed theory matches the experiments. Finally, we propose a concrete
theoretical and empirical proof of all our claims. These are currently the best known attacks on
WEP and WPA.
In the second part, we shed some lights on the theory behind ElimLin, which is an algorithm
for solving multivariate polynomial systems of equations. We attack PRESENT and LBlock block
ciphers with ElimLin algorithm and compare their security using this algebraic technique. Then,
we investigate the security of KATAN family of block ciphers and multi-purpose cryptographic
primitive ARMADILLO against algebraic attacks. We break reduced-round versions of several
members of KATAN family by proposing a novel pre-processing technique on the original algebraic
representation of the cipher before feeding it to a SAT solver. Finally, we propose a devastating
practical key recovery attack against the ARMADILLO1 protocol, which breaks it in polynomial
time using a few challenge-response pairs.
Keywords: Symmetric cryptography, light-weight cryptography, statistical attacks, RC4 crypt-
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Re´sume´
Les primitives cryptographiques a` cle´ syme´trique comme les syste`mes de chiffrement par blocs
et les syste`mes de chiffrement a` flot sont les composantes de base de nombreux protocoles cryp-
tographiques. Il est souvent difficile d’avoir de telles composantes dont la se´curite´ est prouve´e
contre divers types d’attaques. Aussi, de telles conceptions sont souvent trop couˆteuses pour eˆtre
imple´mente´es et sont habituellement ignore´es en pratique. De plus, dans des environnements sous
contraintes comme les protocoles RFID ou les re´seaux de capteurs, il est primordial d’utiliser des
algorithmes bas-couˆt. Il est donc ne´cessaire pour les cryptographes de rechercher un bon com-
promis entre la se´curite´ et l’utilisabilite´. Ce compromis de´pend de l’application. Contrairement
aux primitives a` cle´ publique qui sont souvent base´es sur des proble`mes suppose´s eˆtre difficiles a`
re´soudre, la se´curite´ des syste`mes a` cle´ syme´trique est souvent base´e sur des suppositions heuris-
tiques. Les chercheurs dans ce domaine affirment souvent que la se´curite´ est base´e sur le niveau de
confiance qu’a la communaute´ en leur construction. En conse´quence, de nouveaux protocoles a` cle´
syme´trique apparaissent re´gulie`rement et restent suˆrs jusqu’a` ce que quelqu’un les cassent. Dans
cette the`se, nous e´valuons la se´curite´ de plusieurs primitives a` cle´ syme´trique contre les attaques
statistiques et alge´briques. Cette the`se est compose´e de deux parties distinctes.
Dans la premie`re partie, nous e´tudions la se´curite´ contre les attaques statistiques du syste`me
de chiffrement a` flot RC4. Nous nous inte´ressons en particulier a` ses applications dans les pro-
tocoles WEP et WPA. Nous revisitons les attaques de´veloppe´es pre´ce´demment sur RC4 et nous
les optimisons. En fait, nous proposons un cadre pour traiter une banque de biais pour RC4 de
fac¸on optimise´e. Dans ce travail, nous avons trouve´ de nombreuses nouvelles vulne´rabilite´s dans les
applications correspondantes. Nous montrons aussi que la meilleure attaque actuellement existante
sur WEP peut encore eˆtre ame´liore´e. Nous comparons nos re´sultats avec le logiciel Aircrack-ng,
la meilleure imple´mentation actuelle attaquant WEP et nous ame´liorons sa probabilite´ de succe`s.
Ensuite, nous proposons des attaques par distingueurs ainsi qu’une attaque the´orique sur WPA qui
re´cupe`re la cle´ secre`te. Ces attaques cassent le protocole d’un point de vue cryptographique. Nous
effectuons une e´norme quantite´ d’expe´riences afin d’eˆtre suˆrs que la the´orie que nous proposons
soit bien ve´rifie´e en pratique. Finalement, nous proposons des preuves the´oriques et empiriques de
toutes nos affirmations. Nos attaques sont actuellement les meilleures attaques sur WEP et WPA.
Dans la deuxie`me partie, nous apportons quelques e´claircissements sur la the´orie derrie`re Elim-
Lin qui est un algorithme utilise´ pour re´soudre des syste`mes d’e´quations polynomiales multivarie´es.
Nous e´tudions ensuite la se´curite´ contre les attaques alge´briques de plusieurs syste`mes de chiffre-
ments par blocs et d’une primitive cryptographique multi-usage. Cette liste comprend KATAN,
PRESENT et LBlock pour les chiffrement par blocs et ARMADILLO1 pour la primitive cryptogra-
phique multi-usage. Nous cassons des versions re´duites de plusieurs membres de la famille KATAN
VII
et nous proposons une nouvelle technique de pre´traitement sur la repre´sentation alge´brique du
syste`me avant de le donner a` un solveur SAT. Nous attaquons les syste`mes de chiffrement par
blocs PRESENT et LBlock en utilisant l’algorithme ElimLin et nous comparons leur se´curite´ en
utilisant cette technique alge´brique. Finalement, nous proposons une attaque a` re´cupe´ration de cle´
de´vastatrice contre le protocole ARMADILLO1 qui le casse en temps polynomial en utilisant un
faible nombre de paires challenge/re´ponse.
Mots-cle´s : Cryptographie a` cle´ syme´trique, cryptographie bas-couˆt, attaques statistiques, cryp-
tanalyse de RC4, WEP et WPA, syste`mes de chiffrement par blocs, syste`mes de chiffrement a`
flot, syste`mes d’e´quations polynomiales creuses de faible degre´, protocoles de challenge/re´ponse,
ElimLin, techniques re´solvant SAT
VIII
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Chapter1
Motivation
In the first part of this thesis, we perform extensive amount of analysis on RC4 stream cipher. We
mainly focus on its applications in WEP and WPA protocols.
RC4 is the most widely used stream cipher in cryptography. Due to its simplicity, it has
undergone an extreme amount of cryptanalysis since being anonymously disclosed in 1994. Indeed,
it is widely used in various security protocols, such as SSL/TLS and Wi-Fi. In the following
chapters, we are going to dig more into its security and particularly, we are going to exploit its
weaknesses in WEP and WPA protocols.
WEP was already broken by Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir (FMS) in 2001. Although their
attack is practical, it is not fast enough. Moreover, since the introduction of FMS attack, almost
all vendors restricted the class of weak keys used by the FMS attack. Therefore, that weakness
can be avoided. Later, others such as Andreas Klein and a hacker called Korek came up with new
weaknesses in RC4 and showed that the WEP key can be still recovered quite simply in practice.
This work was further improved by Vuagnoux and Vaudenay and at the same time by Tews,
Weinmann and Pyshkin (PTW). They showed that WEP can be broken in less than 60 seconds.
That was the time when public softwares such as Aircrack-ng appeared which were implementing
all the previous known attacks on WEP. Finally, Aircrack-ng was updated by Tews and Beck, using
the refinement of all the previous attacks.
The drawback of all such analysis was that there was no concrete theory behind all the state of
the art attacks, i.e., if a new weakness is found against RC4, it is not straightforward to compute
how fast the ultimate algorithm would be. More clearly, there was no way to reproduce the results
theoretically. Due to this lack of theory, the previous attacks in the literature set several of their
parameters heuristically. For instance, Aircrack-ng implementers decided to use some heuristic
settings for some parts of their attacks, gaining a better result in practice. Consequently, it was
not clear at all how those attacks could be improved or whether there was any hope in finding an
optimized technique.
In the following chapters, we introduce such a concrete theory. We compute all the parameters
of our attacks theoretically and then, by performing an extensive amount of experiments, we certify
all our theoretical analysis. Finally, we show that our attack is optimized. We improve the data
and computational complexity of the attack on WEP and certify that it works in practice. This
is achieved by proposing a theory on how to manipulate a pool of biases in RC4 in an optimized
1
fashion.
Using the same analysis, we also cryptanalyze the WPA protocol. For the first time, we provide a
practical distinguisher for WPA. Then, we propose some temporary key recovery attacks. Although
our key recovery attacks are not practical, they improve the state of the art attacks on this widely
used wireless protocol. Currently, they are the best attacks against WPA. They also provide a
better understanding of the RC4 stream cipher.
The results in the following chapters on RC4 are mainly derived by merging and extending our
two papers published in SAC 2010 [SVV10] and EuroCrypt 2011 [SVV11] and another submission
(extension of the previous two papers) under the review of Journal of Cryptology [SVV12], co-
authored with Serge Vaudenay and Marin Vuagnoux.
In the second part of this thesis, we focus on algebraic techniques for cryptanalysis of symmetric
primitives. First, we shed some light on the theory behind the ElimLin algorithm, which is an
algorithm for solving polynomial systems of equations. We prove some fundamental theorems
regarding this simple technique and compare it with other methods existing in the literature for
solving multivariate polynomial systems of equations.
The idea behind the analysis of ElimLin was initiated by Nicolas Courtois and myself when I was
doing my master thesis at University College London back in 2007− 2008. The main contribution
of Chapter 10 which is Theorem 10.2 was introduced back in 2008 in [Sep08], but it was never
formalized and rigorously proved until the present work. Here, in Chapter 10, we are providing a
complete proof for such a surprising result on ElimLin. This fundamental result was published at
FSE 2012 [SSV12], co-authored with Nicolas Courtois, Petr Susˇil and Serge Vaudenay. Some of the
attack simulations were also published in CANS 2009 [NSZW09], co-authored with Jorge Nakahara,
Meiqin Wang and Bingsheng Zhang. That paper also evaluates the security of PRESENT block
cipher against linear hulls and breaks 26 rounds out of 31 rounds of this lightweight block cipher.
Next, we propose a novel pre-processing approach applied to the algebraic representation of
ciphers to make it appropriate for a SAT solver. Using this approach, we then attack reduced-
round versions of KATAN family of block ciphers. This attack together with some more analysis
(AIDA/cube and side channel attacks) were published in IndoCrypt 2010 [BCN+10], co-authored
with Gregory Bard, Nicolas Courtois, Jorge Nakahara and Bingsheng Zhang.
Finally, we propose a devastating algebraic attack against the first version of ARMADILLO
multi-purpose cryptographic primitive, proposed by our lab for Oridao company, which breaks
the algorithm in practical complexity. In this thesis, we provide a polynomial time key recovery
attack against the challenge-response application of this protocol. This result together with sev-
eral variants of this protocol and the corresponding attacks were published in CHES 2010 and
CARDIS 2011 [SSV11, BDN+11]. The first paper was co-authored with Petr Susˇil and Serge Vau-
denay. The second paper was co-authored with Ste´phane Badel, Nilay Dagtekin, Jorge Nakahara,
Khaled Ouafi, Nicolas Reffe´, Petr Susˇil and Serge Vaudenay.
The articles that were published and the ones which were submitted while pursuing the PhD
program at EPFL (Oct 2008 - June 2012) are listed hereafter.
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Part I
Statistical Cryptanalysis of RC4 with
Applications to WEP & WPA

Chapter2
RC4 in WEP and WPA Protocols
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we are going to describe the RC4 stream cipher and its applications in IEEE 802.11
standard for wireless communication, i.e., WEP and WPA. Furthermore, we recall the previous
cryptanalysis results against RC4 in both applications.
RC4 was designed by Rivest in 1987. It used to be a trade secret until it was anonymously
posted on Cypherpunks mailing list in September 1994. Nowadays, due to its simplicity, RC4 is
widely used in SSL/TLS, Microsoft Lotus, Oracle Secure SQL and Wi-Fi 802.11 wireless commu-
nications. The 802.11 [IEE03] used to be protected by WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) which is
now being replaced by WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) due to security weaknesses.
WEP uses RC4 with a pre-shared key. Each packet is encrypted by an XOR to a keystream
generated by RC4. The RC4 key is a pre-shared key prepended with a 3-byte nonce initialization
vector IV. The IV is sent in clear for self-synchronization. There have been several attempts to
break the full RC4 algorithm, but it has only been devastating so far in this scenario. Indeed, the
adversary knows that the key is constant except the IV, which is known. An active adversary can
even alter the IV. Nowadays, WEP is considered as being terribly weak, since passive attacks can
recover the full key easily by assuming that the first bytes of every plaintext frame are known.
This happens to be the case due to the protocol specifications.
In order to fix this problem, the Wi-Fi Alliance has replaced WEP by WPA [IEE03]. Peer
authentication is based on IEEE 802.1X which accommodates a simple authentication mode based
on a pre-shared key (WPA-PSK). Authentication creates a Temporary Key (TK). The TK then
goes through the temporary key integrity protocol (TKIP) to derive the per-packet keys (PPK).
The idea is that the TK is derived into a TTAK key to be used for a number of frames limited to
216. Each frame applies a simple transformation to the TTAK and a counter TSC to derive the
RC4 per-packet key PPK. Again, the 3 first bytes of the RC4 key are known (they actually depend
on a counter).
In addition to the key derivation, WPA provides a packet integrity protection scheme MIC
which prevents from replaying or altering the IV. Thus, only passive key recovery attacks can be
considered.
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2.2 Description of RC4 and Notations
The RC4 stream cipher consists of two algorithms: the Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) and
the Pseudo Random Generator Algorithm (PRGA). The RC4 engine has a state defined by two
registers (words) i and j and one array (of N words) S defining a permutation over Z/NZ. The
KSA generates an initial state for the PRGA from a random key K of L words as described in
Figure 2.1. It starts with an array {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, where N = 28 and swaps N pairs, depending
on the value of the secret key K. At the end, we obtain the initial state S′0 = SN−1.
We define all the operators such as addition, subtraction and multiplication in the ring of
integers modulo N represented as Z/NZ, or ZN , where N = 256 (i.e. words are bytes). Thus,
x+ y should be read as (x+ y) mod N .
KSA PRGA
1: for i = 0 to N − 1 do
2: S[i]← i
3: end for
4: j ← 0
5: for i = 0 to N − 1 do
6: j ← j + S[i] +K[i mod L]
7: swap(S[i],S[j])
8: end for
1: i← 0
2: j ← 0
3: loop
4: i← i+ 1
5: j ← j + S[i]
6: swap(S[i],S[j])
7: output zi = S[S[i] + S[j]]
8: end loop
Figure 2.1: The KSA and the PRGA algorithms of RC4.
Once the initial state S′0 is created, it is used by the second algorithm of RC4, the PRGA. Its
role is to generate a keystream of words of log2N bits, which will be XORed with the plaintext
to obtain the ciphertext. Thus, RC4 computes the loop of the PRGA each time a new keystream
word zi is needed, according to the algorithm in Figure 2.1. Note that each time a word of the
keystream is generated, the internal state (i, j, S) of RC4 is updated.
Sometimes, we consider an idealized version RC4?(t) of RC4 defined by a parameter t as shown
in Figure 2.2. Namely, after round t, j is assigned randomly. This model has been already used in
the literature such as in [Max05, Roo95, PM07].
Let Si[k] (resp. S
′
i[k]) denote the value of the permutation defined by the array S at index k,
after the round i in the KSA (resp. the PRGA). We also denote SN−1 = S′0. Let ji (resp. j′i) be the
value of j after round i of the KSA (resp. the PRGA), where the rounds are indexed with respect
to i. Thus, the KSA has rounds 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 and the PRGA has rounds 1, 2, . . .. The KSA and
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KSA?(t) PRGA?
1: for i = 0 to N − 1 do
2: S[i]← i
3: end for
4: j ← 0
5: for i = 0 to N − 1 do
6: if i ≤ t then
7: j ← j + S[i] +K[i mod L]
8: else
9: j ← random
10: end if
11: swap(S[i],S[j])
12: end for
1: i← 0
2: j ← 0
3: loop
4: i← i+ 1
5: j ← random
6: swap(S[i],S[j])
7: output zi = S[S[i] + S[j]]
8: end loop
Figure 2.2: The KSA?(t) and the PRGA? algorithms of RC4?(t).
the PRGA are defined by
KSA PRGA
j−1 = 0 j′0 = 0
ji = ji−1 + Si−1[i] +K[i mod L] j′i = j
′
i−1 + S
′
i−1[i]
S−1[k] = k S′0[k] = SN−1[k]
Si[k] =

Si−1[ji] if k = i
Si−1[i] if k = ji
Si−1[k] otherwise
S′i[k] =

S′i−1[j
′
i] if k = i
S′i−1[i] if k = j
′
i
S′i−1[k] otherwise
zi = S
′
i[S
′
i[i] + S
′
i[j
′
i]]
2.3 Description of WEP
WEP [IEE99b] uses a 3-byte IV concatenated to a secret key of 40 or 104 bits (5 or 13 bytes) as
an RC4 key. Thus, the RC4 key size is either 64 or 128 bits. This is because the packets can be
simply lost through the wireless channel due to a transmission error. So, all the packets should be
encrypted independently. Since the RC4 design does not accept an IV by default, WEP generates
a per packet key for each packet. A devastating problem of WEP is that the 13 bytes of the key
do not change for each packets encryption, while the first 3 bytes of the key are changing. Thus,
the attacker can run a statistical attack on the key. This was avoided in WPA. In this thesis, we
do not consider the 40-bit key variant. So, L = 16. In fact, we have
K = K[0]‖K[1]‖K[2]‖K[3]‖ · · · ‖K[15] = IV0‖IV1‖IV2‖K[3]‖ · · · ‖K[15]
where IVi represents the (i + 1)-th byte of the IV and K[3]‖...‖K[15] represents the fixed secret
part of the key. In theory, the value of the IV should be random but in practice, it is a counter,
mostly in little-endian and it is incremented by one each time a new 802.11b frame is encrypted.
Sometimes, some particular values of the IV are skipped to thwart the specific attacks based on
“weak IV’s”. Thus, each packet uses a slightly different key.
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To protect the integrity of the data, a 32-bit long CRC32 check sum called ICV is appended to
the data. Similar to other stream ciphers, the resulting stream is XORed with the RC4 keystream
and it is sent through the communication channel together with the IV in clear. On the receiver’s
end, the ciphertext is again XORed with the shared key and the plaintext is recovered. It checks
the linear error correcting code and it either accepts the data or declines it.
It is well known [PR88, TWP07, VV07] that a relevant portion of the plaintext is practically
constant and that some other bytes can be predicted. They correspond to the LLC header and
the SNAP header and some bytes of the TCP/IP and ARP encapsulated frames. For example, by
XORing the first byte of the ciphertext with the constant value 0xAA, we obtain the first byte of
the keystream. Thus, even if these attacks are called known plaintext attacks, they are ciphertext
only in practice (see Figure 2.3).
The attacker eavesdrops the ARP packets in the network and since the plaintext bytes are
known up to the 32-nd byte, she can compute z1, . . . , z32 values using the ciphertext. It is also
possible to inject data into the network in an active attack. Because the ARP replies expire quickly,
it usually takes only a few seconds or minutes until an attacker can capture an ARP request and
start re-injecting it [TWP07]. The first public implementation of a practical re-injection attack
was in the BSD− Airtools package [Hul]. Moreover, the TCP packets can be used as well, but some
of the data frames are not known in this case. We will see later that the Klein and the Maitra-Paul
attacks require zi and zi+1 to recover K¯[i] and K¯[i+ 1] respectively. Hence, in reality we are not
able to use those attacks to recover some bytes of the key. This is not the case for the Korek
attacks, since they only require z1 and z2. Thus, if the TCP packets are used, more of them are
needed to launch a successful attack.
2.4 Description of WPA
Since WEP was shown to be terribly weak, the 802.11 WG suggested a new protocol called Wi-Fi
Protected Access (WPA). Its goal is to resolve all the security problems in WEP. Since WEP
was already implemented in many commercial products, it was not cost effective to discard the
protocol and design a new one from scratch. A dirty fix was to have a software patch on the
existing hardware. In fact, the key is scrambled in WPA using a key mixing function and then it
is given to RC4. Hence, WPA uses a completely different key for each packet. This was not the
case for WEP.
WPA includes a key hashing function [HWF02] to defend against the Fluhrer, Mantin and
Shamir attack [FMS01]. It also includes a Message Integrity Code (MIC) [Fer02] to provides
integrity and a key management scheme based on 802.1X [WG.01] to avoid the key reuse and to
ease the key distribution.
The 128-bit Temporal Key (TK) is a per-session key. It is derived from the key management
scheme during the authentication and is given as an input to the phase1 key hashing function (key
mixing algorithm) together with the 48-bit Transmitter Address (TA) and a 48-bit TKIP Sequence
Counter (TSC) which is sometimes called an IV. We will avoid this latter name to avoid confusion
with the first 3 bytes of the RC4 key (which indeed only depend on the TSC, but with a shorter
length).
To maintain the integrity of the data, a non-linear message integrity function called MIC is
used. It takes a MIC key, the TA, the receiver address and the message as the input and it
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A Appendix
ARP Packet
0xAA DSAP
0xAA SSAP
0x03 CTRL
0x00
0x00 ORG Code
0x00
0x08 ARP
0x06
0x00 Ethernet
0x01
0x08 IP
0x00
0x06 Hardware size
0x04 Protocol
0x00 Opcode Request/Reply
0x??
0x?? MAC addr src
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x?? IP src
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x?? MAC addr dst
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x?? IP dst
0x??
0x??
0x??
TCP Packet
0xAA DSAP
0xAA SSAP
0x03 CTRL
0x00
0x00 ORG Code
0x00
0x08 IP
0x00
0x45 IP Version + Header length
0x?? Packet length
0x??
0x?? IP ID RFC815
0x??
0x?? Fragment type and offset
0x?? TTL
0x06 TCP type
0x?? Header checksum
0x??
0x?? IP src
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x?? IP dst
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x?? Port src
0x??
0x?? Port dst
0x??
Fig. 2. The tables above represent the plaintext bytes of 802.11 data frames encapsu-
lating resp. ARP and TCP protocols. The value in white are almost fixed or can be
computed dynamically. The values in light grey can be guessed. The values in dark
grey are not predictable.
Figure 2.3: The plaintext bytes of the 802.11 data frames encapsulating ARP and TCP proto-
cols [VV07]. The values in white are almost fixed or can be computed dynamically. The values in
light Grey can be guessed. The values in dark Grey are not predictable.
outputs the message concatenated with a MIC-tag (see [Fer02] for the MIC description). The
entire encapsulation process is depicted in Figure 2.4. As can be seen, WPA is a wrapper for
WEP.
The TK can be used to encrypt up to 248 packets. Every packet has a 48-bit index TSC
which is split into IV32 and IV16. The IV32 counter is incremented every 216 packets. The packet
is encrypted using a 128-bit RC4KEY which is derived from the TK, the TSC and some other
parameters (for example, the device addresses) which can be assumed constant and known by the
adversary for our purpose. As for WEP, the first three bytes of the RC4KEY only depend on the
TSC so they are not secret. The derivation works in two phases. The first phase does not depend
on the IV16 and is done once every 216 packets for efficiency reasons. It derives a 80-bit key TTAK,
called the TKIP-mixed Transmit Address and Key (TTAK) in the standard (but denoted the P1K
in the reference code):
TTAK = phase1(TK,TA, IV32)
phase1 consists of two steps. It is depicted in Algorithm 2.1. The second phase uses the TK
and the IV16 to derive a 96-bit key PPK which is then turned into the RC4KEY:
RC4KEY = phase2(TK,TTAK, IV16)
phase2 consists of three steps. It is depicted in Algorithm 2.2.
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cally secure. The CRC is a linear function of the mes-
sage, and Borisov et al. [3] showed that it is possible
to make controlled modifications to a ciphertext with-
out disrupting the checksum.
The standard ignores the issue of key management.
Most vendors do not implement any key distribution
mechanism, this means that keys must be statically en-
tered into either the driver software or firmware. All
the mobile stations accessing the same access point
use the same pre-shared key and can therefore decrypt
each others packets. Since the key needs to be manu-
ally distributed and typed into a device, it is not likely
that the key will be changed very often. The IV is only
24 bits long, which implies that the same key and IV
will be reused, this is known as the two-time pad [3].
Fluhrer et al. [4] also found a correlation between
the combination of the IV and user key with the first
RC4 key stream byte, which leads to a practical key
recovery attack.
II.B. Wi-Fi Protected Access
Because WEP has been shown to be totally insecure,
the 802.11 WG has suggested a new security protocol.
The protocol is called Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA).
The goal for this protocol is to fix all known security
flaws in WEP and it was designed to be deployed as a
software patch on existing hardware.
WPA includes a key hash function [5] to defend
against the Fluhrer et al. [4] attack, a Message In-
tegrity Code (MIC) [6] and a key management scheme
based on 802.1X [7] to avoid key reuse and to ease
the key distribution. Figure 2 shows the encapsulation
process.
The 16-byte Temporal Key (TK) is obtained from
the key management scheme during the authentica-
tion, and goes into the key hash function together with
the 6-byte Transmitter Address (TA) and a 48-bit IV,
often called the TKIP sequence counter. The key hash
function outputs a 16-byte RC4 key where the three
first bytes are derived from the IV. This key is used
only for one WEP frame, since the IV is implemented
as a counter which increases after each package, and
the key is therefore often called a per-packet key. The
IV counter also works as a defense against replay at-
tacks, the receiver will not accept packets with smaller
or equal IV to previously received packets.
Integrity of the message is insured by the MIC. This
function takes as input a MIC key, TA, receiver ad-
dress, and the message, and outputs the message con-
catenated with a MIC-tag. If necessary this output is
fragmented before it enters WEP.
Key Mixing
Temporal Key
48?bit IV
counter
Transmitter Address
RC4KEY
WEPPlaintext
MIC
MIC Key
Transmitter Address ||
Ciphertext
Receiver Address
Figure 2: WPA encapsulation process.
This means that WPA is a wrapper for WEP in-
suring that a TK,IV pair is only used once by
a sender, and improving the integrity of WEP frames
by applying a non-linear message integrity function.
More details about the MIC can be found in [6].
II.B.1. Key mixing
The key mixing function is described by Housley et
al. [5], this function is also called a temporal key hash.
As shown on Figure 2, this function takes as input the
TK, the TA and the 48-bit IV, and outputs a 128-bit
WEP key where 24 bits are derived from the IV. The
least significant 16 bits of the 48-bit IV are denoted
IV16, and 32 most significant bits are denoted IV32.
The key mixing is a two-phase process which may be
summarized as follows:
Phase1 of temporal key hash.
Mobile Computing and Communications Review, Volume 8, Number 2 77
Figure 2.4: The WPA encapsulation process [MRH04].
The S[.] function is a 16×16 bijective non-linear S-box, defined by a look up table in [HWF02].
We also define Mk16(X,Y ) = X ‖ Y . Addition is done modulo 216. The functions low16(x) and
high16(x) xtract the 16 LSB and 16 MSB of x. It is similar for low8(x) and high8(x). Finally,
RotR1 represents rotation to the right by 1. The key derivation of WPA based on a pre-shared key
is depicted on Figure 2.5 (without the protocol parameters such as the TA).
PSK - AuthenticationWPA-PSK
- TK -
TSC
6IV16
t
?
IV32
-
phase1 -TTAK phase2 - RC4KEY
802.1X WPA RC4
Figure 2.5: The WPA key derivation based on a pre-shared key authentication method.
In what follows, we denote K[i] = RC4KEY[i mod 16] and IV = K[0]‖K[1]‖K[2] to use the
same notations as in WEP. By convention, TTAK and PPK are considered as vectors or 16-bit
words. The TK and the RC4KEY are considered as vectors or 8-bit words. Vectors are numbered
starting from 0.
Note that a filter avoids the use of some weak IV classes. Actually, it avoids only the weak
class of IV’s discovered by Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir [FMS01].
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Algorithm 2.1 The phase1 of the WPA key hashing function.
phase1, step1:
1: TTAK[0] = low16(IV32)
2: TTAK[1] = high16(IV32)
3: TTAK[2] = Mk16(TA[1],TA[0])
4: TTAK[3] = Mk16(TA[3],TA[2])
5: TTAK[4] = Mk16(TA[5],TA[4])
phase1, step2:
6: for i = 0 to 7 do
7: j = 2 ∗ (i & 1)
8: TTAK[0] = TTAK[0] + S[TTAK[4] + Mk16(TK[j + 1],TK[j])]
9: TTAK[1] = TTAK[1] + S[TTAK[0] + Mk16(TK[j + 5],TK[j + 4])]
10: TTAK[2] = TTAK[2] + S[TTAK[1] + Mk16(TK[j + 9],TK[j + 8])]
11: TTAK[3] = TTAK[3] + S[TTAK[2] + Mk16(TK[j + 13],TK[j + 12])]
12: TTAK[4] = TTAK[4] + S[TTAK[3] + Mk16(TK[j + 1],TK[j])] + i
13: end for
2.5 State of the Art Attacks
2.5.1 Previous Attacks on RC4
We consider three approaches for the cryptanalysis of RC4: attacks based on the weaknesses
of the Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA), attacks based on the weaknesses of the Pseudorandom
Generator Algorithm (PRGA) and the black box analysis.
As for the KSA, one of the first weaknesses published on RC4 was discovered by Roos [Roo95]
in 1995. This correlation binds the secret key bytes to the initial state S′0. Roos [Roo95] and
Wagner [Wag95] identified classes of weak keys which reveal the secret key if the first key bytes are
known. This property has been largely exploited to break WEP (see [Bit03, FMS01, Hul01, Kor04b,
Kor04a, SVV10, BT09, TWP07, VV07]). Another class of results concerns the inversion problem
of the KSA: given the final state of the KSA, the problem is to recover the secret key [BC08, PM07].
Regarding the PRGA, the analysis has been largely motivated by distinguishing attacks [FM01,
Gol97, Man05b, Max05] or the initial state reconstruction from the keystream bytes [Gol00,
KMP+98, MK08, TBNT07] with the complexity of 2241 for the best state recovery attack. Rele-
vant studies of the PRGA reveal biases in the keystream output bytes in [MS01, PP04]. Mironov
recommends in [Mir02] that the first 512 initial keystream bytes must be discarded to avoid these
weaknesses.
Jenkins published in 1996 two biases in the PRGA of RC4 on his website [Jen96]. These
biases have been generalized by Mantin in his Master Thesis [Man01]. In 2008, Paul, Rathi and
Maitra [PRM08] discovered a biased output index of the first keystream word generated by the
PRGA. Another bias on the PRGA has been discovered by Maitra and Paul in [MP08].
In practice, key recovery attacks on RC4 must bind the KSA and the PRGA weaknesses to correlate
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secret key words to the keystream words. Some biases on the PRGA [Kle08, PRM08, MP08]
have been successfully bound to the Roos correlation [Roo95] to provide known plaintext attacks.
Another approach is the black box analysis, which does not require any binding. This approach
will be elaborated later.
In [SPSG11], some biases in the initial keystream bytes of RC4 were found. The authors also
showed that the value of j2 tends towards 4. Finally, they extended the attack of Mantin and
Shamir on Broadcast RC4 [MS01] to recover the bytes 3 to 255 of the plaintext given N3 cipher-
texts. Finally, in [SGMPS11b], the authors provided a theoretical justification for the probability
distribution of the first keystream byte z1 of RC4.
In the following chapters, we are going to elaborate some new empirical biases on RC4. Later,
some of these biases were proved in [SGMPS11a]. Using one of these biases, the authors mounted
a key length discovery attack on RC4.
2.5.2 Previous Attacks on WEP
Regarding the application of RC4 in the WEP protocol, some of the serious security flaws in WEP
were discovered by Borisov, Goldberg and Wagner [BGW01]. They showed that WEP fails to
achieve its security goals. The 802.11 standard does not necessarily ask for the IV to be changed
with every packet, so an implementation has no obligation to reuse the same IV for all the packets.
Since RC4 is a stream cipher, this means that we can find two packets encrypted with exactly
the same keystream if the IV is reused. This leaks the XOR of the corresponding two packets.
Many such pairs can be gathered in matter of hours. In fact, there are many frequency analysis
techniques in the literature (see for instance [Sin99]) to derive the corresponding packets. They
also showed that the ICV is not cryptographically secure. In fact, CRC is a linear function of the
message and it was shown in [BGW01] that it is possible to make a controlled modification of
the ciphertext without disrupting the check sum. This means that WEP does not even provide
integrity. Finally, the 802.11 standard does not specify how the distribution of the keys is to be
accomplished.
WEP key recovery process is harder in practice than in theory. Indeed, some bytes of the
keystream may be unknown. Moreover, theoretical success probability has often been miscalcu-
lated and conditions to recover the secret key are not the same depending on the paper. For
example, [TWP07, VV07, BT09, SVV10] check 106 most probable keys instead of the first one
as in [FMS01, Kor04b, Kor04a, Kle08, SIR02, SIR04]. Additionally, IEEE 802.11 standard does
not specify how the IV’s should be chosen. Thus, some attacks consider randomly picked IV’s or
incremental IV’s (both little-endian and big-endian encoded). Some implementations specifically
avoid some classes of IV’s which are weak with respect to some attacks.
To unify the results, during the entire thesis, we consider recovering a random 104-bit long
secret key with random IV’s. This corresponds to the default IV behavior of the 802.11 GNU/Linux
stack. We compare the previous and the new results using both theoretical and practical analysis.
– In [FMS01], Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir’s attack is only theoretically described. The authors
postulate that 4 million packets would be sufficient to recover the secret key of WEP with
success probability of 50% with incremental IV’s. A practical implementation of this attack
has been realized by Stubblefield, Ioannidis and Rubin [SIR02, SIR04]. They showed that
between 5 million to 6 million packets are needed to recover the secret key using the FMS
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attack. Note that in 2001, almost all wireless cards were using incremental IV’s in big-endian.
– There is no theoretical analysis of the Korek [Kor04a, Kor04b] key recovery attacks. Only
practical implementations such as Aircrack-ng [DO11] are available. Additionally, Aircrack-ng
classifies the most probable secret keys and does a brute-force attack on them. The success
probability of 50% is obtained when about 100 000 packets are captured with random IV’s.
Note that the amount of the brute-forced keys depends on the values of the secret key and
the “Fudge” factor (the number of trials on the key), a parameter chosen by the attacker.
By default, around 1 000 to 1 000 000 keys are brute-forced. We will improve the conditions
of the Korek attacks and prove the success probability of all such biases in the following
chapters.
– In [Kle08], Klein showed theoretically that his new attack needs about 25 000 packets with
random IV’s to recover the secret key with probability 50%. Note that, there is no practical
implementation of the Klein attack, but both PTW [TWP07] and VV07 [VV07] attacks,
which theoretically improve the key recovery process, need more than 25 000 packets. So,
the theoretical success probability of the Klein attack was over estimated. We implemented
this attack and we obtained the success probability of 50% with about 60 000 packets (random
IV’s).
– Physkin, Tews and Weinmann showed in [TWP07] that the secret key can be recovered with
only 40 000 packets for the same success probability (random IV’s). However, this attack
brute-forces the 106 most probable secret keys. Thus, the comparison with previous attacks
is less obvious. Moreover, there is no theoretical analysis of this attack, only practical results
are provided by the authors. We confirmed this practical result.
– Vaudenay and Vuagnoux [VV07] showed an improved attack, where the same success prob-
ability can be reached with an average of 32 700 packets with random IV’s. This attack also
tests the 106 most probable secret keys. Moreover, only practical results are provided by the
authors. We confirmed this practical result.
– According to [BT09], Beck and Tews re-implemented the [VV07] attack in 2009, obtaining
the same success probability with only 24 200 packets using Aircrack-ng in “interactive mode”.
Using this strategy, much less number of packets is required. No other previous attack used
this strategy. The 106 most probable secret keys are brute-forced. Note that we were not
able to reproduce this result. We could successfully recover the secret key with around 30 000
packets only with random IV’s and Aircrack-ng in non-interactive mode to be able to compare
it with the previous results.
We are going to construct a precise theory behind the WEP attack in the subsequent chapters.
All our analysis has been checked precisely through extensive amount of experiments. We show
that we can recover a 104-bit long WEP key using 19 800 packets in less than a minute using an
ordinary PC. With less number of packets, the attack will run for a longer period.
2.5.3 Previous Attacks on WPA
Regarding the security of WPA, in 2004, Moen, Raddum and Hole [MRH04] discovered that the
recovery of at least two RC4 packet keys in WPA leads to a full recovery of the temporal key and
the message integrity check key. When two keys are successfully recovered from the same segment
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of 216 consecutive packets, the Moen, Raddum and Hole attack can be applied. This leads to a TK
key recovery attack on WPA with average complexity of 2104 using 2 packets. Almost all known
and new key recovery attacks on WEP could have been applied to WPA if there were several
packets using the same RC4 key. Indeed, only the Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir attack [FMS01] is
filtered. However, WPA uses a different secret key for every encrypted packet.
In 2009, Tews and Beck [BT09] found a practical attack on WPA-PSK to inject data in an
encrypted channel. Note that this attack does not recover the encryption key and needs some
additional quality of services features (described by IEEE 802.11e) which are not activated by
default.
16
Chapter 2 State of the Art Attacks
Algorithm 2.2 The phase2 of the WPA key hashing function.
phase2, step1:
1: PPK[0] = TTAK[0]
2: PPK[1] = TTAK[1]
3: PPK[2] = TTAK[2]
4: PPK[3] = TTAK[3]
5: PPK[4] = TTAK[4]
6: PPK[5] = TTAK[4] + IV16
phase2, step2:
7: PPK[0] = PPK[0] + S[PPK[5] + Mk16(TK[1],TK[0])]
8: PPK[1] = PPK[1] + S[PPK[0] + Mk16(TK[3],TK[2])]
9: PPK[2] = PPK[2] + S[PPK[1] + Mk16(TK[5],TK[4])]
10: PPK[3] = PPK[3] + S[PPK[2] + Mk16(TK[7],TK[6])]
11: PPK[4] = PPK[4] + S[PPK[3] + Mk16(TK[9],TK[8])]
12: PPK[5] = PPK[5] + S[PPK[4] + Mk16(TK[11],TK[10])]
13: PPK[0] = PPK[0] + RotR1[PPK[5] + Mk16(TK[13],TK[12])]
14: PPK[1] = PPK[1] + RotR1[PPK[0] + Mk16(TK[15],TK[14])]
15: PPK[2] = PPK[2] + RotR1[PPK[1]]
16: PPK[3] = PPK[3] + RotR1[PPK[2]]
17: PPK[4] = PPK[4] + RotR1[PPK[3]]
18: PPK[5] = PPK[5] + RotR1[PPK[4]]
phase2, step3:
19: RC4KEY[0] = high8(IV16)
20: RC4KEY[1] = (high8(IV16) | 0x20) & 0x7f
21: RC4KEY[2] = low8(IV16)
22: RC4KEY[3] = low8((PPK[5]⊕ (RotR1(TK[1]‖TK[0]))))
23: for i = 0 to 5 do
24: RC4KEY[4 + (2 ∗ i)] = low8(PPK[i])
25: RC4KEY[5 + (2 ∗ i)] = high8(PPK[i])
26: end for
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Chapter3
Classification of the RC4 Biases and Some
Useful Lemmas
In this chapter, we introduce some notations and lemmas which are used later in the attacks against
WEP and WPA. Then, we categorize the useful biases against WEP and WPA into two categories:
conditional and unconditional ones. We will discuss later in Chapters 7 and 8 regarding why this
categorization is necessary.
3.1 Notations and Some Useful Lemmas
Throughout this thesis, we denote K¯[i]
def
= K[0]+ · · ·+K[i]. We let z denote the keystream derived
from K using RC4. In the applications we are concerned, the first bytes of a plaintext frame are
often known (see Figure 2.3), as well as the IV, the first 3 bytes of K. That is, we assume that the
adversary can use the keystream z and the IV in a known plaintext attack.
We let I0 be a set of integers, which represents the key byte indices which are already known.
We call an I0-clue a value clue for all K¯ bytes whose index are in I0. To begin with, we have
I0 = {0, 1, 2} and clue = IV.
Given a set of indices I0 and an index i, we assume that we have a list row
RC4
i|I0 of di|I0 vectors
(f¯j , g¯j , pj , qj), j = 1, . . . , di|I0 with functions f¯j and the corresponding predicates g¯j such that
Pr
[
K¯[i] = f¯j(z, clue)|g¯j(z, clue)
]
= pj
for some probability pj 6= 1N and
Pr [g¯j(z, clue)] = qj
where qj is called the density of the bias.
For simplicity, we assume that for some given i, z, and clue, all suggested f¯j(z, clue) for j’s such
that g¯j(z, clue) holds, are pairwise distinct. We further assume that the events K¯[i] = f¯j(z, clue)
with different i’s are independent. We will also assume that f¯j and g¯j are of the form f¯j(z, clue) =
fj(h(z, clue)) and g¯j(z, clue) = gj(h(z, clue)), where µ = h(z, clue) lies in a domain of size Nµ. In
fact, h is just a function compressing the data to the minimum necessary to compute f¯j and g¯j .
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Definition 3.1. Let A,B and C be three random variables over ZN . We say that A is biased
towards B with bias p conditioned on an event E and we represent it as A
p
=
E
B if
Pr(A−B = x|E) =

p if x = 0
1−p
N−1 otherwise
When Pr[E] = 1, it is denoted as A
p
= B.
Lemma 3.1. Let A,B and C be random variables in ZN such that
A
p1
= B B
p2
= C
then we assume that A−B and B − C are independent. We have A P= C, where
P =
1
N
+
(
N
N − 1
)(
p1 − 1
N
)(
p2 − 1
N
)
def
= p1 ⊗ p2
Proof. For x 6= 0, we have
Pr[C −A = x] =
∑
y
Pr[B −A = y] . Pr[C −B = x− y]
=
∑
y 6=0
y 6=x
Pr[B −A = y] . Pr[C −B = x− y]
+Pr[A = B] . Pr[C −B = x] + Pr[B −A = x] . Pr[B = C]
= (N − 2)
(
1− p1
N − 1
)(
1− p2
N − 1
)
+ p1
(
1− p2
N − 1
)
+ p2
(
1− p1
N − 1
)
which does not depend on x. Then,
Pr[A = C] = 1−
∑
x 6=0
Pr[C −A = x] = 1
N
+
(
N
N − 1
)(
p1 − 1
N
)(
p2 − 1
N
)
So, A
P
= C.
Corollary 3.1. Let A,B,C,D and E be random variables in ZN such that
A
p1
= B B
p2
= C C
p3
= D D
p4
= E
then we assume that A−B, B − C, C −D and D − E are independent. We have A P= E, where
P = p1 ⊗ p2 ⊗ p3 ⊗ p4 = 1
N
+
(
N
N − 1
)3
·
4∏
i=1
(
pi − 1
N
)
For p4 = 1, we obtain
P = p1 ⊗ p2 ⊗ p3 = 1
N
+
(
N
N − 1
)2
·
3∏
i=1
(
pi − 1
N
)
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Proof. The ⊗ operation is commutative and associative over [0, 1] and 1 is the neutral element.
The above statements should be trivial using these properties.
We can extend the above Corollary by adding new conditions.
Lemma 3.2. Let A,B,C,D and E be random variables in ZN and Cond and Cond
′ be two events
such that
A
p1
= B B
p2
= C C
p3
=
Cond′
S[D] D
p4
= E
We assume that A − B, B − C, C − S[D], D − E and Cond′ are independent; Furthermore, we
assume
(A = S[D] ∧ Cond)⇔ (A = S[D] ∧ Cond′) and Pr[Cond] = Pr[Cond′]
Assuming that
Pr[A = S[E]|A 6= S[D], D 6= E,Cond] = 1
N − 1
we have
Pr[A = S[E]|Cond] = p1 ⊗ p2 ⊗ p3 ⊗ p4
Proof.
Pr[A = S[D] = S[E]|Cond] = Pr[A = S[D] = S[E]|Cond′]
(
Pr[Cond′]
Pr[Cond]
)
= Pr[A = S[D], D = E|Cond′]
= Pr[A = S[D]|Cond′] . Pr[D = E]
= (p1 ⊗ p2 ⊗ p3) . p4
With the extra assumption
Pr[A = S[E]|A 6= S[D], D 6= E,Cond] = 1
N − 1
we obtain
Pr[A = S[E]|Cond] = p1 ⊗ p2 ⊗ p3 ⊗ p4
We use a critical relation between the key bytes, j and the bytes of the state, which we
summarize it as the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. To avoid the key byte dependency, the following equation can be extracted to have a
better key recovery attack.
K¯[i] = ji −
i∑
x=1
Sx−1[x]
Proof. We prove it by induction on i by using
ji = ji−1 + Si−1[i] +K[i]
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Lemma 3.4. For 0 ≤ t < i, the following five relations hold on RC4?(t) for any set (m1, . . . ,mb)
of pairwise different mj’s such that mj ≤ t or mj > i− 1.
P bA(i, t)
def
= Pr
 b∧
j=1
Si−1[mj ] = · · · = St+1[mj ] = St[mj ]
 = (N−bN )i−t−1
Si−1[mj ]
P 1A= St[mj ]
i∑
x=1
Sx−1[x]
PB(i,t)
= σi(t) with PB(i, t)
def
=
i−t−1∏
k=0
(
N − k
N
)
+
1
N
(
1−
i−t−1∏
k=0
(
N − k
N
))
P0
def
= Pr[S′i−1[i] = · · · = S′1[i] = SN−1[i] = · · · = Si[i]] =
(
N−1
N
)N−2
S′i−1[i]
P0= Si[i]
where mj’s are distinct and
σi(t) =
t∑
j=0
Sj−1[j] +
i∑
j=t+1
St[j]
Proof. Note that Si−1[mj ] = St[mj ] is equivalent to Si−1[mj ] = · · · = St+1[mj ] = St[mj ]. Further-
more, P bA(i, t) is defined as the probability that a set of bytes corresponding to a set of indexes
(m1, . . . ,mb) are not swapped from St to Si−1. Since mj ≤ t or mj > i − 1, this set of indices
will not be selected by the index i from St to Si−1. Hence, they can only be picked by the index j
which moves uniformly at random by the definition of RC4?(t). So, this is correct with probability(
N−b
N
)i−t−1
. In fact, we have
Si−1[mj ]
P 1A= St[mj ]
That is because
Pr
x 6=y
[Si−1[mj ] = y|St[mj ] = x] = 1
N − 1
Since we know up to state St, we have to approximate
∑i
x=1 Sx−1[x] with the state bytes in St.
The first term in PB(i, t) is the probability that Sx−1[x] can be approximated as St[x] for x > t+1.
The second term is the probability that at least one of these approximations is wrong, but at the
end the result holds with uniform probability. We can also assume that
Pr
y 6=σi(t)
[
i∑
x=1
Sx−1[x] = y
]
=
1
N − 1
P0 is the probability that the index i is not swapped from Si to S
′
i−1. This probability depends
only on the values of j and j′, which change uniformly at random in RC4?(t). There are N − 2
state updates in the way, so the overall probability is
(
N−1
N
)N−2
. We also have
Pr
x 6=y
[S′i−1[i] = y|Si[i] = x] =
1
N − 1
This leads to S′i−1[i]
P0= Si[i].
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3.2 Classification of the Biases
In this section, we classify the biases on RC4. We only report those which are exploitable against
WEP and WPA. All such biases would be elaborated in the next chapter and their success proba-
bility would be extracted in our model. The list of biases includes the improved version of the Klein
attack in [VV07], the improved version of the Maitra-Paul attack in [MP08] and two other attacks
in [SVV10]. Furthermore, it includes an improved version of 19 biases by Korek [Kor04b, Kor04a]
and SVV 10, the improved bias of Sepehrdad, Vaudenay and Vuagnoux in [SVV10]. All the prob-
abilities are new.
We finally classify the biases (those exploitable against WEP and WPA) into two categories:
conditional and unconditional ones. We use these notions specifically in the WPA attack section
later. Although all the biases are conditional, we put the SVV 10 and the Korek biases in the
conditional category and the Klein Improved, Maitra-Paul, SVV 008 and SVV 009 biases in the
unconditional category. This is because the conditions of the unconditional biases hold with a high
probability. This is not the case for conditional biases.
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Chapter4
The Biases in the KSA and the PRGA of RC4
In this chapter, we are going to recall the state of the art correlations in RC4, exploitable against
WEP and WPA. We explore three strategies: biases in the KSA, biases in the PRGA and the black
box analysis. Then, we propose an exhaustive strategy to go empirically through all the linear
correlations in the PRGA of RC4 and find the significant ones. Later, some of those correlations
were proved in [SGMPS11a]. Exhausting over all such correlations are very expensive. Hence, to
drop the complexity, we will introduce a technique based on Fourier transform analysis. Often,
biases we derive using this strategy are not exploitable against WEP and WPA, but they are all
valid for RC4 and might be used later by the motivated researchers to launch some other attacks
against RC4.
4.1 Known Correlations in the KSA of RC4
4.1.1 Roos Correlation
In September 1995, Andrew Roos [Roo95] introduced a strong bias between the output bytes of
the KSA and the bytes of the key. This bias exists up to the 48-th byte. After this byte, the
probabilities are extremely close to the uniform distribution. He computed this bias empirically,
but then this correlation was proved in [PM07]. More precisely,
Lemma 4.1 (The Roos Lemma). The most likely value for SN−1[i] at the end of the KSA is
SN−1[i]
PRoos(i)
= K¯[i] +
i(i+ 1)
2
where
PRoos(i) = PB(i,−1)
(
N − i
N
)(
N − 1
N
)N−1
+
1
N
(
1− PB(i,−1)
(
N − i
N
)(
N − 1
N
)N−1)
Proof. We already know from Lemma 3.4 that
K¯[i]
PB(i,−1)
= ji − σi(−1)
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We can also compute
Pr[SN−1[i] = S−1[ji] = ji] =
(
N − i
N
)(
N − 1
N
)N−1
By the above two relations, we have
Pr
[
SN−1[i] = K¯[i] +
i(i+1)
2
]
= PB(i,−1)
(
N−i
N
) (
N−1
N
)N−1
+ 1N
(
1− PB(i,−1)
(
N−i
N
) (
N−1
N
)N−1)
4.1.2 Mantin Correlation in the Output Bytes of the KSA
In his master thesis, Itsik Mantin [Man01] proved that by picking a random key, the output bytes
of the KSA are not uniformly distributed. However, in the literature of the analysis of RC4 and
specifically the PRGA algorithm, it is often assumed that the output of the KSA is a random
permutation chosen from the set of all permutations over {0, . . . , N −1} due to the very small bias
of the output of the KSA.
Lemma 4.2 (Corollary 6.3.1 in [Man01]). At the end of the KSA, for 0 ≤ x < N and 0 ≤ y < N ,
we have
Pr[SN−1[x] = y] =

1
N
[(
N−1
N
)y
+
(
1− (N−1N )y) (N−1N )N−x−1] if y ≤ x
1
N
[(
N−1
N
)N−x−1
+
(
N−1
N
)y]
if y > x
4.2 Known Correlations in the PRGA of RC4
4.2.1 Jenkins Correlation (The Glimpse Property)
In 1996, Robert Jenkins described two biased correlations experimentally found on the PRGA of
RC4 on his website [Jen96]. The first correlation considers the case where S′i[i] +S
′
i[j
′
i] = j
′
i. Thus,
the i-th keystream byte is given by
zi = S
′
i[S
′
i[i] + S
′
i[j
′
i]] = S
′
i[j
′
i] = j
′
i − S′i[i]
which holds with probability 2/N instead of 1/N with i = 1, 2, . . .. The second correlation appears
when S′i[i] + S
′
i[j
′
i] = i. In this case, the i-th byte of the keystream is given by
zi = S
′
i[S
′
i[i] + S
′
i[j
′
i]] = S
′
i[i] = i− S′i[j′i]
which holds with probability 2/N . More precisely,
Theorem 4.1 (Jenkins correlation [Jen96], Sec. 2.3 in [Man01]). Assume that the initial permuta-
tion S′0 = SN−1 is randomly chosen from the set of all the possible permutations over {0, . . . , N−1}.
Then,
Pr[S′i[j
′
i] = i− zi] ≈ 2N Pr[S′i[i] = j′i − zi] ≈ 2N
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Proof.
Pr[S′i[j
′
i] = i− zi] = Pr[S′i[j′i] = i− zi|S′i[i] + S′i[j′i] = i] . Pr[S′i[i] + S′i[j′i] = i]
+Pr[S′i[j
′
i] = i− zi|S′i[i] + S′i[j′i] 6= i] . Pr[S′i[i] + S′i[j′i] 6= i]
= 1N +
1
N
(
1− 1N
) ≈ 2N
By symmetry, the other equation can be proved similarly.
We use this bias later to derive the Klein correlation in order to mount a key recovery attack
on RC4. Mantin generalized the Glimpse property in [Man01], where different relations between
i and zi hint on the corresponding relations between S
′
i[i] and S
′
i[j
′
i]. It is given as the following
theorem:
Theorem 4.2 (Sec. 7 of [Man01]). Let f : ZN → ZN and let hf (x) def= f(x) + x and hf is
one-to-one from ZN to ZN . Then, for every i ∈ ZN , we have
Pr[S′i[j
′
i] = f(S
′
i[i])|hf (Z(S′i, i, j′i)) = i] ≈
2
N
where Z(S′i, i, j
′
i) = S
′
i[S
′
i[i] + S
′
i[j
′
i]].
The original glimpse is a special case with f(x)
def
= i− zi and hf (z) = i.
Later, this theorem was extended in [Man05a] and Mantin discussed the availability of the
glimpse property in many other output selection functions. He proposed a conjecture to generalize
the Jenkins correlation and claimed that the glimpse property exists for almost any output selection
function of depth two.
Conjecture 4.1 (The Generalized Glimpse Conjecture). Let f, g : ZN → ZN be invertible func-
tions and denote their inverse functions by F and G respectively. Let h : ZN × ZN → ZN be a
2-parameter function that is invertible in each of its parameters and let H1 and H2 be the inverse
functions of h, where ∀X,Y ∈ ZN , we have
H1(X,h(X,Y ))) = Y H2(h(X,Y ), Y ) = X
Let Z(S′i, i, j
′
i)
def
= f(S[h(S[g(i)], S[j])]) be an output selection function of an RC4-like keystream
generator. then, we have
Pr[S′i[j
′
i]] = H1(F (Z(S
′
i, i, j
′
i)), g(i))] ≈
2
N
For the intuition behind this conjecture, refer to [Man05a].
4.2.2 Mantin and Shamir Correlation
In 2001, Mantin and Shamir [MS01] discovered a huge bias for the second keystream word z2 of
RC4. Currently, this bias is the largest bias existing in keystreams of RC4. They constructed a
strong distinguisher for RC4, which requires only N output words. Using this bias, the second
byte of the plaintext can be recovered if RC4 is used in a broadcast encryption scheme. In such
schemes, their attack was extended in [SPSG11] to recover bytes 3 to 255 of the plaintext using
N3 ciphertexts by providing a bias for zr towards zero when 2 < r < 256.
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Lemma 4.3 (Theorem 1 in [MS01]). Assume that the initial permutation S′0 = SN−1 is randomly
chosen from the set of all the possible permutations over {0, . . . , N − 1}. Then, the probability that
the second output word of RC4 is 0 is approximately 2/N . In fact, we have z2
2
N= 0.
Proof. First, we show that if SN−1[2] = 0 and SN−1[1] 6= 2, we obtain z2 = 0. Assume that
S′0[1] = α and S′0[α] = β, then i = 1 and j′1 = S′0[1] = α, then we swap S′0[1] and S′0[α]. In the next
iteration, i = 2 and j′2 = α+S′1[2] = α, that is because we assumed SN−1[1] 6= 2 and SN−1[2] = 0,
so S′1[2] = 0, then we swap S′1[2] and S′1[α] and z2 is computed as z2 = S′2[S′2[2]+S′2[α]] = S′2[α] = 0.
Finally,
Pr[z2 = 0] = Pr[z2 = 0|S′0[2] = 0, S′0[1] 6= 2] . Pr[S′0[2] = 0, S′0[1] 6= 2]
+ Pr[z2 = 0|S′0[2] 6= 0 ∨ S′0[1] = 2] . Pr[S′0[2] 6= 0 ∨ S′0[1] = 2]
=
1
N
(
N − 1
N
)
+
1
N
[(
N − 1
N
)
+
1
N
− 1
N
(
N − 1
N
)]
=
1
N
(
N − 1
N
)(
2− 1
N
)
+
1
N2
≈ 2
N
If x 6= 0, we also have
Pr[z2 = x] =
1− Pr[z2 = 0]
N − 1 =
N − 2
N(N − 1)
4.2.3 Paul, Rathi and Maitra Correlation
In 2008, Paul, Rathi and Maitra [PRM08] described a biased correlation on the index of first
keystream byte of RC4. Using this correlation, they found a bias between the three first words
of the secret key and the first keystream word z1 of RC4. We recall the first Lemma here and
describe the second one in Section 4.3.
Lemma 4.4. Assume that the initial state S′0 is chosen uniformly at random from the set of all
possible permutations of the set {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. Then the probability distribution of the output
index S′1[1] + S′1[S′0[1]] = S
′−1
1 [z1] that selects the first byte of the keystream output is given by
Pr
(
S′1[1] + S
′
1[j
′
1] = x
)
=

1
N for odd x
1
N − 2N(N−1) for even x 6= 2
2
N − 1N(N−1) for even x = 2
4.2.4 Mironov Correlation
In 2002, Ilya Mironov [Mir02] observed a “sine-curve-like” probability distribution of the first
keystream byte of RC4. This strange probability distribution was proved recently in [SGMPS11b].
Accordingly, they also proved that the first keystream byte of RC4 is negatively biases towards
zero. We only recall the negative bias of z1 towards zero here. The full distribution function of z1
is given in [SGMPS11b]. The sinusoidal curve from [SGMPS11b] is depicted in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: probability distribution of z1 (both in theory and practice)
Lemma 4.5. Assume that the initial permutation SN−1 of the PRGA of RC4 is randomly chosen
from the set of all permutations of {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. Then the probability that the first output byte
of RC4 keystream z1 is 0 is approximately 1/N − 1/N2.
Mironov [Mir02] also proposed to discard the first 512 keystream bytes of RC4 to avoid the
initial weaknesses in the keystream. Indeed, none of the key recovery attacks on RC4 is applicable
if 512 bytes of the keystream are discarded.
4.3 Binding the State of the Art KSA and PRGA Weaknesses
None of the weaknesses in the KSA and the PRGA can be exploited for RC4 if they can not be
bound together. This means that the attacker should find a way to relate the biases existing for
the KSA and the PRGA of RC4. One of the first of such efforts was done by Andreas Klein, who
merged the weaknesses of the KSA and Jenkins bias for the PRGA. In this section, we are going
to describe how this binding was performed. We later describe more new bindings in Chapters 5
and 6 which did not exist in the literature before. In the same chapter, we show that the Klein
bias and many more biases can still be improved by recovering the sum of the key bytes instead
of the key bytes individually.
4.3.1 Klein Correlation
In 2006, Andreas Klein demonstrated a binding between the KSA weaknesses and Jenkins corre-
lation (see Theorem 4.1) in the PRGA. From Lemma 3.4 and the step 6 of the KSA, we derive
1. S′i[j
′
i]
PJ= i− zi (Lemma 4.1)
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2. S′i[j
′
i] = S
′
i−1[i]
3. S′i−1[i]
P0= Si[i] (Lemma 3.4)
4. Si[i] = Si−1[ji]
5. ji = Si−1[i] + ji−1 +K[i]
By merging all the above relations and using Lemma 3.1, we obtain
K[i]
PK(i)
= S−1i−1[i− zi]− Si−1[i]− ji−1
where
PK(i) = PJP0 +
1
N − 1(1− PJ)(1− P0) = PJ ⊗ P0
The attacker recursively recovers ji’s and K¯[i]’s. If any K¯[i] is recovered incorrectly, all the
key bytes after will be recovered incorrectly as well.
4.3.2 Paul, Rathi and Maitra Correlation
In 2008, Paul, Rathi and Maitra [PRM08] derived a correlation between the first three bytes of
the key and the first keystream byte of RC4 when N = 256 and ` = 16. This correlation was
derived by merging the Roos correlation and Lemma 4.4 (see [PRM08] for proof). We will use this
correlation later in Sec. 6.2.7.
Lemma 4.6. For any arbitrary secret key, the correlation between the key bytes and the first byte
of the keystream output is given by
Pr[z1 = K¯[2] + 3] = ξ =
1
N
[(
N − 1
N
)N (
1− 1
N
+
1
N2
)
+
1
N2
+ 1
]
This bias can not be extended to other bytes of the key as it depends on the index of the first
keystream word.
4.4 Exhausting over All Linear Correlations in the PRGA
In general, the methods used to find correlations in RC4 are either opportunistic or not given.
Papers tend to describe the characteristics of the biases without revealing the techniques used to
discover them. We propose to describe some simple but efficient techniques to highlight weaknesses
in the PRGA through exhaustive search on a subset of elements.
We define a set of linear equations which contains all the known biased correlations of the
PRGA described in the previous section.
Our objective is to highlight linear correlations between the internal values of a round of
the PRGA and the keystream word generated by this round; that is, the subset of elements
{i, j′i, S′i[i], S′i[j′i], zi}. The correlations previously discovered by Jenkins, Mantin and Shamir and
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Paul, Rathi and Maitra must be rediscovered with this method. Surprisingly, some new biases are
found as well. Later in the attack on WEP or WPA, we do not use any of these biases, as we could
not merge them with the KSA weaknesses.
We define the linear equations as
a0 · i+ a1 · j′i + a2 · S′i[i] + a3 · S′i[j′i] + a4 · zi = b (4.1)
where the ai’s are elements of Z/256Z and b is a fixed value in Z/256Z. This defines 2
48 linear
equations.
To reduce this number, we decompose these equations into 256 subgroups. Each of them
corresponds to a specific round (i.e., i is fixed). Thus, both a0 · i and b can be merged into one
value and Eq. (4.1) becomes
c0 · j′i + c1 · S′i[i] + c2 · S′i[j′i] + c3 · zi = C (4.2)
where C = (b − a0 · i) and ci’s are elements of Z/256Z. Since the number of linear equations is
still too large, we limit the coefficients set of the ci’s to {−1, 0, 1}. Indeed, this set is enough to
include all the previously known biased correlation in the PRGA. We obtain 256 graphs of 81 linear
equations.
We compute the 256 first rounds of the PRGA with 109 randomly chosen RC4 secret keys of 16
bytes and we verify all the linear equations described by Eq. (4.2). For every equation, a counter
is incremented when it holds.
Below, we give the biased correlations found for the 256 first keystream bytes (from z1 to z256)
generated by the PRGA. Every coefficient ci has been replaced by the corresponding element to
provide an easier reading of the table (i.e., j′i must be read as c0, S
′
i[i] as c1, etc). Correlations with
zi (i.e., c3 6= 0) are called New XXX and biases without zi (i.e., c3 = 0) are named New noz XXX.
In Figure 4.2, we confirm the presence of known biases such as the Jenkins correlations. More
interestingly, new biases in the PRGA appear. Some of them have a probability of success which
depends on the value of i.
Some rounds of the PRGA provide additional biased correlations. In Figure 4.3, we give extra
biases which appear in round 1. Figure 4.4 depicts the additional correlations in the second round
of the PRGA. Finally, Figure 4.5 describes further biased correlations in rounds 0 mod 16 of the
PRGA. In Chapter 5, we bind New 008 and New 009 biases with the KSA weaknesses.
The probability of the biased correlations New 001 and New 002 depends on the round of the
PRGA and the value C. In Figure 4.6, we show the success probability of New 001 according to C
and the rounds 1, 16, 32, 64, 128, 192 and 256 of the PRGA. Similarly, we compute the evolution
of the success probability of the biased correlations New 002 in Figure 4.7.
4.4.1 Spectral Approach to Derive New Biases
The brute force approach of the previous section is too expensive. If we do not restrict the coeffi-
cients to be in the set {−1, 0, 1}, it is infeasible to find the best biases using the exhaustive search
approach. In the following, we propose a technique to find all such correlations in a reasonable
amount of time using the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) algorithm. First, we define the Fourier
Transform of a function. Unless otherwise mentioned, G represents the group Zp.
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j′i S
′
i[i] S
′
i[j
′
i] zi C Prob
(i = 3)
Remark
1 -1 0 -1 0 2/N Jenkins
0 0 1 1 i 2/N Jenkins
0 1 1 -1 0 1.9/N New 000
0 1 1 -1 1 0.89/N New 001
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 1 1 -1 255 1.25/N New 001
0 1 1 1 0 0.95/N New 002
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 1 1 1 255 0.95/N New 002
1 1 0 0 0 0.95/N New noz 000
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
1 1 0 0 255 0.95/N New noz 000
1 1 -1 0 i 2/N New noz 001
1 -1 1 0 i 2/N New noz 002
1 -1 0 0 1 0.9/N New noz 003
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
1 -1 0 0 255 1.25/N New noz 003
1 -1 0 0 0 1.9/N New noz 004
0 0 1 0 i+ 1 1.36/N New noz 005
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 1 0 255 0.9/N New noz 005
0 0 1 0 i 2.34/N New noz 006
Figure 4.2: The correlations experimentally observed for rounds 1, 2, 3, . . . , 256 of the PRGA. Note
that probability of the biases New 000, New noz 005 and New noz 006 decreases according to
i. The probabilities given in this table correspond to round 3 (i.e., i = 3). New noz 004 and
New noz 006 are not biased when i = 1.
Definition 4.1. Let p be an integer and θ = e
2ipi
p . The Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) of a
function f over Gs is defined as
fˆ(c) =
∑
x∈Gs
f(x)θ−c • x
where • is the dot product.
We compute the Fourier Transform of the type f of the distribution that some state bytes of
RC4 are following. Deploying this method over Zs256, we can derive some good linear relations. We
call a linear relation good if the probability of Eq. (4.1) occurring is much higher than expected
( 1N ). We use the 4-tuple defined above as an example. In fact, we can use exactly the same
method to derive the biases for the linear relations in Sec. 4.5.2 between the secret key and the
keystream. To deal with this problem, we assume G = Z256 and we fix i. Then, we query RC4
for N vectors Vt ∈ (j′i, S′i[i], S′i[j′i], zi)t ∈ G4 corresponding to N distinct keys, where 1 ≤ t ≤ N .
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j′1 S′1[1] S′1[j′1] z1 C Prob Remark
0 1 0 -1 0 0.95/N New 003
0 1 1 0 2 1.95/N Paul, Rathi, Maitra
1 1 0 0 2 1.94/N New noz 014
Figure 4.3: Additional biased correlations experimentally observed using Eq. (4.2) in the first
round of the PRGA (i.e., i = 1).
j′2 S′2[2] S′2[j′2] z2 C Prob Remark
0 0 0 1 0 2/N Mantin and Shamir
1 -1 1 -1 0 2/N New 004
1 1 0 -1 even 1.0183/N New 005
1 1 0 -1 odd 1.0316/N New 006
1 0 1 0 6 2.37/N New noz 007
1 0 -1 0 255 0.75/N New noz 008
1 -1 1 0 0 2/N New noz 009
0 -1 1 0 0 0.95/N New noz 010
Figure 4.4: Additional biased correlations experimentally observed using Eq. (4.2) in the second
round of the PRGA (i = 2). Note that the probability of successes of correlations New 005 and
New 006 decrease according to the value C.
Finally, we define a function f as follows:
f(x) = counter(x) =
1
N
N∑
t=1
1Vt=x
where x ∈ G4 and 1Vt=x is a random variable which is 1 if Vt = x and it is zero otherwise. In
fact, f is the type of the distribution the 4-tuples are following. We query RC4 and compute the
the numerical values of the f function and store it in a table. Deploying the Discrete Fourier
Transform (DFT) on f , we have
fˆ(c) =
∑
x
θ−c • xf(x) =
∑
C
∑
(x : c • x=C)
θ−Cf(x) =
∑
C
θ−C · Pr[c • V = C] (4.3)
for a random vector V, where • is the dot product. Then, we follow this approach: we compute
|fˆ(c)|2 for c’s such that this norm is high. Filtering those c’s yields “good” c’s. More clearly, we
construct the table |fˆ(c)|2 of all linear masks and filter out c’s that lead to small value for |fˆ(c)|2.
We end up with some almost-good c’s. Then, we can exhaustively search in the list of almost-good
c’s left and find the good ones.
The above technique works because in the last sum in Eq. (4.3) we are working in a complex
circle. Assuming that the probability of Eq. (4.2) for all incorrect c’s to be uniform and to be
high for the the correct c, all the complex vectors in the circle would cancel out each other except
the one that corresponds to the correct c. Therefore, using this method one can find a list of
almost-good c’s. Then, one would run an exhaustive search over C and check all almost-good c’s.
We only keep those that yield a probability much higher than 1N for Eq. (4.2).
This method is much faster than exhaustive search. Since we currently do not know how to
merge biases of the PRGA when S′i[i] is involved, we only consider the linear relation between the
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j′i S
′
i[i] S
′
i[j
′
i] zi C Prob Remark
0 0 0 1 -i 1.0411/N New 007
0 0 1 -1 i 1.0500/N New 008
0 0 1 1 -i 1.0338/N New 009
0 1 1 0 -i 1.1107/N New noz 011
0 1 0 0 -i 1.1276/N New noz 012
0 1 -1 0 -i 1.1067/N New noz 013
Figure 4.5: Additional biased correlations experimentally observed using Eq. (4.2) in rounds 0 mod
16 of the PRGA. Note that the probability of success of these correlations decreases according to
the value i and become barely exploitable when i > 48. Probabilities given in this table come from
the round 16.
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Figure 4.6: The probability of success of the biased correlation New 001, according the value C
for some rounds of the PRGA.
elements of the vector (j′i, S
′
i[j
′
i], zi) instead of (j
′
i, S
′
i[i], S
′
i[j
′
i], zi). This yields us all biases quite fast.
This method can be easily generalized to the case when S′i[i] is also involved and it is dramatically
faster than exhaustive search.
It would be clearer if we explain how we compute the fast Fourier Transform. we need to compute
fˆ(c1, c2, c3) =
∑
x1,x2,x3
θ−(c1x1+c2x2+c3x3)f(x1, x2, x3)
This can be computed deploying 3 update stages:
f1(c1, x2, x3) =
∑
x1
θ−c1x1f(x1, x2, x3)
⇓
f2(c1, c2, x3) =
∑
x2
θ−c2x2f1(c1, x2, x3)
⇓
fˆ(c1, c2, c3) =
∑
x3
θ−c3x3f2(c1, c2, x3)
We first compute f1 table using f and store it. Then using f1, we compute f2. Finally, using
f2 we compute fˆ . Hence, the complexity of this method for the triplet case is 3 · 232, while for
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Figure 4.7: Probability of success of biased correlation New 002, according the value C for some
rounds of the PRGA.
the exhaustive search the complexity reaches to 247 if N = 107, which is a reasonable number
of samples we found out experimentally. We end up with all the biases for the triplet over Z3256.
Using this method, we found some new biases. We only list those which are significant and not
artifact of known biases, those which can be bound with the biases of the KSA and can be exploited
against WEP and WPA. They are listed in Figure 4.8. We do not list those biases which involve
K[0], K[1] and K[2], since they are already known in both WEP and WPA protocols. Interested
readers can derive them all using this method. The complexity of the above method using the
4-tuple (j′i, S
′
i[i], S
′
i[j
′
i], zi) is 2
42 compared to 255 of exhaustive search. Using this technique, we
can recover all biases in Z4256 as well in a reasonable amount time.
After investigation, it seems that all the listed biases in Figure 4.8 are artifact of a new conditional
bias which is
Pr[S′16[j
′
16] = 0|z16 = −16] = Pdb = 0.038488
So far, we have no explanation about this new bias. We later modify this bias slightly and
derive a new bias which we bind with the KSA weaknesses. An effort was done in [SGMPS11a]
to prove similar biases, but the proof of this bias is still an open problem. In [SGMPS11a], the
authors claimed that the number 16 in this bias is coming from the fact that we often set ` = 16.
They found a few more biases which depend on the size of the key. Finally, they launched a key
length discovery attack on RC4 using those biases.
4.5 RC4 as a Black Box
The secret key words and the keystream words may be correlated if the weaknesses in the KSA
and the PRGA can be bound. However, from an attacker’s point of view, there is no reason to
determine weaknesses in the KSA or the PRGA. Her objective is to find correlations between the
known values and the secret key words. Moreover, the biased correlations previously found concern
only elements inside a round of the PRGA. Correlations between elements from different rounds
can not be highlighted.
In this section, we present another way to attack RC4. We consider RC4 as a black box. The
objective is to discover linear correlations between the input (the secret key words) and the output
(the keystream words), since we consider known keystream attacks. First, we study known RC4
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j′16 S′16[16] S′16[j′16] z16 C Probability Remark
0 0 1 1 240 1.04/N New 010
0 0 1 50 224 1.04/N New 011
0 0 1 68 192 1.05/N New 012
0 0 1 98 224 1.04/N New 013
0 0 1 148 192 1.05/N New 014
0 0 1 162 224 1.05/N New 015
0 0 1 186 96 1.03/N New 016
0 0 1 187 80 1.04/N New 017
0 0 1 251 80 1.04/N New 018
0 0 2 19 208 1.04/N New 019
0 0 2 127 16 1.04/N New 020
0 0 2 147 208 1.04/N New 021
0 0 2 255 16 1.04/N New 022
0 0 4 59 80 1.04/N New 023
0 0 4 123 80 1.04/N New 024
0 0 8 19 208 1.04/N New 025
0 0 8 55 144 1.03/N New 026
0 0 8 81 240 1.03/N New 027
0 0 8 215 144 1.03/N New 028
0 0 8 241 48 1.03/N New 029
0 0 8 243 208 1.04/N New 030
0 0 32 39 144 1.04/N New 031
0 0 32 191 16 1.04/N New 032
Figure 4.8: correlations in the PRGA derived using the DFT algorithm.
correlations between the keystream words and the secret key words. Then, we propose a method
to highlight new biases. Finally, we list the new discovered biases in RC4.
4.5.1 Maitra and Paul Correlation
In 2008, Maitra and Paul [MP08] discovered a new bias in RC4 which involves the state bytes and
the keystream bytes from different rounds (see [MP08] for the proof).
zi+1
PMaitra(i)
=
i(i+ 1)
2
+ K¯[i]
where
PMaitra(i) =

(
N−1
N
)2 (N−2
N
)N−1 · γ1 + 1N if i = 0(
N−1
N
) (
N−i−1
N
) [(
N−i
N
) (
N−1
N
) i(i+1)
2
+i+1
+ 1N
]
· if 1 < i < N
(
N−2
N
)N−i−1 (N−3
N
)i−1 · γi+1 + 1N
and
γi+1 =
1
N
(
N − 1
N
)N−i−2
+
1
N
(
N − 1
N
)
− 1
N
(
N − 1
N
)N−i−1
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Their bias does not hold for i = 1. This was experimentally observed by Maitra and Paul, but
they did not provide any theoretical justification of it. We show in Sec. 5.1.3 why this is the case.
This bias has not been found with our previous technique, since these elements are not in the
same round of the PRGA. However, with the black box technique, we are able to rediscover this
bias and new ones.
We improve this bias in Chapter 5 by introducing new conditions to gain a better success
probability together with extending it for the case when the values of the state bytes for some
rounds of the KSA are known.
4.5.2 Discovering New Linear Correlations in RC4
We define a linear equation containing the input and output elements.
a0 ·K[0] + . . .+ a`−1 ·K[`− 1] + a` · z1 + . . .+ aN+`−1 · zN = b (4.4)
This kind of exhaustive search is identical to those presented in Sec. 4.4. First, we consider
the subset of all ai’s defined by A = {−1, 0, 1} and b ∈ Z/NZ. The number of equations is
N · 3`+N = 2439.11 for N = 256 and ` = 16, which is obviously too large for an exhaustive search.
Based on the fact that SN−1[i] depends only on K[0], . . . ,K[i−2],K[i−1] with a non negligible
probability (Roos correlation), we can reduce the size of the equation by considering only the first
` keystream words. Hence, Eq. (4.4) becomes
a0 ·K[0] + . . .+ a`−1 ·K[`− 1] + a` · z1 + . . .+ a2`−1 · z` = b
Thus, we obtain a number of equations equals to N · 32` = 258.7 which is still too large for
an exhaustive search. Thus, we reduced the secret keys length to ` = 5 bytes to obtain 223.8496
equations. We speculate that the correlations found with a RC4 key length of 5 bytes can be
generalized to RC4 with a secret key of 16 bytes. Then, the supposed biased correlation are tested
experimentally. After a few computation, we remarked that the constant value represented by
b can be reduced to the subset generated by i · (i + 1)/2 with i = 0, 1, 2 . . . , 22, since only the
Roos correlation seems to be exploited in the KSA. Thus, the number of equations decreases to
23 · 310 = 220.373. Figure 4.9 gives the correlations found in RC4 with a secret key of 5 bytes which
were experimentally confirmed on RC4 with a key length of 16 bytes.
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Equation Probability Remarks
z1 +K[0] +K[1] = 0 1.35779/N Klein
z1 −K[0] = 0 1.11784/N Maitra and Paul
z2 = 0 2.01825/N Mantin and Shamir
z2 +K[0] +K[1] +K[2] = −1 1.36095/N Klein
z1 −K[0]−K[1] = 1 1.04237/N New bb 000
z1 −K[0] +K[1] = −1 1.04969/N New bb 001
z3 +K[0] +K[1] +K[2] +K[3] = −3 1.35362/N Klein
z3 −K[0] +K[3] = −3 1.04620/N New bb 002
z1 −K[0]−K[1]−K[2] = 3 1.33474/N Paul, Rathi and Maitra
z2 −K[0]−K[1]−K[2] = 3 0.64300/N New bb 003
z3 −K[0]−K[1]−K[2] = 3 1.13555/N Maitra and Paul
z2 +K[1] +K[2] = −3 1.36897/N New bb 004
z2 −K[1]−K[2] = 3 1.36733/N New bb 005
z1 −K[2] = 3 1.14193/N New bb 006
z1 +K[0] +K[1]−K[2] = 3 1.14116/N New bb 007
z4 −K[0] +K[4] = 4 1.04463/N New bb 008
z4 +K[0] +K[1] +K[2] +K[3] +K[4] = −6 1.35275/N Klein
z4 −K[0]−K[1]−K[2]−K[3] = 10 1.11432/N Maitra and Paul
Figure 4.9: The biased correlations experimentally observed with the black box technique with
` = 5 in Eq. (4.5.2). Note that these biases are exploitable in RC4 with a secret key of 16 bytes as
well.
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Unconditional Correlations in RC4,
Exploitable against WEP and WPA
In this chapter, we are going to elaborate the unconditional biases in RC4. We only explain those
which are exploitable against the WEP and the WPA protocols.
5.1 The Klein-Improved Attack
Andreas Klein combined the Jenkins correlation for the PRGA and weaknesses of the KSA and
derived a correlation between the key bits and the keystream. This bias was further improved
in [VV07] by recovering K¯[i]’s instead of K[i] to reduce the secret key bytes dependency. We use
the theorem by Jenkins (see Theorem 4.1) and explain how it can be merged with the weaknesses
of the KSA (see Algorithm 5.1). In fact, the attacker checks the conditions. If they all hold, she
votes for K¯[i] using the key recovery relation.
Algorithm 5.1 The Klein-Improved Attack
Success Probability: PKI
Assumptions: (see Figure 5.1)
1: St[ji] = · · · = Si−1[ji] = Si[i] = S′i−1[i] = S′i[j′i] = i− zi
Conditions: (i− zi) 6∈ {St[t+ 1], . . . , St[i− 1]} (Cond)
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = S−1t [i− zi]− σi(t)
Exploiting the Jenkins correlation and the relations in the KSA and the PRGA, we obtain
1. S′i[j
′
i]
PJ= i− zi (Lemma 4.1)
2. S′i[j
′
i] = S
′
i−1[i]
3. S′i−1[i]
P0= Si[i] (Lemma 3.4)
4. Si[i] = Si−1[ji]
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Figure 5.1: The RC4 state update in the Klein-Improved attack
5. Si−1[ji]
P 1A=
Cond′
St[ji] (where Cond
′ is the event that ji ≤ t or ji > i− 1.)
6. ji = K¯[i] +
i∑
x=1
Sx−1[x] (Lemma 3.3)
7.
i∑
x=1
Sx−1[x]
PB= σi (Lemma 3.4)
We make the same heuristic assumptions of independence as in Lemma 3.2, then using this Lemma
and Lemma 3.4, we derive
PKI(i, t) = PJ ⊗ P0 ⊗ P 1A(i, t)⊗ PB(i, t)
conditioned to Cond. Hence, the key recovery relation becomes
K¯[i]
PKI=
Cond
S−1t [i− zi]− σi(t)
5.1.1 SVV 008 Attack
The probability of this bias is smaller than the one used in the Klein-Improved attack and concerns
only rounds i mod 16 = 0 of the PRGA. This bias turned out to be non-exploitable against WEP,
since its probability is so low due to the fact that we only know up to state S2. On the other hand,
if up to state Si−1 is known, the bias is quite effective to recover K¯[i].
Similar to the Klein-Improved attack (see Algorithm 5.2), we obtain
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Algorithm 5.2 The SVV 008 Attack
Success Probability: P8I
Assumptions: (see Figure 5.2)
1: St[ji] = · · · = Si−1[ji] = Si[i] = S′i−1[i] = S′i[j′i] = i+ zi
Conditions: (i+ zi) 6∈ {St[t+ 1], . . . , St[i− 1]} and i = 16i′ (Cond)
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = S−1t [i+ zi]− σi(t)
1. S′i[j
′
i]
P8= i+ zi (Figure 5 in [SVV10])
2. S′i[j
′
i] = S
′
i−1[i]
3. S′i−1[i]
P0= Si[i] (Lemma 3.4)
4. Si[i] = Si−1[ji]
5. St[ji]
P 1A=
Cond′
Si−1[ji] (where Cond′ is the event that ji ≤ t or ji > i− 1)
6. ji = K¯[i] +
i∑
x=1
Sx−1[x] (Lemma 3.3)
7.
i∑
x=1
Sx−1[x]
PB= σi (Lemma 3.4)
where P8 =
1.05
N as in [SVV10]. Hence, the key recovery relation becomes
K¯[i]
P8I=
Cond′
S−1t [i+ zi]− σi(t)
Using Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.4, its probability of success is P8I(i, t), defined by
P8I(i, t) = P8 ⊗ P0 ⊗ P 1A(i, t)⊗ PB(i, t)
for any (i+ zi) 6∈ {St[t+ 1], . . . , St[i− 1]}, i = 0 mod 16.
5.1.2 The SVV 009 Attack
This bias is similar to the previous one and concerns only rounds i mod 16 = 0.
Algorithm 5.3 The SVV 009 Attack
Success Probability: P9I
Assumptions: (see Figure 5.3)
1: St[ji] = · · · = Si−1[ji] = Si[i] = S′i−1[i] = S′i[j′i] = −i− zi
Conditions: (−i− zi) /∈ {St[t+ 1], . . . , St[i− 1]} and i = 16i′ (Cond)
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = S−1t [−i− zi]− σi(t)
Using the same reasoning as SVV 008, this bias is not exploitable against WEP. On the other
hand, if Si−1 is known, the bias is quite effective (see Algorithm 5.3).
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Figure 5.2: The RC4 state update in the SVV 008 attack
1. S′i[j
′
i]
P9= −i− zi (Figure 5 in [SVV10])
2. S′i[j
′
i] = S
′
i−1[i]
3. S′i−1[i]
P0= Si[i] (Lemma 3.4)
4. Si[i] = Si−1[ji]
5. St[ji]
P 1A=
Cond′
Si−1[ji] (where Cond′ is the event that ji ≤ t or ji > i− 1.)
6. ji = K¯[i] +
i∑
x=1
Sx−1[x] (Lemma 3.3)
7.
i∑
x=1
Sx−1[x]
PB= σi (Lemma 3.4)
where P9 =
1.0338
N as in [SVV10]. Hence, the key recovery relation becomes
K¯[i]
P9I=
Cond
S−1t [−i− zi]− σi(t)
Using Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.4, its probability of success is P9I(i, t), defined by
P9I(i, t) = P9 ⊗ P0 ⊗ P 1A(i, t)⊗ PB(i, t)
for any (−i− zi) /∈ {St[t+ 1], . . . , St[i− 1]} and i = 0 mod 16.
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Figure 5.3: The RC4 state update in the SVV 009 attack
5.1.3 The Maitra-Paul-Improved Attack
Maitra and Paul illustrated in [MP08] that the Pr[zi+1 = ji] is not uniformly distributed. We
can use this bias to perform a key recovery attack on RC4 using Lemma 3.3. There was initially
no condition on this bias, except that it does not hold for i = 1. Maitra and Paul observed this
abnormality for i = 1 experimentally. We introduce some extra conditions which improve the
success probability of this attack. In the following, we specify the assumptions on this attack and
extract its probability of success and prove that the bias does not hold for i = 1. Their bias is
directly exploitable for t = 2. We generalize it to any t. We do not use this bias for the WEP or the
WPA attack, since it does not provide anything significantly more than what the Klein-Improved
and the Korek attacks offer.
Algorithm 5.4 The Maitra-Paul-Improved Attack
Success Probability: PMPI
Assumptions: (see Figure 5.4)
1: (∃m > i | jm = i)
2: ji = S−1[ji] = · · · = Si−1[ji] = Si[i] = · · · = Sm−1[i] = Sm[m] = · · · = S′i+1[m]
3: m = S−1[m] = · · · = Sm−1[m] = Sm[i] = · · · = S′i−1[i] = S′i[j′i] = S′i+1[i+ 1]
4: S′i[i+ 1] = S
′
i+1[j
′
i+1] = 0
4: Conditions: i 6= 1, zi+1 ≥ i and (∀0 ≤ i′ ≤ t : ji′ 6= zi+1)
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = zi+1 − σi
Later, for the attack to work, an m should exist such that jm = i. Due to the assumptions, we
also assume S−1[m] and S−1[ji] are maintained until Si−1. Hence, we compute
Pr[S−1[ji] = · · · = Si−1[ji], S−1[m] = · · · = Si−1[m]] = P 2A(i, 0)
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Furthermore, ji ≥ i and m ≥ i, otherwise they would both be swapped in the i-th initial KSA
state updates. Right now, we fix m and then we sum over it. Thus, we compute
Pr[ji ≥ i] =
(
N−i
N
)
and Pr[jm = i] =
(
1
N
)
At the i-th stage of the KSA update, Si−1[ji] is moved to Si[i]. Due to the assumptions, Si−1[m]
is maintained. So, we obtain Si[m] = m. This holds with probability
Pr[Si−1[m] = Si[m]] = P 1A(i+ 1, i− 1)
At the next stage, due to the assumptions, Si[i] and Si[m] are maintained until Sm−1, so at
Sm−1 we have Sm−1[m] = m and Sm−1[i] = ji. Thus, we compute
Pr[Si[i] = · · · = Sm−1[i], Si[m] = · · · = Sm−1[m]] = P 2A(m, i)
Since jm = i, at the next update, we gain Sm[m] = ji and Sm[i] = m. Due to the assumptions,
these two bytes are maintained until S′i−1. So, we compute
Pr[Sm[i] = · · · = S′i−1[i], Sm[m] = · · · = S′i−1[m]] = P 2A(N + i− 1,m)
At the i-th step of the PRGA update, S′i−1[i] is moved to S
′
i[j
′
i] and due to the assumptions, we
assume the value of S′i−1[m] is maintained. At this stage, we have S
′
i[m] = ji and S
′
i[j
′
i] = m. We
also have S′i[i+ 1] = 0, due to the assumptions. Thus, we compute
Pr[S′i−1[m] = S
′
i[m]] = PA(N + i,N + i− 2) and Pr[S′i[i+ 1] = 0] =
(
1
N
)
Finally, at the (i + 1)-th PRGA update, S′i[i + 1] is moved to S
′
i+1[j
′
i] and S
′
i[j
′
i] is moved to
S′i+1[i + 1]. Due to the assumptions, the value of S
′
i[m] is maintained until S
′
i+1. Ultimately, we
compute
Pr[S′i[m] = S
′
i+1[m]] = P
1
A(N + i+ 1, N + i− 1)
We also know that
1. zi+1 = S
′
i+1[S
′
i[i+ 1] + S
′
i[j
′
i+1]]
2. j′i+1 = j
′
i + S
′
i[i+ 1] = j
′
i
3. S′i[j
′
i+1] = S
′
i[j
′
i] = S
′
i−1[i] = Sm[i] = Sm[jm] = Sm−1[m] = m
Hence,
zi+1 = S
′
i+1[m] = Sm[m] = Sm−1[jm] = Sm−1[i] = Si[i] = Si−1[ji] = ji
So overall, using Lemma 3.1 and Corollary 3.1, we obtain
PMPI(i, t) = Pr[K¯[i] = zi+1 − σi] = PB ⊗ PD = PD(i)PB(i, t) + 1
N − 1 (1− PD(i)) (1− PB(i, t))
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Table 5.1: The unconditional biases for RC4, exploitable against WEP and WPA
row reference f¯ g¯ p
i Klein− Improved S−1t [−zi + i]− σi (i− zi) 6∈ {St[t+ 1], . . . , St[i− 1]} PKI(i, t)
i 6= 1 MP− Improved zi+1 − σi i 6= 1, zi+1 ≥ i, (∀0 ≤ i′ ≤ t : j′i 6= zi+1) PMPI(i, t)
i = 16i′ SVV 008 zi + i− σi (i+ zi) 6∈ {St[t+ 1], . . . , St[i− 1]} P8I(i, t)
i = 16i′ SVV 009 −zi − i− σi (−i− zi) /∈ {St[t+ 1], . . . , St[i− 1]} P9I(i, t)
where
PD(i) = Pr[zi+1 = ji] =
N−1∑
m=i+1
(
1
N
)2(N − i
N
)
. P 2A(i, 0) . P
1
A(i+ 1, i− 1) . P 2A(m, i) .
P 2A(N + i− 1,m) . P 1A(N + i,N + i− 2) . P 1A(N + i+ 1, N + i− 1)
=
(N − i− 1)(N − i)
N3
(
N − 2
N
)N−3+i(N − 1
N
)3
We added extra conditions to this attack. Clearly, Si−1[ji] = ji implies that ji ≥ i and ∀i′ <
i : j′i 6= ji. So, we can have a better probability with conditions zi+1 ≥ i and ∀i′ ≤ t : ji′ 6= zi+1.
This bias does not hold when i = 1. This is because, at the first iteration of the PRGA, we
have i = 1 and j′1 = SN−1[1] = m. Then, we swap SN−1[1] and SN−1[m]. Thus, we have S′1[1] = ji
and S′1[m] = m. At the next iteration, i = 2 and j′2 = m+S′1[2] = m, so we swap S′1[2] and S′1[m].
Finally, z2 is computed as z2 = S
′
2[S
′
2[2] + S
′
2[m]] = S
′
2[m] = 0. As a result, z2 6= ji. The value
S[m] should be maintained during all steps of the KSA and the PRGA, while if i = 1, it would be
swapped at the first stage.
5.2 Computation of the Biases
To summarize, all the biases in this chapter together with their corresponding probabilities are
listed below and in Table 5.1.
PKI(i, t) = PJ ⊗ P0 ⊗ P 1A(i, t)⊗ PB(i, t)
PMPI(i, t) = PD(i)⊗ PB(i, t)
P8I(i, t) = P8 ⊗ P0 ⊗ P 1A(i, t)⊗ PB(i, t)
P9I(i, t) = P9 ⊗ P0 ⊗ P 1A(i, t)⊗ PB(i, t)
where PJ =
2
N , P0 =
(
N−1
N
)N−2
, P8 =
1.05
N and P9 =
1.0338
N .
P bA(i, t) =
(
N−b
N
)i−t−1
PB(i, t) =
∏i−t−1
k=0
(
N−k
N
)
+ 1N
(
1−∏i−t−1k=0 (N−kN ))
PD(i) =
(N−i−1)(N−i)
N3
(
N−2
N
)N−3+i (N−1
N
)3
These formulas are new. The biases were originally provided with probabilities for t = −1.
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Figure 5.4: The RC4 state update in the Maitra-Paul-Improved attack
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Chapter6
Conditional Correlations, Exploitable against
WEP and WPA
In this chapter, we are going to elaborate the conditional biases in RC4. We only explain those
which are exploitable against WEP and WPA protocols.
6.1 The Sepehrdad-Vaudenay-Vuagnoux Bias
We showed in Chapter 4 that Pr[S′16[j′16] = 0|z16 = −16] is not uniformly distributed and it
holds with probability Pdb = 0.038488. This bias was further analyzed but was not proved
in [SGMPS11a]. Moreover, it was deployed to perform a key length discovery attack on RC4.
Algorithm 6.1 The Sepehrdad-Vaudenay-Vuagnoux Attack
Success Probability: PSVV10(t)
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.1)
1: St[j16] = · · · = S15[j16] = S16[16] = 0
2: i = 16
Conditions: S−1t [0] < t+ 1 or S
−1
t [0] > 15, z16 = −16
Key recovery relation: K¯[16] = (S−1t [0]− σ16)
Using the SVV 10 bias, the overall probability of the correlation between the keystream bytes
and the key bytes is not easily computable. Therefore, we refined this bias and derived a new one
Pr[S16[16] = 0|z16 = −16] = Pdb2 = 0.03689. Next, merging this bias with the weaknesses of the
KSA, we obtain
0
Pdb2=
Cond
S16[16] = S15[j16]
P 1A(16,t)= St[j16] and j16
PB= K¯[16] + σ16
where j16 /∈ {t + 1, . . . , 15}, due to Lemma 3.2. We should set S−1t [0] < t + 1 or S−1t [0] > 15 to
make sure that the index of zero is not trivially picked in the next iterations (see Algorithm 6.1).
Using Lemma 3.2, we obtain
K¯[16]
PSVV10(t)
= S−1t [0]− σ16
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Figure 6.1: The RC4 state update in the SVV 10 attack
which holds with overall probability of
PSVV10(t) = Pdb2 ⊗ P 1A(16, t)⊗ PB(16, t)
6.2 The Korek Attacks
6.2.1 Introduction
In 2004, a hacker nicknamed Korek found 20 key recovery attacks on RC4 similar to the FMS
attack [FMS01]. Korek classified them into three categories. The first class of attacks uses only
z1 and the state of the array Si−1 (i.e., K[0],K[1] . . . ,K[i − 1]) of the KSA to recover the secret
key K[i]. The second class of attacks uses the second byte of the keystream z2. Ultimately, the
last one highlights the improbable secret key bytes. They are called negative attacks or impossible
attacks. We only mention 19 of such correlations, as the conditions of the attack A u5 4 are rarely
held in practice except for i = 6 and t = 2. Even for this case, its success probability is very close
to the uniform distribution.
The Korek biases were used a few times in the literature for cryptanalysis of WEP [VV07,
TWP07, BT09, DO11]. The only effort to analyze such biases were done in [Cha06, Vua10], but
the success probability of such attacks were not computed precisely and the attack scenarios were
not elaborated clearly. In this chapter, we are going to explain the theory behind all such biases
and we will prove each of such correlations individually. During this process, we discovered that
a few conditions set by Korek initially are not precise either, so we refined all those conditions to
provide a higher success probability.
It will be discussed in the following chapters that the Korek biases are extremely important in
cryptanalysis of WEP. We also demonstrate that this is not the case for WPA.
As all such biases are conditional, we introduce the conditions in which the attack holds.
Then, we mention the assumptions we make and compute the probability that the assumptions
hold. Finally, the key recovery relation is derived and the overall success probability of the attack
is computed.
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6.2.2 The A u15 Attack
This attack is the best Korek attack with the highest success probability. First, we introduce
the conditions for this attack to succeed, the assumptions we make and the equation for the key
recovery.
Algorithm 6.2 The A u15 attack
Success Probability: P 1fixed−j
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.2)
1: St[i] = · · · = Si−1[i]
2: Si[2] = · · · = SN−1[2] = S′1[2] = 0
3: ji = 2
Conditions: St[i] = 0 and z2 = 0
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = 2− σi
We classify the conditions as
C1 : St[i] = 0 and C2 : z2 = 0
We also classify the assumptions and the events and the key recovery bias as
S1 : St[i] = · · · = Si−1[i]
S2 : Si[2] = · · · = SN−1[2] = S′1[2]
S3 : K¯[i] = ji − σi
E1 : ji = 2
B : K¯[i] = 2− σi
Then, we compute the theoretical success probability of the attack. The goal is to estimate
the probability Pr[B|C1,C2]. So, we compute
Pr[B|C1,C2] = Pr[E1S3|C] + Pr[B¬S3|C]
= Pr[E1|S3C] . Pr[S3|C] + Pr[B|¬S3C] . (1− Pr[S3|C])
Now,
Pr[B|¬S3C] = Pr[B¬E1|¬S3C]
≈ Pr[B¬E1|C]
= Pr[B|¬E1C] . Pr[¬E1|C]
≈ 1N−1 (1− Pr[E1|C])
Overall,
Pr[B|C1,C2] ≈ Pr[E1|C] . Pr[S3|C] +
(
1−Pr[E1|C]
N−1
)
. (1− Pr[S3|C])
= Pr(E1|C) .
(
NPr[S3|C]−1
N−1
)
+
(
1−Pr[S3|C]
N−1
)
We then approximate Pr[S3|C] ≈ PB(i, t) and we also have
Pr[E1|C] = Pr(C1|E1C2)
(
Pr(E1|C2)
Pr(C1|C2)
)
≈ Pr(C1|E1C2)
= Pr(C1S1S2|E1C2) + Pr(C1¬(S1S2)|E1C2)
≈ Pr(C1S1S2|E1C2) + 1N (1− Pr(S1S2|E1C2))
≈ Pr(C1S1S2|E1C2) + 1N
(
1− P 1A(i, t) .
(
N−1
N
)N−i)
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Pr[C1S1S2|E1C2] =
(
Pr[C1S1S2E1|C2]
Pr[E1|C2]
)
= Pr[C2|C1S1S2E1] .
(
Pr[C1S1S2E1]
Pr[C2] . Pr[E1|C2]
)
Deploying Lemma 4.3, we obtain
Pr[C1S1S2|E1C2] = 1
2
P 1A(i, t)
(
N − 1
N
)N−i
Therefore, overall we have
Pr[B|C1C2] =
(
NPB(i, t)− 1
N − 1
)
.
[
1
2
P 1A(i, t)
(
N − 1
N
)N−i
+
1
N
(
1− P 1A(i, t)
(
N − 1
N
)N−i)]
+
(
1− PB(i, t)
N − 1
)
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Figure 6.2: The RC4 state update in the A u15 attack.
6.2.3 The A s5 1 Attack
This attack in the generalization of the FMS attack. The conditions for this attack to succeed, the
assumptions we make and the equation for the key recovery attack are represented in Algorithm 6.3.
The attack works as follows: Assume St[1] = α, St[α] = β and also assume α + β = i by the
conditions. Then, assume these two values are maintained at the same position up to the state
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Algorithm 6.3 The A s5 1 attack
Success Probability: Kor32
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.3)
1: St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1] = Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1] = α
2: St[α] = · · · = Si−1[α] = Si[α] = · · · = SN−1[α] = β
3: St[ji] = · · · = Si−1[ji] = Si[i] = · · · = SN−1[i]
Conditions: St[1] < t+1, St[1]+St[St[1]] = i, z1 6= {St[1], St[St[1]]}, (S−1t [z1] < t+1 or S−1t [z1] >
i− 1)
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = S−1t [z1]− σi
Si−1 and then up to the state SN−1. Another assumption we make is that Si[i] is maintained up
to the state SN−1. At the first iteration of the PRGA, i = 1 and j′1 = SN−1[1] = α. Then, a swap
is made between SN−1[1] and SN−1[α]. Finally, we have z1 = S′1[S′1[1] + S′1[α]] = S′1[α + β] =
S′1[i] = Si[i] = Si−1[ji] = St[ji]. Hence, we obtain z1 = St[ji] and so ji = S
−1
t [z1]. As we also
have K¯[i] = ji − σi(t), we conclude from the previous equation that K¯[i] = S−1t [z1]− σi. The last
condition on z1 in the list of conditions are for filtering out some incorrect events leading to the
same results. This makes the success probability and the key recovery more precise. The condition
{St[1], S−1t [z1]} < t+ 1 is to make {α, ji} < t+ 1, therefore it is not trivially swapped during the
KSA iterations. We also should make sure that z1 6= {α, β}, so we end up with 3 elements in the
state that have not moved. Thus, we need the condition z1 6= {St[1], St[St[1]]}.
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Figure 6.3: The RC4 state update in the A s5 1 attack.
6.2.4 The A s13 Attack
The conditions for this attack to succeed, the assumptions we make and the equation for the key
recovery attack are represented in Algorithm 6.4.
In this attack, a nice event happens in the PRGA which automatically makes S′1[1] = 0. Assume
that SN−1[i] = γ, then we explain that γ = 0. At the first step of the PRGA, i = 1 and j′1 =
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Algorithm 6.4 The A s13 attack
Success Probability: Kor21
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.4)
1: St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1] = Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1] = i
2: St[ji] = · · · = Si−1[ji] = Si[i] = · · · = SN−1[i] = 0
Conditions: St[1] = i, (S
−1
t [0] < t+ 1 or S
−1
t [0] > i− 1) and z1 = i
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = S−1t [z1]− σi
SN−1[1] = i, so we swap SN−1[1] and SN−1[i]. To compute z1, we have z1 = S′1[S′1[1] + S′1[i]] =
S′1[γ + i] = i, since from the conditions we have z1 = i. This makes us conclude that γ = 0. We
already know from the relations in the KSA that Si−1[ji] = Si[i] and we assume that Si−1[ji] = St[ji]
and also Si−1[ji] = 0. Thus, St[ji] = 0. Then, we obtain ji = S−1t [0]. Using the similar formulas
as the previous attacks, we get K¯[i] = S−1t [0]− σi.
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Figure 6.4: The RC4 state update in the A s13 attack.
6.2.5 The A u13 1 Attack
The conditions for this attack to succeed, the assumptions we make and the equation for the key
recovery attack are represented in Algorithm 6.5.
Algorithm 6.5 The A u13 1 attack
Success Probability: Kor21
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.5)
1: St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1] = Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1] = i
2: St[ji] = · · · = Si−1[ji] = Si[i] = · · · = SN−1[i] = 1− i
Conditions: St[1] = i, (S
−1
t [1− i] < t+ 1 or S−1t [1− i] > i− 1) and z1 = 1− i
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = S−1t [z1]− σi
At the first step of the PRGA, i = 1 and j′1 = SN−1[1] = i, so we swap SN−1[1] and SN−1[i]. To
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compute z1, we have z1 = S
′
1[S
′
1[1] + S
′
1[i]] = S
′
1[1] = 1− i. We already know from the relations in
the KSA that Si−1[ji] = Si[i] and we assume that Si−1[ji] = St[ji] and also Si−1[ji] = 1− i. Thus,
St[ji] = 1− i. Then, we obtain ji = S−1t [1− i]. Using the similar formulas as the previous attacks,
we get K¯[i] = S−1t [z1]− σi.
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Figure 6.5: The RC4 state update in the A u13 1 attack.
6.2.6 The A u5 1 Attack
The conditions for this attack to succeed, the assumptions we make and the equation for the key
recovery attack are represented in Algorithm 6.6.
Algorithm 6.6 The A u5 1 attack
Success Probability: Kor32
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.6)
1: St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1] = Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1] = i
2: assuming S−1t [z1] = α, we should have St[α] = · · · = Si−1[α] = Si[α] = · · · = SN−1[α] = z1.
3: St[ji] = · · · = Si−1[ji] = Si[i] = · · · = SN−1[i] = S−1t [z1]− i
Conditions: St[1] = i, S
−1
t [z1] < t + 1, S
−1
t [S
−1
t [z1] − i] 6= 1, (S−1t [S−1t [z1] − i] < t +
1 or S−1t [S
−1
t [z1]− i] > i− 1), z1 6= {i, 1− i, S−1t [z1]− i} and S−1t [z1] 6= 2i
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = S−1t [S
−1
t [z1]− i]− σi
At the first stage of the PRGA, we have i = 1 and j′1 = SN−1[1] = i. So we swap SN−1[1] and
SN−1[i]. We know that Si[i] = Si−1[ji] = S−1t [z1] − i and also ji = S−1t [S−1t [z1] − i]. The output
z1 would be z1 = S
′
1[S
′
1[1] + S
′
1[i]] = S
′
1[S
−1
t [z1] − i + i] = S′1[S−11 [z1]] = z1. Therefore, we have
K¯[i] = S−1t [S
−1
t [z1]− i]− σi. The condition z1 6= {i, 1− i} is to filter out the attacks A u13 1 and
A s13. S−1t [z1] < t+ 1, because otherwise z1 would be swapped in the next iterations of the KSA.
If S−1t [S
−1
t [z1]− i] = 1, then ji = 1 and so a swap will be made between Si−1[1] and Si−1[i], in the
i-th step of the KSA.
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Figure 6.6: The RC4 state update in the A u5 1 attack.
6.2.7 The A u5 2 Attack
The conditions for this attack to succeed, the assumptions we make and the equation for the key
recovery attack are represented in Algorithm 6.7.
Algorithm 6.7 The A u5 2 attack
Success Probability: P 2fixed−j
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.7)
1: St[i] = · · · = Si−1[i] = Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1] = 1
2: St[2] = · · · = SN−1[2] = z1
3: ji = 1
Conditions: St[i] = 1 and z1 = St[2]
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = 1− σi
This is one of the attacks in which we assume ji = 1. Lets check how the PRGA works. Initially,
i = 1 and j′1 = SN−1[1] = 1. In the swap step, no swap is made, since we have to swap SN−1[1]
and SN−1[1]. Hence, z1 = S′1[S′1[1] + S′1[1]] = S′1[2] = St[2]. So, the key recovery formula becomes
K¯[i] = 1− σi.
We classify the conditions as
C1 : St[i] = 1 and C2 : z1 = St[2]
We also classify the assumptions and the events and the key recovery bias as
S1 : St[i] = · · · = Si−1[i]
S2 : Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1]
S3 : St[2] = · · · = SN−1[2]
S4 : K¯[i] = ji − σi
E1 : ji = 1
B : K¯[i] = 1− σi
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Next, we compute the theoretical success probability of the attack. The goal is to estimate
Pr[B|C1,C2]. Deploying a similar approach to the one of the attack A u15, we end up with
Pr[B|C1,C2] = Pr(E1|C) .
(
NPB(i, t)− 1
N − 1
)
+
(
1− PB(i, t)
N − 1
)
where
Pr[E1|C] ≈ Pr(C1S1S2S3|E1C2) + 1
N
(
1− P 2A(i, t) .
(
N − 2
N
)N−i−1)
Pr[C1S1S2S3|E1C2] =
(
Pr[C1S1S2S3E1|C2]
Pr[E1|C2]
)
= Pr[C2|C1S1S2S3E1] .
(
Pr[C1S1S2S3E1]
Pr[C2] . Pr[E1|C2]
)
As Pr[C2] is not uniformly distributed, we use Lemma 4.6 to compute its value. Then, we
approximate Pr[C2] ≈
(
N−1
N
)t−2
. Pr[z1 = K¯[2] + 3]. Deploying Lemma 4.6, we obtain
Pr[C1S1S2S3|E1C2] =
(
N
N − 1
)t−2
.
N
ξ
(
1
N
.
1
N
(
N − 2
N
)N−1−i
. P 2A(i, t)
)
=
1
Nξ
P 2A(i, t)
(
N
N − 1
)t−2(N − 2
N
)N−1−i
Therefore, overall we have
Pr[B|C1C2] = 1
N
(
NPB(i, t)− 1
N − 1
)
.
[
1
ξ
P 2A(i, t)
(
N
N − 1
)t−2(N − 2
N
)N−1−i
+
(
1− P 2A(i, t)
(
N − 2
N
)N−i−1)]
+
(
1− PB(i, t)
N − 1
)
6.2.8 The A u13 2 Attack
This attack is very similar to the previous attack. The conditions for this attack to succeed, the
assumptions we make and the equation for the key recovery attack are represented in Algorithm 6.8.
Algorithm 6.8 The A u13 2 attack
Success Probability: P 3fixed−j
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.8)
0: St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1] = Si[i] = · · · = SN−1[i] = 0
0: St[i] = · · · = Si−1[i] = Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1] = i
Conditions: St[i] = i, St[1] = 0 and z1 = i
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = 1− σi
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Figure 6.7: The RC4 state update in the A u5 2 attack.
Again, we assume ji = 1. In the KSA, we know that Si−1[1] = 0 and Si−1[i] = i. At the
i-th stage, due to the swap, we have Si[1] = i and Si[i] = 0. We assume these two values are
maintained until the end of the KSA. In the PRGA, initially i = 1 and j′1 = SN−1[1] = i. So,
we swap SN−1[1] and SN−1[i]. Then, z1 = S′1[S′1[1] + S′1[i]] = i. Hence, the key recovery formula
would be K¯[i] = 1− σi.
We classify the conditions as
C1 : St[i] = i and C2 : St[1] = 0 and C3 : z1 = i
We also classify the assumptions and the events and the key recovery bias as
S1 : St[i] = · · · = Si−1[i]
S2 : Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1]
S3 : St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1]
S4 : Si[i] = · · · = SN−1[i]
S5 : K¯[i] = ji − σi
E1 : ji = 1
B : K¯[i] = 1− σi
Now, we compute the theoretical success probability of the attack. The goal is to estimate
Pr[B|C1,C2,C3]. Deploying a similar approach as the one of the attack A u15, we end up with
Pr[B|C1,C2,C3] = Pr(E1|C) .
(
NPB(i, t)− 1
N − 1
)
+
(
1− PB(i, t)
N − 1
)
where
Pr[E1|C] ≈ Pr(C1C2S1S2S3S4|E1C3) + 1
N
(
1− P 2A(i, t) .
(
N − 2
N
)N−i−1)
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Pr[C1C2S1S2S3S4|E1C3] =
(
Pr[C1C2S1S2S3S4E1|C3]
Pr[E1|C3]
)
= Pr[C3|C1C2S1S2S3S4E1] .
(
Pr[C1C2S1S2S3S4E1]
Pr[C3] . Pr[E1|C3]
)
=
(
N − 1
N
)t+1(N − 2
N
)N−1−i
. P 2A(i, t)
Pr[C3] is uniformly distributed in this case and we also have
Pr[St[i] = i] =
(
N − 1
N
)t+1
Therefore, overall we have
Pr[B|C1C2C3] =
(
NPB(i, t)− 1
N − 1
)
.
[(
N − 1
N
)t+1(N − 2
N
)N−1−i
. P 2A(i, t) +
1
N
(
1− P 2A(i, t)
(
N − 2
N
)N−i−1)]
+
(
1− PB(i, t)
N − 1
)
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Figure 6.8: The RC4 state update in the A u13 2 attack.
6.2.9 The A u13 3 Attack
This attack is going through exactly the same approach as the previous attack, but with different
values. The conditions for this attack to succeed, the assumptions we make and the equation for
the key recovery attack are represented in Algorithm 6.8.
Again, we assume ji = 1. In the KSA, we know that Si−1[1] = 1− i and Si−1[i] = i. At the i-th
stage, due to swap, we have Si[1] = i and Si[i] = 1− i. We assume these two values are maintained
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Algorithm 6.9 The A u13 3 attack
Success Probability: P 3fixed−j
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.9)
1: St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1] = Si[i] = · · · = SN−1[i] = 1− i
2: St[i] = · · · = Si−1[i] = Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1] = i
3: ji = 1
Conditions: St[i] = i, St[1] = 1− i and z1 = 1− i
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = 1− σi
until the end of the KSA. In the PRGA, i = 1 and j′1 = SN−1[1] = i. So, we swap SN−1[1] and
SN−1[i]. Then, z1 = S′1[S′1[1] + S′1[i]] = S′1[1] = 1 − i. Hence, the key recovery formula would be
K¯[i] = 1− σi.
We classify the conditions as
C1 : St[i] = i and C2 : St[1] = 1− i and C3 : z1 = 1− i
We also classify the assumptions and the events and the key recovery bias as
S1 : St[i] = · · · = Si−1[i]
S2 : Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1]
S3 : St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1]
S4 : Si[i] = · · · = SN−1[i]
S5 : K¯[i] = ji − σi
E1 : ji = 1
B : K¯[i] = 1− σi
Now, we compute the theoretical success probability of the attack. The goal is to estimate
Pr[B|C1,C2,C3]. Deploying a similar approach to the one of the attack A u15, we end up with
Pr[B|C1,C2,C3] = Pr(E1|C) .
(
NPB(i, t)− 1
N − 1
)
+
(
1− PB(i, t)
N − 1
)
where
Pr[E1|C] ≈ Pr(C1C2S1S2S3S4|E1C3) + 1
N
(
1− P 2A(i, t) .
(
N − 2
N
)N−i−1)
Pr[C1C2S1S2S3S4|E1C3] =
(
Pr[C1C2S1S2S3S4E1|C3]
Pr[E1|C3]
)
= Pr[C3|C1C2S1S2S3S4E1] .
(
Pr[C1C2S1S2S3S4E1]
Pr[C3] . Pr[E1|C3]
)
=
(
N − 1
N
)t+1(N − 2
N
)N−1−i
. P 2A(i, t)
Pr[C3] is uniformly distributed in this case and we also have
Pr[St[i] = i] =
(
N − 1
N
)t+1
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Therefore, overall we have
Pr[B|C1C2C3] =
(
NPB(i, t)− 1
N − 1
)
.
[(
N − 1
N
)t+1(N − 2
N
)N−1−i
. P 2A(i, t) +
1
N
(
1− P 2A(i, t)
(
N − 2
N
)N−i−1)]
+
(
1− PB(i, t)
N − 1
)
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Figure 6.9: The RC4 state update in the A u13 3 attack.
6.2.10 The A u5 3 Attack
This attack is the extension of A u13 2 and A u13 3 attacks. The conditions for this attack to
succeed, the assumptions we make and the equation for the key recovery attack are represented in
Algorithm 6.10.
Algorithm 6.10 The A u5 3 attack
Success Probability: P 5fixed−j
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.10)
1: St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1] = Si[i] = · · · = SN−1[i] = S−1t [z1]− i
2: St[i] = · · · = Si−1[i] = Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1] = i
3: S−1t [z1] = · · · = S−1i−1[z1] = S−1i [z1] = · · · = S−1N−1[z1]
4: ji = 1
Conditions: St[i] = i, S
−1
t [z1] 6= 1, S−1t [z1] < t+ 1 and z1 = St[St[1] + i]
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = 1− σi
Again, we assume ji = 1. In the KSA, we know that Si−1[1] = S−1t [z1] − i and Si−1[i] = i.
At the i-th stage, due to the swap we have Si[1] = i and Si[i] = S
−1
t [z1] − i. We assume these
two values and S−1t [z1] are maintained until the end of the KSA. Now in the PRGA, initially
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i = 1 and j′1 = SN−1[1] = i. So, we swap SN−1[1] and SN−1[i]. Then, z1 = S′1[S′1[1] + S′1[i]] =
S′1[S
−1
t [z1] − i + i] = z1. Hence, the key recovery formula would be K¯[i] = 1 − σi. The condition
S−1t [z1] 6= 1 is to filter the attack A u13 3.
We classify the conditions as
C1 : St[i] = i and C2 : S
−1
t [z1] 6= 1, S−1t [z1] < t+ 1 and C3 : z1 = St[St[1] + i]
We also classify the assumptions and the events and the key recovery bias as
S1 : St[i] = · · · = Si−1[i]
S2 : Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1]
S3 : St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1]
S4 : Si[i] = · · · = SN−1[i]
S5 : S
−1
t [z1] = · · · = S−1N−1[z1]
S6 : K¯[i] = ji − σi
E1 : ji = 1
B : K¯[i] = 1− σi
Now, we compute the theoretical success probability of the attack. The goal is to estimate
Pr[B|C1,C2,C3]. So, we compute
Pr[B|C1,C2,C3] = Pr[E1S6|C] + Pr[B¬S3|C]
= Pr[E1|S6C] . Pr[S6|C] + Pr[B|¬S6C] . (1− Pr[S6|C])
≈ Pr[E1|S6C] . Pr[S6|C] +
(
1−Pr[E1|S6C]
N−1
)
. (1− Pr[S6|C])
= Pr(E1|S6C) .
(
NPr[S6|C]−1
N−1
)
+
(
1−PB(i,t)
N−1
)
We then approximate Pr[S6|C] ≈ PB(i, t) and we also have
Pr[E1|S6C] ≈ Pr(E1|C)
= Pr(C1C2|E1C3)
(
Pr(E1|C3)
Pr(C1C2|C3)
)
≈ Pr(C1C2|E1C3)
= Pr(C1C2S1S2S3S4S5|E1C3) + Pr(C1C2¬(S1S2S3S4S5)|E1C3)
≈ Pr(C1C2S1S2S3S4S5|E1C3) + 1N (1− Pr(S1S2S3S4S5|E1C3))
≈ Pr(C1C2S1S2S3S4S5|E1C3) + 1N
(
1− P 1A(i, t) .
(
N−1
N
)N−i)
Pr[C1C2S1S2S3S4S5|E1C3] =
(
Pr[C1C2S1S2S3S4S5E1|C3]
Pr[E1|C3]
)
= Pr[C3|C1C2S1S2S3S4S5E1] .
(
Pr[C1C2S1S2S3S4S5E1]
Pr[C3] . Pr[E1|C3]
)
Pr[B|C1,C2,C3] = Pr(E1|S6C) .
(
NPB(i, t)− 1
N − 1
)
+
(
1− PB(i, t)
N − 1
)
where
Pr[E1|S6C] ≈ Pr(C1C2S1S2S3S4S5|E1C3) + 1
N
(
1− P 3A(i, t) .
(
N − 3
N
)N−i−1)
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Pr[C1C2S1S2S3S4S5|E1C3] =
(
Pr[C1C2S1S2S3S4S5E1|C3]
Pr[E1|C3]
)
= Pr[C3|C1C2S1S2S3S4S5E1] .
(
Pr[C1C2S1S2S3S4S5E1]
Pr[C3] . Pr[E1|C3]
)
Pr[C3] is uniformly distributed in this case and we also have
Pr[St[i] = i] =
(
N − 1
N
)t+1
Finally,
Pr[E1|C3] = Pr[C3|E1]
(
Pr[E1]
Pr[C3]
)
= Pr[C3|E1]
= Pr[C3|E1C1C2] . Pr[C1C2|E1] + Pr[C3|E1C1C2] . Pr[C1C2|E1]
= Pr[C1C2|E1] + 1
N
(1− Pr[C1C2|E1])
=
(
1− 1
N
)
Pr[C1C2|E1] + 1
N
This leads to
Pr[C1C2S1S2S3S4S5|E1C3] =
(
N−1
N
)t+1 ( t
N
) (
N−3
N
)N−1−i
P 3A(i, t)(
1− 1N
) (
N−1
N
)t+1 ( t
N
)
+ 1N
Therefore, overall we have
Pr[B|C1C2C3] =
(
NPB(i, t)− 1
N − 1
)
.
[ (
N−1
N
)t+1 ( t
N
) (
N−3
N
)N−1−i(
1− 1N
) (
N−1
N
)t+1 ( t
N
)
+ 1N
. P 3A(i, t) +
1
N
(
1− P 3A(i, t)
(
N − 3
N
)N−i−1)]
+
(
1− PB(i, t)
N − 1
)
6.2.11 The A s3 Attack
The conditions for this attack to succeed, the assumptions we make and the equation for the key
recovery attack are represented in Algorithm 6.11.
In the PRGA, at the first iteration i = 1 and j′1 = SN−1[1] = α, then we swap SN−1[1] and
SN−1[α]. Assume that S′1[2] = β. At the next stage, i = 2 and j′2 = S′1[2] +α = α+β. Then, swap
S′1[2] = β and S′1[α+ β]. By one of the conditions, we have St[2] +St[St[2] +St[1]] = i. Therefore,
we can write β + S[β + α] = i. So, S[α + β] = i − β. By the KSA, we have Si[i] = Si−1[ji] and
ji = S
−1
t [z2], so Si[i] = z2. If we look at how z2 is generated, we have z2 = S
′
2[S
′
2[i] + S
′
2[j
′
2]] =
S′2[S′2[2] +S′2[α+ β]] = S′2[i− β + β] = S′2[i] = Si[i] = z2. Using the same formulas as the previous
attacks, we get K¯[i] = S−1t [z2] − σi. The condition St[1] 6= 2 prevents the value of St[2] to be
swapped in the first iteration of the PRGA. The condition St[2] 6= 0 prevents z2 to be something
except S′2[i], otherwise z2 = i − β. The condition St[1] + St[2] < t + 1 makes its value not to be
swapped in the next iterations of the KSA. We do not want the index of z2 to be 1, 2 nor St[1]+St[2],
because then, these values would be modified. So, we need to have S−1t [z2] 6= {1, 2, St[1] + St[2]}.
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Figure 6.10: The RC4 state update in the A u5 3 attack.
Algorithm 6.11 The A s3 attack
Success Probability: Kor43
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.11)
1: St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1] = Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1]
2: St[2] = · · · = Si−1[2] = Si[2] = · · · = SN−1[2]
3: St[St[1] + St[2]] = · · · = Si−1[Si−1[1] + Si−1[2]] = Si[Si[1] + Si[2]] = · · · = SN−1[SN−1[1] +
SN−1[2]]
4: St[ji] = · · · = Si−1[ji] = Si[i] = · · · = SN−1[i] = z2
Conditions: St[1] 6= 2, St[2] 6= 0, St[2] + St[1] < t + 1, St[2] + St[St[2] + St[1]] = i, S−1t [z2] 6=
{1, 2, St[1] + St[2]}, St[1] + St[2] 6= {1, 2} and (S−1t [z2] < t+ 1 or S−1t [z2] > i− 1)
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = S−1t [z2]− σi
6.2.12 The A s5 2 Attack
The conditions for this attack to succeed, the assumptions we make and the equation for the key
recovery attack are represented in Algorithm 6.12.
Algorithm 6.12 The A s5 2 attack
Success Probability: Kor32
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.12)
1: St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1] = Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1]
2: St[2] = · · · = Si−1[2] = Si[2] = · · · = SN−1[2]
3: St[ji] = · · · = Si−1[ji] = Si[i] = · · · = SN−1[i]
Conditions: St[2] +St[1] = i, S
−1
t [St[1]−St[2]] 6= {1, 2}, (S−1t [St[1]−St[2]] < t+ 1 or S−1t [St[1]−
St[2]] > i− 1) and z2 = St[1]
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = S−1t [St[1]− St[2]]− σi
In the PRGA, at the first stage i = 1 and j′1 = SN−1[1] = α. Then, we swap SN−1[1] and SN−1[α].
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Figure 6.11: The RC4 state update in the A s3 attack.
At the next iteration, i = 2 and j′2 = S′1[2] + α = α + β = i, where β is S′1[2] and from the
conditions, we know that α + β = i. Then, a swap is made between S′1[2] and S′1[i]. Finally,
z2 = S
′
1[S
′
1[2] + S
′
1[i]]. By the key recovery formula, we assume that ji = S
−1
t [St[1]− St[2]]. Also,
we know that Si[i] = Si−1[ji] = St[1] − St[2] = α − β. Therefore, z2 = S′1[α − β + β] = S′1[α] =
α = St[1]. Hence, the key recovery formula is K¯[i] = S
−1
t [St[1] − St[2]] − σi. The condition
S−1t [St[1] − St[2]] 6= {1, 2} prevents ji to be 1 or 2, so it prevents the swap of Si−1[1] and Si−1[2]
in the i-th step of the KSA.
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Figure 6.12: The RC4 state update in the A s5 2 attack.
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6.2.13 The A s5 3 Attack
The conditions for this attack to succeed, the assumptions we make and the equation for the key
recovery attack are represented in Algorithm 6.13.
Algorithm 6.13 The A s5 3 attack
Success Probability: Kor32
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.13)
1: St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1] = Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1]
2: St[2] = · · · = Si−1[2] = Si[2] = · · · = SN−1[2]
3: St[ji] = · · · = Si−1[ji] = Si[i] = · · · = SN−1[i]
Conditions: St[2] + St[1] = i, S
−1
t [z2] 6= {1, 2}, (S−1t [2− St[2]] < t+ 1 or S−1t [2− St[2]] > i− 1)
and z2 = 2− St[2]
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = S−1t [2− St[2]]− σi
In the PRGA, at the first stage i = 1 and j′1 = SN−1[1] = α. Then, we swap SN−1[1] and
SN−1[α]. At the next iteration, i = 2 and j′2 = S′1[2] + α = α + β = i, where β is S′1[2] and from
the conditions, we know that α + β = i. Then, a swap is made between S′1[2] and S′1[i]. Finally,
z2 = S
′
1[S
′
1[2] + S
′
1[i]]. By the key recovery formula, we assume that ji = S
−1
t [2− St[2]]. Also, we
know that Si[i] = Si−1[ji] = 2− St[2] = 2− β. Therefore, z2 = S′1[2− β + β] = S′1[2] = 2− St[2].
Hence, the key recovery formula becomes K¯[i] = S−1t [2−St[2]]−σi. The condition S−1t [z2] 6= {1, 2}
prevents ji to be 1 or 2, so it prevents the swap of Si−1[1] and Si−1[2] in the i-th step of the KSA.
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Figure 6.13: The RC4 state update in the A s5 3 attack.
6.2.14 The A 4 s13 Attack
The conditions for this attack to succeed, the assumptions we make and the equation for the key
recovery attack are represented in Algorithm 6.14.
This attack only works when i = 4. We also assume that j4 = S
−1
t [0]. This assumption sets zero
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Algorithm 6.14 The A 4 s13 attack
Success Probability: P 4fixed−j
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.14)
1: St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1] = Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1]
2: St[ji] = · · · = Si−1[ji] = Si[i] = · · · = SN−1[i]
3: j4 = S
−1
t [0]
4: i = 4
Conditions: St[1] = 2, St[4] 6= 0, (S−1t [0] < t+ 1 or S−1t [0] > i− 1) and z2 = 0
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = S−1t [0]− σ4
into S4[4]. In the PRGA, at the first iteration i = 1 and j
′
1 = SN−1[1] = 2. Then, we swap
SN−1[1] and SN−1[2]. At the next iteration, i = 2 and j′2 = S′1[2] + 2 = 4. Then, we swap S′1[2]
and S′1[4]. Finally, z2 = S′2[S′2[2] + S′2[4]] = S′2[2] = 0. Hence, the formula for the key recovery
becomes S−1t [0] − σ4. We set the condition St[4] 6= 0 to differentiate this attack from the A u15
attack.
We classify the conditions as
C1 : St[1] = 2 and C2 : St[4] 6= 0
C3 : (S
−1
t [0] < t+ 1 or S
−1
t [0] > i− 1) and C4 : z2 = 0
We also classify the assumptions, the events and the key recovery bias as
S1 : St[j4] = · · · = S3[j4]
S2 : S4[4] = · · · = SN−1[4]
S3 : St[1] = · · · = SN−1[1]
S4 : K¯[i] = ji − σi
E1 : ji = S
−1
t [0]
B : K¯[i] = S−1t [0]− σi
We compute the theoretical success probability of the attack. The goal is to estimate the
probability Pr[B|C1,C2,C3,C4]. Deploying a similar approach to the one of the attack A u15, we
end up with
Pr[B|C1C2C3C4] = Pr(E1|C) .
(
NPB(i, t)− 1
N − 1
)
+
(
1− PB(i, t)
N − 1
)
where
Pr[E1|C] ≈ Pr(C1C2C3S1S2S3|E1C4) + 1
N
(
1− P 2A(i, t) .
(
N − 2
N
)N−i−1)
Pr[C1C2C3S1S2S3|E1C4] =
(
Pr[C1C2C3S1S2S3E1|C4]
Pr[E1|C4]
)
= Pr[C4|C1C2C3S1S2S3E1] .
(
Pr[C1C2C3S1S2S3E1]
Pr[C4] . Pr[E1|C4]
)
=
1
2
(
N − 1
N
)t+1(N − 2
N
)N−1−i
. P 2A(i, t)
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We know from Lemma 4.3 that Pr[C4] =
2
N and we also have
Pr[St[i] = i] =
(
N − 1
N
)t+1
Therefore, overall we have
Pr[B|C1C2C3] =
(
NPB(i, t)− 1
N − 1
)
.
[
1
2
(
N − 1
N
)t+1(N − 2
N
)N−1−i
. P 2A(i, t) +
1
N
(
1− P 2A(i, t)
(
N − 2
N
)N−i−1)]
+
(
1− PB(i, t)
N − 1
)
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Figure 6.14: The RC4 state update in the A 4 s13 attack.
6.2.15 The A 4 u5 1 Attack
The conditions for this attack to succeed, the assumptions we make and the equation for the key
recovery attack are represented in Algorithm 6.15.
This attack only works when i = 4. We also know that ji = S
−1
t [N − 2]. So, Si[i] = Si−1[ji] =
N − 2. In the PRGA, at the first iteration i = 1 and j′1 = SN−1[1] = 2. Then, we swap SN−1[1]
and SN−1[2]. At the next iteration, i = 2 and j′2 = S′1[2] + 2 = 4. Then, we swap S′1[2] and S′1[4].
Finally, z2 = S
′
2[S
′
2[2] + S
′
2[4]] = S
′
2[N − 2 + 2] = S′2[0]. Hence, the formula for the key recovery
becomes S−1t [N −2]−σ4. We set the condition z2 6= 0 to differentiate this attack from the A 4 s13
attack.
6.2.16 The A 4 u5 2 Attack
The conditions for this attack to succeed, the assumptions we make and the equation for the key
recovery attack are represented in Algorithm 6.16.
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Algorithm 6.15 The A 4 u5 1 attack
Success Probability: Kor32
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.15)
1: St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1] = Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1] = 2
2: St[0] = · · · = Si−1[0] = Si[0] = · · · = SN−1[0] = z2
3: St[ji] = · · · = Si−1[ji] = Si[i] = · · · = SN−1[i]
4: i = 4
Conditions: St[1] = 2, z2 6= 0, z2 6= N − 2, (S−1t [N − 2] < t+ 1 or S−1t [N − 2] > 3) and z2 = St[0]
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = S−1t [N − 2]− σ4
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Figure 6.15: The RC4 state update in the A 4 u5 1 attack.
Algorithm 6.16 The A 4 u5 2 attack
Success Probability: Kor32
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.16)
1: St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1] = Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1] = 2
2: St[2] = · · · = Si−1[2] = Si[2] = · · · = SN−1[2] = z2
3: St[ji] = · · · = Si−1[ji] = Si[i] = · · · = SN−1[i]
4: i = 4
Conditions: St[1] = 2, z2 6= 0, (S−1t [N − 1] < t+ 1 or S−1t [N − 1] > 3) and z2 = St[2]
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = S−1t [N − 1]− σ4
This attack only works when i = 4. We also know that ji = S
−1
t [N − 1]. So, Si[i] = Si−1[ji] =
N − 1. In the PRGA, at the first iteration i = 1 and j′1 = SN−1[1] = 2. Then, we swap SN−1[1]
and SN−1[2]. At the next iteration, i = 2 and j′2 = S′1[2] + 2 = 4. Then, we swap S′1[2] and S′1[4].
Finally, z2 = S
′
2[S
′
2[2] + S
′
2[4]] = S
′
2[N − 1 + 2] = S′2[1] = SN−1[2] = St[2]. Hence, the formula for
the key recovery becomes S−1t [N −1]−σ4 . We set the condition z2 6= 0 to differentiate this attack
from the A 4 s13 attack.
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Figure 6.16: The RC4 state update in the A 4 u5 2 attack.
6.2.17 The A neg 1 Attack
The conditions for this attack to succeed, the assumptions we make and the equation for the key
recovery attack are represented in Algorithm 6.17.
Algorithm 6.17 The A neg 1 attack
Success Probability: Pneg(i, t)
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.17)
1: St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1] = Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1] = 2
2: St[2] = · · · = Si−1[2] = Si[2] = · · · = SN−1[2] = 0
Conditions: St[2] = 0, St[1] = 2 and z1 = 2
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = (1− σi) or K¯[i] = (2− σi)
In the PRGA, at the first iteration i = 1 and j′1 = SN−1[1] = 2. Then, we swap SN−1[1] and
SN−1[2]. Finally, z1 is computed as z1 = S′1[S′1[1] + S′1[2]] = 2. This means that ji /∈ {1, 2},
otherwise it moves Si−1[1] or Si−1[2] from their positions and so z1 = 2 would not hold. Thus, we
get K¯[i] 6= 1− σi and K¯[i] 6= 2− σi.
At this stage, we compute the probability of these two negative biases. We define the following
events and conditions.
E1 : ji = 1 or ji = 2 B : K¯[i] = 1− σi or K¯[i] = 2− σi
C :

C1 : St[2] = 0
C2 : St[1] = 2
C3 : z1 = 2
S :

S1 : St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1]
S2 : Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1]
S3 : St[2] = · · · = Si−1[2]
S4 : Si[2] = · · · = SN−1[2]
S5 : K¯[i] = ji − σi
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What we need is to compute Pr[B|C]. It is computed as follows:
Pr[B|C] = Pr[E1S5|C] + Pr[B¬S5|C]
= Pr[E1|S5C]Pr[S5|C] + Pr[B¬S5|C]
= Pr[E1|S5C]Pr[S5|C] + Pr[B|¬S5C] (1− Pr[S5|C])
≈ Pr[E1|S5C]Pr[S5|C] +
(
1−Pr[E1|S5C]
N−1
)
(1− Pr[S5|C])
= Pr(E1|S5C)
(
NPr[S5|C]−1
N−1
)
+
(
1
N−1
)
(1− Pr[S5|C])
We know that Pr[S5|C] ≈ PB(i, t), so we just need to compute Pr[E1|S5C]. Our approach is as
follows:
Pr[E1|S5C] ≈ Pr[E1|C] = Pr[C3|E1C1C2] .
(
Pr[E1|C1C2]
Pr[C3|C1C2]
)
≈ 0
So, overall, we have
Pr[B|C] =
(
1− PB(i, t)
N − 1
)
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Figure 6.17: The RC4 state update in the A neg 1 attack.
6.2.18 The A neg 2 Attack
The conditions for this attack to succeed, the assumptions we make and the equation for the key
recovery attack are represented in Algorithm 6.18.
Algorithm 6.18 The A neg 2 attack
Success Probability: Pneg(i, t)
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.18)
1: St[2] = · · · = Si−1[2] = Si[2] = · · · = SN−1[2] = 0
Conditions: St[2] = 0, St[1] 6= 2 and z2 = 0
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = (2− σi)
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In the PRGA, at the first iteration i = 1 and j′1 = SN−1[1] = α. Then, we swap SN−1[1] and
SN−1[α]. In the next iteration, i = 2 and j′2 = S′1[2] + α = α. Then, we swap S′1[2] and S′1[α].
Consequently, z2 = S
′
2[S
′
2[2] + S
′
2[α]] = S
′
2[α] = 0. Similarly to the previous negative attacks, if
ji = 2, then Si−1[2] would be moved at the i-th step of the PRGA. To differentiate between this
attack and the previous one, we set St[1] 6= 2. Finally, the filtering formula for the key would be
K¯[i] = (2− σi).
We define the following events and conditions.
E1 : ji = 2 B : K¯[i] = 2− σi
C :

C1 : St[2] = 0
C2 = St[1] 6= 2
C3 : z2 = 0
S :

S1 : St[2] = · · · = Si−1[2]
S2 : Si[2] = · · · = SN−1[2]
S3 : K¯[i] = ji − σi
What we need is to compute Pr[B|C]. It is computed as follows:
Pr[B|C] ≈ Pr(E1|S3C)
(
NPr[S3|C]− 1
N − 1
)
+
(
1
N − 1
)
(1− Pr[S3|C])
We know that Pr[S3|C] ≈ PB(i, t), so we just need to compute Pr[E1|S3C]. Our approach is as
follows:
Pr[E1|S3C] ≈ Pr[E1|C] = Pr[C3|E1C1C2] .
(
Pr[E1|C1C2]
Pr[C3|C1C2]
)
≈ 0
So, overall, we have
Pr[B|C] =
(
1− PB(i, t)
N − 1
)
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Figure 6.18: The RC4 state update in the A neg 2 attack.
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Algorithm 6.19 The A neg 3 attack
Success Probability: Pneg(i, t)
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.19)
1: St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1] = Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1] = 1
2: St[2] = · · · = Si−1[2] = Si[2] = · · · = SN−1[2] = z1
Conditions: St[1] = 1 and z1 = St[2]
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = (1− σi) or K¯[i] = (2− σi)
6.2.19 The A neg 3 Attack
The conditions for this attack to succeed, the assumptions we make and the equation for the key
recovery attack are represented in Algorithm 6.19.
In the PRGA, at the first iteration i = 1 and j′1 = SN−1[1] = 1. After the swap, no element
would be modified. Consequently, z1 = S
′
1[S
′
1[1]+S
′
1[1]] = S
′
1[2]. Similarly to the previous negative
attacks, if ji = 1 or ji = 2, then Si−1[1] or Si−1[2] would be moved at the i-th step of the PRGA.
Finally, the filtering formula for the key would be K¯[i] = (1 − σi) or K¯[i] = (2 − σi) with a very
low probability.
At this stage, we compute the probability of these two negative biases. We define the following
events and conditions.
E1 : ji = 1 or ji = 2 B : K¯[i] = 1− σi or K¯[i] = 1− σi
C :
{
C1 : St[1] = 1
C2 : z1 = St[2]
S :

S1 : St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1]
S2 : Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1]
S3 : St[2] = · · · = Si−1[2]
S4 : Si[2] = · · · = SN−1[2]
S5 : K¯[i] = ji − σi
What we need is to compute Pr[B|C]. It is computed as follows:
Pr[B|C] ≈ Pr(E1|S5C)
(
NPr[S5|C]− 1
N − 1
)
+
(
1
N − 1
)
(1− Pr[S5|C])
We know that Pr[S5|C] ≈ PB(i, t), so we just need to compute Pr[E1|S5C]. Our approach is as
follows:
Pr[E1|S5C] ≈ Pr[E1|C] = Pr[C2|E1C1] .
(
Pr[E1|C1]
Pr[C2|C1]
)
≈ 0
So, overall, we have
Pr[B|C] =
(
1− PB(i, t)
N − 1
)
6.2.20 The A neg 4 Attack
The conditions for this attack to succeed, the assumptions we make and the equation for the key
recovery attack are represented in Algorithm 6.20.
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Figure 6.19: The RC4 state update in the A neg 3 attack.
Algorithm 6.20 The A neg 4 attack
Success Probability: Pneg(i, t)
Assumptions: (see Figure 6.20)
1: St[0] = · · · = Si−1[0] = Si[0] = · · · = SN−1[0] = 1
2: St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1] = Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1] = 0
Conditions: St[1] = 0, St[0] = 1 and z1 = 1
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = (−σi) or K¯[i] = (1− σi)
In the PRGA, at the first iteration i = 1 and j′1 = SN−1[1] = 0. Then, SN−1[1] and SN−1[0]
are swapped. Consequently, z1 = S
′
1[S
′
1[1] +S
′
1[0]] = 1. Similarly to the previous negative attacks,
if ji = 0 or ji = 1, then Si−1[0] or Si−1[1] would be moved at the i-th step of the PRGA. Finally,
the filtering formula for the key would be K¯[i] = (−σi) or K¯[i] = (1− σi) which occurs with a low
probability.
We compute the probability of these two negative biases. We define the following events and
conditions.
E1 : ji = 0 or ji = 1 B : K¯[i] = −σi or K¯[i] = 1− σi
C :

C1 : St[0] = 1
C2 : St[1] = 0
C3 : z1 = 1
S :

S1 : St[0] = · · · = Si−1[0]
S2 : Si[0] = · · · = SN−1[0]
S3 : St[1] = · · · = Si−1[1]
S4 : Si[1] = · · · = SN−1[1]
S5 : K¯[i] = ji − σi
What we need is to compute Pr[B|C]. It is computed as follows:
Pr[B|C] ≈ Pr(E1|S5C)
(
NPr[S5|C]− 1
N − 1
)
+
(
1
N − 1
)
(1− Pr[S5|C])
We know that Pr[S5|C] ≈ PB(i, t), so we just need to compute Pr[E1|S5C]. Our approach is as
72
Chapter 6 The Korek Attacks
follows:
Pr[E1|S3C] ≈ Pr[E1|C] = Pr[C3|E1C1C2] .
(
Pr[E1|C1C2]
Pr[C3|C1C2]
)
≈ 0
So, overall, we have
Pr[B|C] =
(
1− PB(i, t)
N − 1
)
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Figure 6.20: The RC4 state update in the A neg 4 attack.
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6.3 Computation of the Biases
The biases were computed using the following formulas:
Korbc(i, t) = R
b
c(i, t)⊗ PB(i, t)
Pneg(i, t) =
(
1−PB(i,t)
N−1
)
PSVV10(t) = Pdb2 ⊗ P 1A(16, t)⊗ PB(16, t)
P 1fixed−j =
(
NPB(i,t)−1
N−1
)
.
[
1
2P
1
A(i, t)
(
N−1
N
)N−i
+ 1N
(
1− P 1A(i, t)
(
N−1
N
)N−i)]
+
(
1−PB(i,t)
N−1
)
P 2fixed−j =
1
N
(
NPB(i,t)−1
N−1
)
.
[
1
ξP
2
A(i, t)
(
N
N−1
)t−2 (
N−2
N
)N−1−i
+
(
1− P 2A(i, t)
(
N−2
N
)N−i−1)]
+
(
1−PB(i,t)
N−1
)
P 3fixed−j =
(
NPB(i,t)−1
N−1
)
.
[(
N−1
N
)t+1 (N−2
N
)N−1−i
. P 2A(i, t) +
1
N
(
1− P 2A(i, t)
(
N−2
N
)N−i−1)]
+
(
1−PB(i,t)
N−1
)
P 4fixed−j =
(
NPB(i,t)−1
N−1
)
.
[
1
2
(
N−1
N
)t+1 (N−2
N
)N−1−i
. P 2A(i, t) +
1
N
(
1− P 2A(i, t)
(
N−2
N
)N−i−1)]
+
(
1−PB(i,t)
N−1
)
P 5fixed−j =
(
NPB(i,t)−1
N−1
)
.
[
(N−1N )
t+1
( tN )(
N−3
N )
N−1−i
(1− 1N )(N−1N )
t+1
( tN )+
1
N
. P 3A(i, t) +
1
N
(
1− P 3A(i, t)
(
N−3
N
)N−i−1)]
+
(
1−PB(i,t)
N−1
)
where Pdb2 =
9.444
N and ξ =
1
N
[(
N−1
N
)N (
1− 1N + 1N2
)
+ 1
N2
+ 1
]
.
P bA(i, t) =
(
N−b
N
)i−t−1
PB(i, t) =
∏i−t−1
k=0
(
N−k
N
)
+ 1N
(
1−∏i−t−1k=0 (N−kN ))
Rbc(i, t) = rc(i)P
b
A(i, t) +
1
N (1− rc(i)P bA(i, t))
r1(i) =
(
N−2
N
)N−i−1
r2(i) =
(
N−3
N
)N−i−1
r3(i) =
(
N−4
N
)N−i−1
These formulas are new. The biases were originally provided with probabilities for t = −1.
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Table 6.1: The Conditional Biases for RC4, exploitable against WEP and WPA
row reference f¯ g¯ p
i A u15 2− σi St[i] = 0, z2 = 0 P 1fixed−j
i A s13 S−1t [0]− σi St[1] = i, (S−1t [0] < t +
1 or S−1t [0] > i− 1), z1 = i
Kor21
i A u13 1 S−1t [z1]− σi St[1] = i, (S−1t [z1] < t +
1 or S−1t [z1] > i− 1), z1 = 1− i
Kor21
i A u13 2 1− σi St[i] = i, St[1] = 0, z1 = i P 3fixed−j
i A u13 3 1− σi St[i] = i, St[1] = 1− i, z1 = 1− i P 3fixed−j
i A s5 1 S−1t [z1]− σi St[1] < t + 1, St[1] + St[St[1]] = i,
z1 6= {St[1], St[St[1]]}, (S−1t [z1] <
t+ 1 or S−1t [z1] > i− 1)
Kor32
i A s5 2 S−1t [St[1]− St[2]]− σi St[2]+St[1] = i, S−1t [St[1]−St[2]] 6=
{1, 2}, (S−1t [St[1] − St[2]] < t +
1 or S−1t [St[1]−St[2]] > i− 1), z2 =
St[1]
Kor32
i A s5 3 S−1t [z2]− σi St[2] + St[1] = i, S−1t [z2] 6= {1, 2},
(S−1t [z2] < t+ 1 or S
−1
t [z2] > i− 1),
z2 = 2− St[2]
Kor32
i A u5 1 S−1t [S
−1
t [z1]− i]− σi St[1] = i, S−1t [z1] < t + 1,
S−1t [S
−1
t [z1]−i] 6= 1, (S−1t [S−1t [z1]−
i] < t+1 or S−1t [S
−1
t [z1]−i] > i−1),
z1 6= {i, 1−i, S−1t [z1]−i}, S−1t [z1] 6=
2i
Kor32
i A u5 2 1− σi St[i] = 1, z1 = St[2] P 2fixed−j
i A u5 3 1− σi St[i] = i, S−1t [z1] 6= 1, S−1t [z1] <
t+ 1, z1 = St[St[1] + i]
P 5fixed−j
i A s3 S−1t [z2]− σi St[1] 6= 2, St[2] 6= 0, St[2] + St[1] <
t + 1, St[2] + St[St[2] + St[1]] =
i, S−1t [z2] 6= {1, 2, St[1] + St[2]},
St[1] + St[2] 6= {1, 2}, (S−1t [z2] <
t+ 1 or S−1t [z2] > i− 1)
Kor43
4 A 4 s13 S−1t [0]− σ4 St[1] = 2, St[4] 6= 0, (S−1t [0] < t +
1 or S−1t [0] > i− 1), z2 = 0
P 4fixed−j
4 A 4 u5 1 S−1t [N − 2]− σ4 St[1] = 2, z2 6= 0, z2 = St[0],
z2 6= N − 2, (S−1t [N − 2] < t +
1 or S−1t [N − 2] > 3)
Kor32
4 A 4 u5 2 S−1t [N − 1]− σ4 St[1] = 2, z2 6= 0, (S−1t [N − 1] <
t+ 1 or S−1t [N − 1] > 3), z2 = St[2]
Kor32
i A neg 1 1− σi or 2− σi St[2] = 0, St[1] = 2, z1 = 2 Pneg(i, t)
i A neg 2 2− σi St[2] = 0, St[1] 6= 2, z2 = 0 Pneg(i, t)
i A neg 3 1− σi or 2− σi St[1] = 1, z1 = St[2] Pneg(i, t)
i A neg 4 −σi or 1− σi St[1] = 0, St[0] = 1, z1 = 1 Pneg(i, t)
16 SVV 10 S−1t [0]− σ16 S−1t [0] < t+ 1 or S−1t [0] > 15, z16 =
−16, j2 /∈ {t+ 1, . . . , 15}
PSVV10(t)
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Cryptanalysis of the WPA Protocol
In this chapter, we introduce two types of attacks against the WPA protocol. The first is a
key recovery attack and the second is a distinguishing attack. Firstly, based on several partial
temporary key recovery attacks, we recover the full 128-bit temporary key by using 242 packets.
It works with the complexity of 296. Then, we describe a distinguisher for WPA of complexity 242
and advantage 0.5 which uses 242 packets. So far, this is the best attack against WPA. We believe
that our analysis brings further insights to the security of RC4.
Note. We analyzed four unconditional biases in Chapter 5, i.e., the Klein-Improved correlation,
the SVV 008, the SVV 009 and the Maitra-Paul-Improved correlation. The success probability of
SVV 008 and SVV 009 are quite low. Hence, we avoid these two biases during our experiments.
Furthermore, we found out that using the Maitra-Paul-Improved bias together with the Klein-
Improved attack bring only a low extra success probability. Hence, during all our experiments
on WPA and later on WEP, we also avoided the Maitra-Paul-Improved attack. Regarding the
conditional attacks, we used all the Korek attacks together with the SVV 10 attack.
7.1 Useful Notations
We use a list of classes of biases from Table 5.1 and 6.1. More specifically, we use the rows rowRC4i′|I0
in those tables. Furthermore, there exists a prominent relation between the key bytes of RC4:
K¯[i+ 16j] = K¯[i] + jK¯[15]
for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15 and j = 0, 1, 2. This relation reveals that if K¯[15] is known, the biases for K¯[i] and
K¯[i+ 16j] can be merged. Later, we recover K¯[15] before any other byte of the key.
We define deduce(I) to be the set of all i’s such that we can compute K¯[i] using this property,
based on the values of K¯ with indices in I. For instance, deduce(0, 1, 2, 5) = {0, 1, 2, 5} and
deduce(0, 1, 2, 5, 15) = {0, 1, 2, 5, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, . . .}. Next, we transform the
above table by removing some rows for the keys which can be deduced and by merging the rows
leading to the same key byte. Namely, we define rowi|I0 as follows: if i ∈ deduce(I0), the row has
a single “bias” f¯1(z, clue) = K¯[i] with probability p1 = 1, as K¯[i] can be computed from the clue.
Otherwise, the row is the concatenation of all rowRC4i′|I0 for i
′ such that i ∈ deduce(I0 ∪ {i′}). For
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instance, row2|{0,1,2} has a single bias, row5|{0,1,2} = rowRC45|{0,1,2}, and
row5|{0,1,2,15} = rowRC45|{0,1,2,15}‖rowRC421|{0,1,2,15}‖rowRC437|{0,1,2,15}
In the “concatenation” above, we only update f¯j from the rowi′|I0 so that it computes the K¯[i]
instead of the K¯[i′]. Given two lists of byte indices I0 and I = (i1, . . . , i#I), we construct a new
table Π(I|I0) in which the list of rows is rowi1|I0 , rowi2|I0,i1 , ..., rowi#I |I0,i1,i2,...,i#I−1 . For instance,
I0 = {0, 1, 2} and I is a list of the key byte indices which are sequentially obtained using the biases.
We assume that I0 is a minimal set in the sense that there is no strictly smaller set with the same
deduce(I0). We further assume that I is a minimal set in the sense that there is no strictly smaller
set with the same I ∩ I0 and deduce(I ∪ I0). For instance, I = (2, 3, 13, 14, 15) is minimal for
I0 = {0, 1, 2}, but I = (2, 3, 13, 14, 15, 16) is not. We define ν = (K¯[i])i∈I which belongs to a set of
size Nν(I) = N
#I . Given i ∈ I, we let dΠ(I|I0)i be the length of the row for K¯[i] in Π(I|I0). Given
a tuple (ji)i∈I such that 1 ≤ ji ≤ dΠ(I|I0)i for all i ∈ I, by collecting the ji-th bias of the row i,
we obtain an agglomerated bias to compute ν from z and an I0-clue clue. Note that for technical
reasons, we may have to keep elements of I0 in I. This is why we may have rows for i ∈ I0 in
Π(I|I0) with a single bias with probability 1. We let
k(I|I0) =
∏
i∈I
d
Π(I|I0)
i
be the number of possible agglomerated biases. For convenience, we number the agglomerated
biases with an index ` from 1 to k(I|I0), where each number defines a tuple (ji)i∈I . So, the `-th
bias is defined by ν = f`(z, clue) with probability
p
Π(I|I0)
` =
∏
i∈I
p
Π(I|I0)
i,ji
where p
Π(I|I0)
i,j is the probability of the j-th bias in the row corresponding to K¯[i] in Π(I|I0).
We let Nµ(Π(I)) be N raised to the power of the number of zi bytes and I0 bytes appearing
in any of the biased equations from Π(I). For example, Nµ(Π(3, 13, 14|0, 1, 2)) = N8, as biases for
K¯[3] are based on z3 and z4 and biases for K¯[13] and K¯[14] are based on z13, z14 and z15. We
further need the IV to compute the St. So, we have 8 bytes in total: zi for i ∈ {3, 4, 13, 14, 15}
and the IV. Given a keystream z, we define µ = hΠ(I)(z, clue) as the vector of all zi and clue bytes
which are useful. We define ν = f
Π(I)
` (µ).
For simplicity, we write Π, k, Nν , Nµ, p`, h and f` when I and I0 are made clear from context.
That is, the range of h has size Nµ, and f` goes from a domain of Nµ elements to a range of Nν
elements.
Finally, this section describes a way to construct a list Π of k biases for the vector ν = (K¯[i])i∈I
from µ = h(z, clue).
7.2 A Key Recovery attack on WPA
There are 8 bits of the TK that we call weak, because they have a simple relation with the bits of
the PPK. These bits consist of the 7 most significant bits of the TK[0] and the least significant bit
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of the TK[1]. We define some statistical attacks using the following mappings:
zm, IVm
h−−−−−−→ µ f`−−−−−−→
if g`(µ)
ν
pi−−−−−−→ x
Here, zm is the m-th keystream using the IVm and µ is some compressed information to compute
ν. The ν is some RC4 key bytes which are useful in computing x. The x is some information
about the TK which we want to recover using statistics. We define Nx as the number of possible
values for x.
7.2.1 The First Attack: Recovering some Weak Bits of TK
We use I0 = {0, 1, 2} and I = (2, 3, 13, 14). Given K¯[2], K¯[3], K¯[13] and K¯[14], the adversary can
compute K[3] = K¯[3]− K¯[2] and K[14] = K¯[14]− K¯[13]. According to Algorithm 2.2, we have
PPK[5] = K[15]‖K[14]
K[3] = low8((PPK[5]⊕ (RotR1(TK[1]‖TK[0]))))
So, given ν = (K¯[2], K¯[3], K¯[13], K¯[14]), the adversary can compute x = high7(TK[0]) by
pi(ν) = low7((K¯[3]− K¯[2])⊕ (RotR1(K¯[14]− K¯[13])))
Nν = 2
32 is the total number of possible ν’s and Nx = 2
7 is the total number of possible x’s. We
have Nµ = 2
48, the total number of µ = h(z, IV).
We can recover the 7 weak bits as follows: for each candidate value x, each packet m, and each
` = 1, . . . , k (corresponding to a tuple (j2, j3, j13, j14), if the agglomerated condition g`(h(z
m, IVm))
holds, we define ν = f`(h(z
m, IVm)) as the value of the RC4 key bytes suggested by the bias `
on packet m, which is correct with probability p`. We let x = pi(ν) be the suggested value of
x computed as explained. We let Xx,m,` be some magic coefficient a` (to be optimized later) if
pi(f`(h(z
m, IVm))) = x and 0 otherwise. We let
Yx =
n∑
m=1
k∑
`=1
Xx,m,`
where n is the total number of packets to be used. Clearly, the correct value for ν is suggested
with probability p` and others are obtained randomly. We assume the incorrect ones are suggested
with the same probability 1−p`Nν−1 .
If x is not the correct value, it is not suggested for sure when ν is correct. Since pi is balanced,
this incorrect x has NνNx values ν belonging to the set of Nν − 1 incorrect ones. So, x is suggested
with probability NνNx ×
1−p`
Nν−1 . So, the Xx,m,` for the incorrect x’s are random variables with the
expected values
a`q`Nν
1− p`
Nx(Nν − 1)
if x is not the correct value.
If x is the correct value, it is suggested with probability p` for the correct ν and by pi when ν is
one of the Nν−NxNx (incorrect) preimages of x. That is, with overall probability p` +
Nν−Nx
Nx
× 1−p`Nν−1 .
So, the Xx,m,` for the correct x are random variables with the expected value
a`q`Nν
1− p`
Nx(Nν − 1) + a`q`
Nνp` − 1
Nν − 1
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The difference between these two expected values is important. This is also the case for the
difference of the variances. As every x is suggested with probability roughly q`Nx , we assume that
the variance of a bad Xx,m,` can be approximated by
q`
Nx
(
1− q`Nx
)
a2` . Let ∆ be the operator
making the difference between the distributions of a good x and a bad one. We have
E(Yx bad) =
n
Nx
(
1− 1Nν
)∑
`
a`q`(1− p`)
E(Yx good) = E(Yx bad) + ∆E(Y )
∆E(Y ) =
n
1− 1Nν
∑
`
a`q`
(
p` − 1
Nν
)
V (Yx bad) ≈ n
∑
`
a2`
q`
Nx
(
1− q`
Nx
)
V (Yx good) = V (Yx bad) + ∆V (Y )
∆V (Y ) ≈ n
1− 1Nν
∑
`
a2`q`
(
p` − 1
Nν
)
where E(Yx bad) and V (Yx bad) denote the expected value and the variance of a Yx variable for any
bad x respectively. Here, we removed the subscript x of Yx in ∆E(Y ) as this does not depend on a
specific value for x. Let λ be such that ∆E(Y ) = λ
√
V (Yx bad) + V (Yx good). The probability that
the correct Yx is lower than an arbitrary wrong Yx is ρ = ϕ (−λ). That is, the expected number
of wrong x’s with larger Yx is
r = (Nx − 1)ϕ (−λ) (7.1)
So,
n =
λ2
∑
`
a2`
[
2
(
q`
Nx
)(
1− q`
Nx
)(
1− 1
Nν
)2
+ q`
(
p` − 1
Nν
)(
1− 1
Nν
)]
(∑
`
a`q`
(
p` − 1
Nν
))2
By derivating both terms of the fraction with respect to a` and equaling them, we obtain that the
optimal value is reached for
a` = aopt
def
=
(
p` − 1Nν
)
(
p` − 1Nν
)
+ 2Nx
(
1− 1Nν
)(
1− q`Nx
)
Hence, we obtain
n = nopt
def
=
λ2
(
1− 1Nν
)
∑
`
a`q`
(
p` − 1
Nν
) (7.2)
The attack works as in Algorithm 7.1.
Clearly, the time complexity is nk. The complexity is measured in terms of the number of
times the if statement is executed. This should have a complexity which is essentially equivalent to
executing the phase2 key derivation function. The memory complexity has the order of magnitude
of Nx. Another variant is represented in Algorithm 7.2.
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Algorithm 7.1 The first attack on WPA (recovering the 7 weak bits of the TK in WPA).
1: set I = (2, 3, 13, 14) and I0 = {0, 1, 2}
2: initialize the Yx counters to 0
3: for m = 1 to n do
4: for ` = 1 to k do
5: if g`(h(z
m, IVm)) holds then
6: compute ν = f`(h(z
m, IVm)), the suggested (K¯[2], K¯[3], K¯[13], K¯[14])
7: compute x = pi(ν)
8: increment Yx by a`
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
12: output x = arg maxx Yx
Algorithm 7.2 Another variant of the first attack on WPA.
1: set I = (2, 3, 13, 14) and I0 = {0, 1, 2}
2: initialize a table yµx to 0
3: for ` = 1 to k do
4: for all possible µ such that g`(µ) holds do
5: compute x = pi(f`(µ))
6: increment yµx by a`
7: end for
8: end for
9: initialize the Yx counters to 0
10: for m = 1 to n do
11: for all x do
12: compute µ = h(zm, IVm)
13: increment Yx by y
µ
x
14: end for
15: end for
16: output x = arg maxx Yx
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In the new variant, the time complexity is Nµk + Nxn and the memory complexity is NµNx.
So, the complexity is
c = min(nk,Nµk +Nxn) (7.3)
The two complexity curves cross for n = Nµ
k
k−Nx ≈ Nµ when Nx  k.
For I = (2, 3, 13, 14), we have Nν = 2
32, Nµ = 2
48 and Nx = 2
7. The complexities with and
without using the conditional biases are summarized in Table 7.1. As we can see, when ignoring
the conditional biases, we need about 65% more packets, but the complexity is much lower, because
k is smaller. So, the conditional biases do not seem to be useful in this case.
7.2.2 The Second Attack on WPA
Let I0 = {0, 1, 2}, I = (15, 2, 3, 14) and x = low1(TK[1]) be the last weak bit. Given the IV and
ν = (K¯[2], K¯[3], K¯[14], K¯[15]), we deduce x = pi(ν) by
pi(ν) = high1((K¯[3]− K¯[2])⊕ (K¯[15]− K¯[14]))
So, we apply the first attack with this I and Nx = 2. As 15 ∈ I, we have more biases. We have r,
n and c from Eq. (7.1), Eq. (7.2) and Eq. (7.3).
For I = (15, 2, 3, 14), we have Nν = 2
32, Nµ = 2
120 and Nx = 2. The complexities are
summarized in Table 7.1. Again, the conditional biases are not very useful. We can also see
that this choice of I leads to a better attack than the one from Sec. 7.2.1 in terms of n, but the
complexity is slightly higher. This is due to a larger k.
7.2.3 Merging the Attacks
Given two attacks with the sets I1 (resp. I2) for recovering independent x1 (resp. x2) leading to
characteristics Yx1 (resp. Yx2), c
1 (resp. c2), n1 (resp. n2) and λ1 (resp. λ2), one problem is to
merge the sorted lists of x1 and x2. One can follow the approach by Junod-Vaudenay [JV03]. We
sort the pairs following their likelihood ratio, which is obtained by multiplying the likelihood ratio
of both terms. We assume that all Yxi are independent, normally distributed with the variance
either V (Yxi bad) or V (Yxi good) = V (Yxi bad) + ∆V (Yxi) and the expected value either E(Yxi bad)
or E(Yxi good) = E(Yxi bad) + ∆E(Yxi). Given x
i, the ratio for xi being the correct value based on
the observation Yxi is
Pr[Yxi |xi good]
Pr[Yxi |xi wrong]
=
1√
2piV
(
Yxi good
)e
−
(
Y
xi
−E
(
Y
xi good
))2
2V
(
Y
xi good
)
1√
2piV (Yxi bad)
e
−(Yxi−E(Yxi bad))
2
2V (Yxi bad)
=
√
V (Yxi bad)
V
(
Yxi good
)e(
Y
xi
−E(Yxi bad))
2
2V (Yxi bad)
−
(
Y
xi
−E
(
Y
xi good
))2
2V
(
Y
xi good
)
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So, when multiplying some terms of this form for the pairs of values, sorting them by decreasing
product is equivalent to sorting them by the decreasing value of
1
2
(
1
V1b
− 1V1g
)
Y 2x1 +
(
E1g
V1g
− E1bV1b
)
Yx1 +
1
2
(
1
V2b
− 1V2g
)
Y 2x2 +
(
E2g
V2g
− E2bV2b
)
Yx2
= a (Yx1 − β1)2 + b (Yx2 − β2)2
where
V1g = V (Yx1 good) V2g = V (Yx2 good)
V1b = V (Yx1 bad) V2b = V (Yx2 bad)
∆V1 = ∆V (Yx1) ∆V2 = ∆V (Yx2)
E1g = E(Yx1 good) E2g = E(Yx2 good)
E1b = E(Yx1 bad) E2b = E(Yx2 bad)
a = 12
(
1
V1b
− 1V1g
)
b = 12
(
1
V2b
− 1V2g
)
β1 =
(
V1gE1b−V1bE1g
∆V1
)
β2 =
(
V2gE2b−V2bE2g
∆V2
)
So we let Yx1,x2 = a (Yx1 − β1)2+b (Yx2 − β2)2. With the same assumptions as in [JV03], we are
back in a situation where Yx1,x2 is distributed with Generalized-χ
2 distribution [Dav73, Dav80a]
(see Appendix A.1 for more details). The average number of wrong (x1, x2) pairs with a higher
score than the good one is
r = (Nx1Nx2 − 1) · Pr
(
Yx1,x2 good − Yx1,x2 bad < 0
)
Thus, we define a new random variable
∆Yx1,x2
def
= Yx1,x2 good − Yx1,x2 bad =
2∑
m=1
∑
j=b,g
amj
[
(Yxmj − βm)2
Vmj
]
where
a1g = aV1g a1b = −aV1b Yxig = Yxi good
a2g = bV2g a2b = −bV2b Yxib = Yxi bad
∆Yx1,x2 is a quadratic form in independent normal random variables. It can be expressed as the
linear combination
∆Yx1,x2 =
2∑
m=1
∑
j=b,g
amjX
2
mj (7.4)
where Xmj ’s are independent and normally distributed random variables with variance one. We
write
t2mj =
(E(Ymj)−βm)2
V (Ymj)
= t′2mj · n
The characteristic function of a quadratic form in independent normal random variables ∆Yx1,x2
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is given by [Dav73], where
ϕ∆Yx1,x2 (u) = E(e
iu∆Yx1,x2 ) =
e
iu
 2∑
m=1
∑
j=b,g
amjt
2
mj
1− 2iuamj

2∏
m=1
∏
j=b,g
(1− 2iuamj) 12
If E(|∆Yx1,x2 |) is finite, it follows from [GP51] that
F∆Yx1,x2 (w) = Pr(∆Yx1,x2 < w) =
1
2
−
∫ ∞
−∞
Im
(
ϕ∆Yx1,x2 (u)e
−iuw
2piu
)
du
Substituting what we have, one derives
F∆Yx1,x2 (0) = Pr(∆Yx1,x2 < 0) =
1
2
−
∫ ∞
−∞
Im

e
iu
 2∑
m=1
∑
j=b,g
amjt
2
mj
1− 2iuamj

2piu
2∏
m=1
∏
j=b,g
(1− 2iuamj) 12
 du
Finally, setting r, the value of n can be numerically computed.
It might be of interest to evaluate n analytically. In Eq. (7.4), the X2i ’s follow the non-
centralized χ2 distribution. Our experiment revealed that their non-centrality parameters are
large. Let ni and t
2
i be their corresponding degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameters
respectively. It was shown in [Mui05] (see pages 22− 24 and problem 1.18) that when ni →∞ or
t2i →∞, the non-centralized χ2 random variable can be approximated by the normal distribution
with the same expected value and variance. Using this approach, the above integral can be avoided.
Hence,
E(∆Yx1,x2) ≈
2∑
m=1
∑
j=b,g
amj
(
1 + t2mj
)
V (∆Yx1,x2) ≈
2∑
m=1
∑
j=b,g
2a2mj
(
1 + 2t2mj
)
To find n, we need to solve the following equation.(
−E(∆Yx1,x2)√
V (∆Yx1,x2)
)
= ϕ−1
(
r
Nx1Nx2 − 1
)
Thus, we derive
n ≈
[
1
µ
ϕ−1
(
r
Nx1Nx2 − 1
)]2
where
µ =
2∑
m=1
∑
j=b,g
amjt
′
mj√√√√ 2∑
m=1
∑
j=b,g
4a2mjt
′
mj
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Table 7.1: The complexities of several attacks to recover log2Nx bits from the TK. We compare
them when including the conditional biases and without. We provide the number of packets n,
the running time complexity c, the expected number r of the better wrong values, as well as the
parameters k, λ and Nν . Except when Nx = 2 for which it would not make any sense, we target
r = 12 (that is, the correct value has the higher score in half of the cases). We used I0 = {0, 1, 2}.
ref. I n c r Nx k λ Nν Nµ cond.
1u (2, 3, 13, 14) 242.10 242.10 12 2
7 1 2.66 232 N6 without
1c (2, 3, 13, 14) 241.38 253.10 12 2
7 211.72 2.66 232 N8 with
2u (15, 2, 3, 14) 240.38 245.38 14 2 2
5 0.67 232 N15 without
2c (15, 2, 3, 14) 239.12 255.85 14 2 2
16.73 0.67 232 N17 with
3u merge 241.83 246.87 12 2
8 without
1u+2u
3c merge 241.22 257.99 12 2
8 with
1c+2c
4u (15, 2, 3, 13, 14) 251.72 257.72 12 2
8 26 2.88 240 N17 without
4c (15, 2, 3, 13, 14) 251.05 272.69 12 2
8 221.64 2.88 240 N19 with
We can use these merging rules to merge the two previous attacks, i.e., setting c = c1 + c2 by
using Eq. (7.3) for c1 and c2. We obtain the results from Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 shows the complexities when merging the previous attacks to recover the 8 weak bits
of the TK. We compare them with the attack using a merged set I directly. As we can see, merging
the attacks with small I’s (reference 3) is much better than making a new attack with a merged
I (reference 4).
7.2.4 A Temporary Key Recovery Attack on WPA
The results from [MRH04] lead to an “easy” attack on WPA: guess the 96-bit PPK and the 8 weak
bits of the TK with an average complexity of 2103 until it generates the correct keystream. Then,
guess the 96-bit PPK of another packet in the same segment (with the weak bits already known).
Then, apply the method of [MRH04] to recover the TK. We improve this attack by recovering the
weak bits of the TK separately: we know from Table 7.1 that we can recover the weak bits of TK
by using 242 packets. After having recovered the weak bits, we note that the 96-bit PPK is now
enough to recalculate the RC4KEY. So, we can do an exhaustive search on the PPK for a given
packet until we find the correct one generating the packet. This works with an average complexity
of 295. We do it twice to recover the PPK of two packets in the same segment. Given these two
PPK sharing the same IV32, we recover the TK by using the method of [MRH04]. Therefore, we
can recover the temporary key TK and decrypt all the packets with complexity 296. The number
of packets needed to recover the weak bits is 242.
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7.3 Distinguishing WPA
As first mentioned by Mantin during the [SVV11] presentation in Estonia, RC4 can be distinguished
using N packets [MS01] and since WPA’s output is already an output of RC4, it can be simply
distinguished from random using a few packets. However, the distinguisher of [MS01], based on
the bias of z2, can not distinguish two protocols that are both using RC4. In this section, we are
using the previous biases on RC4 together from some weaknesses on the structure of WPA and
mount a distinguishing attack on WPA. This distinguisher is also capable of distinguishing WPA
from other protocols using RC4.
The first attack can be turned into a distinguisher as follows: The expected value and the
variance of the correct Yx are
E(Yx good) = E(Yx bad) + λ
√
V (Yx bad) + V (Yx good)
V (Yx good) = V (Yx bad) + ∆V (Y )
Let’s extend our notations by defining
γ =
(
V (Yx good)
V (Yx bad)
)
The random variable Yx of the good counter is larger than
T = E(Yx bad) + λ
′
√
V (Yx bad) + V (Yx good)
with probability ϕ
(
(λ− λ′)
√
1 + 1γ
)
. Now, if we replace the WPA packets by some random
sequences, all the counters have expected value E(Yx bad) and variance approximately V (Yx bad).
The probability that a given counter exceeds T is ϕ
(−λ′√1 + γ). The probability that any counter
exceeds this is lower than Nxϕ
(−λ′√1 + γ). So, the condition maxx Yx > T makes a distinguisher
of the same n and c as in the first attack and with Adv ≥ β, where
β = ϕ
(
(λ− λ′)
√
1 +
1
γ
)
−Nxϕ
(
−λ′
√
1 + γ
)
(7.5)
Finally, we find the optimal λ′ which maximizes the advantage.
λ′ =
√(
1 + 1γ
)2
λ2 +
(
γ − 1γ
) [(
1 + 1γ
)
λ2 + 2 ln
(
Nx
√
γ
)]− (1 + 1γ)λ(
γ − 1γ
)
We use the same values as before and target Adv ≥ 12 . We use Eq. (7.2) for n, Eq. (7.3) for
c and Eq. (7.5) for a lower bound β of the advantage. The performances of the distinguishers
are summarized on Table 7.2. Again, the attack based on I = (15, 2, 3, 14) is better in terms
of the number of packets, but not in terms of the complexity. It works using 241.23 packets and
complexity 246.23. The one based on I = (2, 3, 13, 14) works with 50% more packets (241.83) with
no conditional biases, but with a much better complexity of 241.83.
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Table 7.2: The complexities of several distinguishers for WPA. We compare them when including
the conditional biases and without. We provide the number of packets n, the running time com-
plexity c, the bound on the advantage β, as well as parameters k, λ and Nν . We target β =
1
2 .
We used I0 = {0, 1, 2}.
I n c β Nx k λ Nν Nµ cond. biases
1u I = (2, 3, 13, 14) 241.83 241.83 0.5 27 1 2.42 232 N6 without
1c I = (2, 3, 13, 14) 241.11 252.83 0.5 27 211.72 2.42 232 N8 with
2u I = (15, 2, 3, 14) 241.23 246.23 0.5 2 25 1.28 232 N15 without
2c I = (15, 2, 3, 14) 240.97 257.70 0.5 2 216.73 1.28 232 N17 with
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Cryptanalysis of the WEP Protocol
For many people, breaking WEP is similar to beating a dead horse. Unfortunately, it is still widely
used in many countries. Hence, we believe further analysis into this protocol is still of great interest.
Moreover, it also provides a better understanding of the security of RC4. In most previous analysis
of WEP, there is no concrete theory behind most of the claims, i.e., there is no way to test whether
the attacks work, except if we implement them again and check the results. If a new correlation is
found for RC4 that is exploitable whether against WEP or WPA, someone should implement the
attacks and go through a very time consuming experimental analysis to check the new correlation.
Also, many biases already existing in the literature are overestimated or the probabilities are not
properly computed. Many parameters were set incorrectly or heuristically without any proper
justification of their origin.
We performed more than one year of extensive theoretical and experimental analysis of all the
biases we used for RC4 (see Chapters 5, 6) and the complexities we derived in Chapter 7. All the
attacks were fully implemented and match the theoretical analysis.
We first elaborate the FMS attack on WEP and then explain how we can achieve better results
by using the Klein-Improved, the Korek and the SVV 10 correlations. To avoid all the heuristic
settings in the literature against WEP, we compute all the parameters of our attacks theoretically
and derive an optimized attack on the WEP protocol. We call this attack Tornado attack due to
the similarity between the distribution of our counters and the distribution of Tornadoes in real
life. Finally, we deploy a sequential distinguishing approach to reduce the data complexity of our
attack.
In the initial attacks on WEP such as the FMS attack and the the Klein attack, the attacker
recovers each byte of the key individually. Later, it was found in [VV07, TWP07] that we can use
the repetition of the key to increase the success probability of the attacks. In fact, according to
the K¯[i+ 16j] = K¯[i] + jK¯[15] relation, if K¯[15] is known, the biases for K¯[i] can be merged with
K¯[i + 16j] to obtain a higher success probability. Therefore, both papers recover the sum of the
key bytes instead. This was not the case for the FMS and the Klein attacks.
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8.1 The Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir (FMS) Attack
In 1995, Roos [Roo95] and Wagner [Wag95] found a class of weak keys for RC4. This class was
derived from some linear properties of the PRGA and Roos correlation for the KSA (see Sec. 4.1.1).
Depending on the value of the first 3 bytes of the key, the fourth byte might be recovered with
their attack. They could not exploit this weakness against any protocol using RC4, because at
that time WEP protocol did not exist. In fact, it was proposed 4 years later in 1999 [IEE99a].
Later, Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir [FMS01] used Roos and Wagner class of weak keys and
mounted a devastating attack on the WEP protocol. They claimed that 4 million packets would
be enough to recover the WEP secret key with probability 50% with incremental IV’s. Later
in [SIR02, SIR04], the authors showed that in fact between 4 million to 6 million packets are
required to break a WEP key with the FMS attack. Consequently, many vendors restricted the
class of weak keys used by the FMS attack to avoid RC4 weaknesses in the WEP mode.
In the following, we are going to describe this attack. The conditions, the assumptions, the key
recovery relation and the success probability are listed in Algorithm 8.1. We name this algorithm
FMS-Improved, as in the initial FMS attack in [FMS01], it was assumed that t = i − 1 and the
key bytes are recovered instead of their sum.
Algorithm 8.1 The FMS-Improved Attack
Success Probability: PFMSI(t)
Assumptions: (see Figure 8.1)
1: St[0] = · · · = SN−1[0] = i
2: St[1] = · · · = SN−1[1] = 0
3: St[ji] = · · · = Si−1[ji] = Si[i] = · · · = SN−1[i]
Conditions: z1 /∈ {0, i} and (S−1t [z1] < t+ 1 or S−1t [z1] > i− 1)
Key recovery relation: K¯[i] = S−1t [z1]− σi(t)
!"
!"−!
!"
!"−!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!"
!
!!
!!
!!
!!
Figure 8.1: The RC4 state update in the FMS-Improved attack.
If we focus on the PRGA, at the first round SN−1[1] and SN−1[0] are swapped. Then, the value
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of z1 is computed as z1 = S
′
1[S
′
1[1] + S
′
1[0]] = S
′
1[i] = z1. According to step 6 of the KSA, we have
ji = Si−1[i] + ji−1 +K[i]. The index of z1 should be less than t+ 1 or more than i− 1, otherwise
z1 would be swapped in St to Si−1 state updates. Hence, the FMS attack recovers the key bytes
as
K[i] = S−1t [z1]− Si−1[i] + ji−1
Indeed, we start recovering K[3] first and then we update the state to S3. Consequently, we
recover K[4], . . . ,K[15] similarly. This relation can be improved by recovering the sum of the
key bytes (FMS-Improved attack) instead. Using Lemma 3.3, the key recovery relation becomes
K¯[i] = S−1t [z1] − σi; To recover K¯[i], it is not necessary any more to recover K¯[i − 1] first. The
success probability of the attack using Lemma 3.4 is
PFMSI = R
3
2(i, t) · PB(i, t) +
1
N − 1
(
1−R32(i, t)
)
(1− PB(i, t))
where
R32(i, t) = r2(i) · P 3A(i, t) + 1N
(
1− r2(i) · P 3A(i, t)
)
r2(i) =
(
N−3
N
)N−i−1
8.2 Tornado Attack on WEP
We use a similar strategy as the attack on WPA. As the values of K¯[0], K¯[1] and K¯[2] are known,
we update the state to S2. We first recover the value of K¯[15] by using all the biases we have. In
fact, we can merge the biases for K¯[15], . . . , K¯[18] and K¯[31], . . . , K¯[34], as the first 3 bytes of the
key are known. As the biases K¯[31], . . . , K¯[34] vote for 2K¯[15], we vote for two distinct values in
Z256 in the table of K¯[15]. Then, we recover K¯[3] by merging all the biases for K¯[3] and K¯[19]. In
practice, we do not use any bias for i > 34, since after i = 34, the probabilities are very close to the
uniform distribution and also we can not predict the keystream. Then, we update the state to S3
and vote for K¯[4] and K¯[20] and we merge them. We repeat this procedure until K¯[14]. Finally,
we check the recovered key. If it is not the correct key, then we pick the second best element in
the sorted list of K¯[3] and repeat the same procedure. So, at the end our approach is recursive.
To be more precise, we apply the first attack on WPA with x = ν: we only recover key bytes
which are the same for all packets. This attack produces a ranking of possible x’s in the form of
a list L by decreasing order of likelihood (see Algorithm 8.2).
Let Πi = Π(i|0, . . . , i − 1, 15) for i = 3, . . . , imax and Π15 = Π(15|0, 1, 2) be the table of biases
used by the attack on K¯[i]. Similarly, let Nx = Nν = N and ri, ci be their parameters following
Eq. (7.1,7.3). Let Ri be the rank of the correct k¯i value in Li. Let’s define a random variable
Uij = 1(Yxi good<Yxi badj ), where Yxi badj is the j-th bad counter in attacking K¯[i]. Hence, we have
Ri =
Nx−1∑
j=1
Uij
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Algorithm 8.2 An optimized attack against the WEP protocol
1: compute the ranking L15 for I = (15) and I0 = {0, 1, 2}
2: truncate L15 to its first ρ15 terms
3: for each k¯15 in L15 do
4: run recursive attack on input k¯15
5: end for
6: stop: attack failed
recursive attack with input (k¯15, k¯3, . . . , k¯i−1):
7: If input is only k¯15, set i = 3.
8: if i ≤ imax then
9: compute the ranking Li for I = (i) and I0 = {0, . . . , i− 1, 15}
10: truncate Li to its first ρi terms
11: for each k¯i in Li do
12: run recursive attack on input (k¯15, k¯3, . . . , k¯i−1, k¯i)
13: end for
14: else
15: for each k¯imax+1, . . . , k¯14 do
16: test key (k¯3, . . . , k¯14, k¯15) and stop if correct
17: end for
18: end if
The expected value and the variance of this random variable can be computed as follows:
ri = E(Ri) = (Nx − 1)ϕ(−λi)
and
E(R2i ) = E(Ri) + (Nx − 1)(Nx − 2) · E(Ui1.Ui2)
(8.1)
where
E(Ui1.Ui2) =
1√
2piV (Yxi good)
∫ ∞
−∞
e
−
(
Y−E(Y
xi good
)
)2
2V (Y
xi good
)
1− ϕ(Y − E(Yxi bad)√
V (Yxi bad)
)2 dY
This finally yields
V (Ri) = (Nx − 1)ϕ(−λi) + (Nx − 1)(Nx − 2) . E(Ui1.Ui2)− (Nx − 1)2ϕ(−λi)2 (8.2)
In [SVV11], Ui1 and Ui2 were incorrectly assumed to be independent, leading to
V (Ri) ≈ (Nx − 1)ϕ(−λi)(1− ϕ(λi)) ≈ ri
which did not match our experiment. Now, the fundamental question is what would be the
distribution of Ri. This is discussed in the next section.
8.2.1 Analysis Based on Po´lya Distribution
In [SVV11], it was assumed that the distribution of Ri is normal. Running a few experiments,
we noticed that in fact it is following a distribution very close to the Poisson distribution. An
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amazing observation was that the variance of the distribution was much higher than the expected
value. A number of distributions have been devised for series in which the variance is significantly
larger than the mean [Ans50, Fel43, Ney39], frequently on the basis of more or less complex
biological models [BF53]. The first of these was the negative binomial, which arose in deriving the
Poisson series from the point binomial [Stu07, Whi14]. We use a generalized version of negative
binomial distribution called the Po´lya distribution (see Appendix A.2 for more details). The
main application of the Po´lya distribution is in Tornado Outbreaks [Tho63] and Hail Frequency
analysis [Tho57].
In most climates, the probability of hail is small. If the hail frequency ranges on an interval
f1 < f < f2 for all climates, it is observed that for values of f near f1 the hail storms are quite
scattered through each year. For this case, the hail storms might be considered independent of
each other. In this instance, the series of annual frequencies of the hail events might be expected
to follow the Poisson distribution of rare events. On the other hand, if the mean hail frequency
is near f2, then it seems reasonable to assume that the successive hail storms may no longer be
independent and so, if one storm had hail, the next storm would be more likely to have hail as well.
The introduction of dependence between successive storms leads in a special fashion to the negative
binomial distribution [Tho57]. Similarly, tornadoes tend to cluster within years and follow a Po´lya
process rather than a Poisson process in areas where the frequency of occurrence is high [Tho63].
This observation led us to find out that Ri is in fact following the Po´lya distribution (see
Appendix A for the definition of the Po´lya distribution and some of its properties). To be more
precise, if two events occur with Poisson distribution and their expected value is very low, then it
can be assumed that those events are happening independently. On the other hand, for the Poisson
events with high expected values (approximated as normal), the occurrence of the former event
may increase the probability of the latter. In such cases, the overall distribution would be the
Po´lya. Regarding the current problem, the events (Yxi good < Yxi badj ) and (Yxi good < Yxi badj′ )
are not independent. Therefore, they tend to follow the Po´lya distribution. As E(Ri) and V (Ri)
are known from Eq. (8.1, 8.2), the values pi and ri for attacking K¯[i] can be simply computed by
pi =
(
1− E(Ri)
V (Ri)
)
and ri =
(
E(Ri)
2
V (Ri)− E(Ri)
)
As a proof of concept, we have sketched the probability distribution of R3 for 5 000 packets.
The corresponding parameters for the Po´lya distribution would be p = 0.9839 and r = 0.356 (see
Figure 8.2). As can be observed, those two distributions are extremely close. Also,
ui
def
= Pr[Ri ≤ ρi − 1] = 1− Ipi(ρi, ri)
where I is the regularized incomplete beta function. Overall, the success probability is
u = u15
imax∏
i=3
ui
and the complexity is
c = c15 + ρ15
(
c3 + ρ3
(
c4 + ρ4
(· · · cimax + ρimaxN14−imax · · · )))
To be able to compare our results with the state of the art, we set u = 50%. To approximate
the optimal choice of ρ’s, let imax = 14. We have to deal with the following optimization problem:
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Figure 8.2: R3 distribution using 5 000 packets following the Po´lya distribution
Minimize c in terms of ρi’s, with the constraint that u =
15∏
i=3
(1− Ipi(ρi, ri)) =
1
2
To solve this optimization problem, we deploy three distinct approaches:
– To obtain the probability 50%, we let the probabilities ui’s to be equal for all i ∈ {3, . . . , 15}.
Hence, we set
(1− Ipi(ρi, ri)) = 2
(
−1
imax−1
)
= 0.9481
and we find the corresponding ρi’s. This approach does not yield the optimal solution, but
at least it gives a benchmark on what we should expect.
– Another approach is to use Lagrange multipliers to find the optimal solution. We used
the fmincon function in Matlab with the Sequential Quadratic Programming [NW06] (SQP)
algorithm as the default algorithm to compute the local minimum. This algorithm was very
fast and stable compared to the Genetic algorithm being explained next. As this algorithm
needs a starting point x0 for its computations, we used the GlobalSearch class which iterates
the fmincon function multiple times using random vectors for x0. Simultaneously, it checks
how the results merge towards the global minimum. The drawback of any Lagrange multiplier
approach is that the algorithm should be fed with a continuous objective function. This is
because it has to compute some derivatives. As we need integer values for ρi’s in practice,
we had to relax the outputs by the ceil function to round up the ρi’s found by this approach.
Therefore, it does not guarantee that the optimal solution is found at the end, but it finds a
complexity very close to the optimal. As our experiment revealed, this algorithm most often
sets ρ14 = N . So, using this approach, imax = 13 and we do not often need to vote for K¯[14].
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– The last approach is to find an algorithm which can handle discrete functions, i.e., it accepts
integers as input. One option is to use the Genetic algorithms. We used the ga function in
Matlab for this purpose. As these algorithms are evolutionary, the drawback is that with
the same parameters, each run outputs different results. So, we had to run the algorithm
multiple times and pick the best solution. The other drawback is that it will find a local
minimum and does not guarantee to find the global optima. As can be observed in Figure 8.3,
this method is not as stable as the other approaches. Moreover, the experiment time is much
longer compared to the other methods. To obtain a stable result, the parameters of the
Genetic algorithm should be set carefully enough. This approach often yields a high value
for ρ15, but it is often less than N .
Moreover, using the empirical distribution of Ri’s and by deploying the Genetic algorithm
approach, we computed the experimental curve of the complexity. We have depicted the result of
all these three approaches in Figure 8.3.
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Figure 8.3: The theoretical and experimental logarithmic complexities in terms of the data com-
plexity of breaking a WEP key with probability at least 50% with respect to three distinct opti-
mization approaches: the Benchmark approach, the Global optimization technique and the Genetic
algorithm technique.
We call the optimized key ranking attack on RC4, “Tornado Attack”, as Ri’s follow exactly
the same distribution as tornadoes.
Recovering K¯[15] is a crucial step in WPA and WEP attacks. We compare the theoretical
and experimental success probability of recovering K¯[15] as the first element in the sorted list. In
[SVV11], it is assumed that Yx good − Yi is independent for all bad i’s and was deduced that the
good x had a top Yx with probability (1 − ϕ(−λ))N−1. Running some experiments, we observed
incoherent results which invalidate this model. Figure. 8.4 represents this success probability with
respect to the number of packets, theoretically and experimentally. As we already know that the
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distribution of the rank is the Po´lya distribution, we obtain
Pr[R15 = 0] = (1− p15)r15
The difference between these two curves are coming from the dependency between biases. In
all our analysis, we assumed that the biases are independent, which is not a precise assumption.
This difference can be observed in Figure 8.4.
For the attacks against WEP and WPA, we used the biases up to K¯[34]. for any i > 34, the
probabilities are getting very close to the uniform distribution. It can still improve the overall
success rate of the attack, but this improvement is not significant and it further increases the
computational cost of the attack. The IV’s are picked pseudo-randomly using the SNOW 2.0
stream cipher. We used the Klein-Improved attack, the Korek biases and the SVV 10 bias for the
attacks on WEP and WPA.
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Figure 8.4: The success probability of recovering K¯[15] as the top element in the voted list in
theory and practice.
8.2.2 Comparison with Aircrack-ng
Aircrack-ng [DO11] is a WEP and WPA-PSK keys cracking program that can recover keys once
enough data packets have been captured. It implements the standard FMS attack [FMS01]
along with some optimizations like the Korek attacks [Kor04a, Kor04b], as well as the PTW
attack [TWP07]. In fact, it currently has the implementation of state of the art attacks on WEP
and WPA. In this section, we compare our results with Aircrack-ng 1.1.
Aircrack-ng does not deploy the recursive algorithm we use. Hence, it is not straightforward
to compare our results. A fair approach for comparison is to compare the success probability of
both when only the first key in the sorted list is checked i.e., ρi = 1 for all i. If that fails, the
entire key recovery attack will fail. This way, we do not enter the recursive loop. We sketched the
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Figure 8.5: The success probability of recovering a WEP key versus the number of packets, when
only the first key in the voted list is checked i.e., ρi = 1 for all i.
corresponding curve for our attack and Aircrack-ng in Figure 8.5. To obtain the success probability
of 50%, our attack requires 27 500 packets in average, while Aircrack-ng requires 44 000 packets.
With 27 500 packets, Aircrack-ng has only 3% success rate to recover the correct WEP key. With
44 000 packets, our attack can recover a WEP key with probability close to 1. We also sketch the
curve of the theoretical success probability in the same figure. The distance between the theoretical
result and the experimental one is coming from the dependency between the biases in Table 5.1
and 6.1. This dependency was already observed in Figure 8.4, when recovering K¯[15]. Hence, if
the same biases are used to recover K¯[i]’s for i ∈ {3, . . . , 15}, the distance would accumulate and
it makes sense to have such a distance between the theoretical and the experimental curves. One
approach to reduce the distance is to discard the biases that do not contribute significantly to the
success probability. This can be achieved by discarding a few of the Korek attacks with very low
densities.
We also draw the success probability versus the number of packets without the Korek and the
SVV 10 biases in Figure 8.6. Note that without these biases, the same analysis with 22 500 packets
(50% success rate in theory including all the biases) yields only 18% success rate. So, these biases
make a huge difference in this case.
8.2.3 The Sequential Distinguishing Approach
Up to this point, it was assumed that a fixed number of packets is given to the adversary and
the aim was to maximize the success probability. Changing the perspective, we can look at the
problem as fixing the success probability and searching for the minimum average number of packets
to gain that probability. This idea was used initially by Davies and Murphy [MD95] to decrease the
complexity of their attack against DES. With this type of model in mind, the notion of nmax-limited
generic sequential non-adaptive distinguishers was defined by Junod in [Jun03], where nmax is an
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Figure 8.6: The success probability of recovering a WEP key versus the number of packets with
the Klein-Improved bias only, when only the first key in the voted list is checked. It also depicts
the number of packets by using all the biases.
upper bound for the allowed number of packets in our context. Indeed, we can use a sequential
distinguisher for key recovery.
Mapping the definition of an nmax-limited generic sequential non-adaptive distinguisher in [Jun03]
to our attack, the new attack works as follows: the attacker waits for some small number of packets
to be eavesdropped from the channel and then runs the attack from the previous section. If it fails,
then it waits for more packets to come and runs the attack again. This procedure is iterated again
and again. The attacker would stop when she finds the correct key or the threshold nmax number
of packets is reached. If the former occurs, it outputs 1 (success), otherwise it outputs 0 (failure).
This attack mode was already used in Aircrack-ng. We refer to it as the “interactive mode” from
now on.
This approach turns out to be more efficient in terms of the number of packets compared
to other types of distinguishers. In fact, Siegmund [Sie85] has proved the following theorem
(see [Jun03] for details).
Theorem 8.1. For a simple hypothesis testing against a simple alternative with independent and
identically distributed observations, a sequential probability ratio test is optimal in the sense of
minimizing the expected number of samples among all tests having no larger error probabilities.
Using this technique, we can decrease the average number of packets to reach the success
probability of 50%. In fact, we could drop the data complexity of our fastest attack (i.e., with
all ρi = 1) in Figure 8.5 from 27 500 to 22 500 packets in average using this approach to gain the
success probability of 50%. This attack runs in less than 3 seconds on an ordinary PC. We give
another example to illustrate how the number of packets can be dropped using this technique.
Using 23 000 packets and the attack from the previous section, we computed the almost optimized
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ρi’s derived from the Genetic algorithm approach in practice to gain the success probability of
50%. We set
ρ3 = 2 ρ4 = 1 ρ5 = 1 ρ6 = 2 ρ7 = 2
ρ8 = 1 ρ9 = 2 ρ10 = 1 ρ11 = 1 ρ12 = 4
ρ13 = 2 ρ14 = 86 ρ15 = 1
Next, we run the attack in interactive mode with the above ρi’s for a lot of WEP keys and
find the minimal value of nmax which yields 50% success rate. Our experiments showed that
nmax = 22 000. Consequently, we run the same attack in interactive mode with nmax = 22 000 for
recovering different WEP keys Ki leading to some ni to succeed. Then, we compute the statistical
average of the number of packets ni when it succeeds and nmax for the attacks which fail. The
average number of packets we obtained in practice was 19 800 packets. This attack runs in less
than a minute on an ordinary PC. If we have less number of packets at our disposal, the attack
will run for a larger period.
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Conclusion
We revisited the statistical attacks on RC4, with applications to WEP and WPA protocols. We
provided a precise proof for almost all useful correlations existing for RC4 which are exploitable
against WEP and WPA.
We deployed a framework to handle pools of biases for RC4 which can be used to break
WEP and WPA protocols. In the case of the 8 weak bits of the TK of WPA, we have shown a
simple distinguisher and a partial key recovery attack working with 242 packets and a practical
complexity. This can be used to improve the attack by Moen-Raddum-Hole [MRH04] to mount
a full temporary key recovery attack of complexity 296 using 242 packets. So far, this is the best
temporal key recovery attack against WPA.
We have shown that conditional biases are not very helpful for breaking WPA, but they really
are against WEP. For WEP, we recover the secret key with a success rate of 50% by using 19 800
packets in less than a minute using a sequential distinguishing approach. This improve the attack
of Beck and Tews [BT09] using 30 000 packets. The attack is still feasible with less number of
packets, but it runs for a longer period.
Further Work. We did not perform any concrete theoretical analysis of the sequential distin-
guishing approach in the WEP attack. A further work could be to perform a precise analysis of
this approach and compare it with the “interactive mode” in Aircrack-ng. We also plan to study
further key recovery attacks on WPA to recover more pieces of the TK with a complexity lower
than 296.
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Part II
Algebraic Cryptanalysis of A Few
Symmetric Cryptosystems

Chapter10
ElimLin Algorithm for Solving Polynomial
Systems of Equations
10.1 Introduction
Various techniques exist in cryptanalysis of symmetric ciphers. Some involve statistical analysis
and some are purely deterministic. One of the latter methods is algebraic attack formulated as
early as 1949 by Shannon [Sha49].
Any algebraic attack consists of two distinct stages:
– Writing the cipher as a system of polynomial equations of low degree often over GF(2) or
GF(2k), which is feasible for any cipher [Wei03, CP02, MR02].
– Recovering the secret key by solving such a large system of polynomial equations.
Algebraic attacks have been successful in breaking several stream ciphers (see [AA09, CM03,
Cou03, DS11, COQ09, Cou09, DS09, Cou02] for instance) and a few block ciphers, for instance
Keeloq [IKD+08] and GOST [Cou11], but they are not often as successful as statistical attacks.
On the other hand, they often require low data complexity.
General purpose algebraic attack techniques were developed in the last few years by Cour-
tois, Bard, Meier, Fauge`re, Raddum, Semaev, Vielhaber, Dinur and Shamir to solve these sys-
tems [CB07, CSPK00, CP02, CM03, Cou03, Fau99, Fau02, RS08, Vie07, DS09, DS11]. The prob-
lem of solving such polynomial systems of multivariate equations is called the MQ problem which is
known to be NP hard in general. Currently, for a random system in which the number of equations
is equal to the number of unknowns, there exists no technique faster than exhaustive key search
to solve such systems. On the other hand, the equations derived from symmetric ciphers turn out
to be overdefined and sparse for most ciphers. So, they are easier to solve. This sparsity is coming
from the fact that, due to the limitations in hardware and the need for lightweight algorithms,
simple operations arise in the definition of cryptosystems. They are also overdefined due to the
non-linear operations.
105
Pouyan Sepehrdad
The traditional methods for solving overdefined polynomial systems of equations are known
to be various Gro¨bner basis algorithms such as Buchberger algorithm [Buc06], F4 and F5 [Fau99,
Fau02] and XL [CSPK00]. The most critical drawback of the Gro¨bner basis approach is the
elimination step where the degree of the system increases. This leads to an explosion in memory
space and in the worst case scenario, they run in double exponential time, and even the most
efficient implementations of Fauge`re algorithms [Fau99, Fau02] under PolyBoRi framework [BD07]
or Magma [Mag] are not capable of handling large systems of equations efficiently. On the other
hand, they are faster than other methods for overdefined dense systems or when the equations are
over GF(q) where q > 2. In fact, together with SAT solvers, they are currently the most successful
methods for solving polynomial systems.
Nevertheless, due to the above mentioned technical reasons, the system of equations extracted
from symmetric ciphers turns out to be sparse. Unfortunately, the Gro¨bner basis algorithms can not
exploit this property. In such cases, algorithms such as XSL [CP02], SAT solving techniques [Bar09,
ES, BCJ07], Raddum-Semaev algorithm [RS08] and ElimLin [CB07] are of interest.
In this chapter, we study the elimination algorithm ElimLin that falls within the remit of
Gro¨bner basis algorithms, though it is conceptually much simpler and is based on a mix of simple
linear algebra and substitution. It maintains the degree of the equations and it does not require any
fixed ordering on the set of all monomials. This is not the case for the Gro¨bner basis algorithms,
where monomial ordering is a prominent factor. On the contrary, we need to work with ad-hoc
monomial orderings to preserve the sparsity and make it run faster. This simple algorithm reveals
some hidden linear equations existing in the ideal generated by the system. We show in Sec. 10.4.4
that ElimLin does not find all such linear equations.
As far as we are aware, no clue has been yet found which demonstrates that ElimLin power
is limited. This does not mean that ElimLin can break any system. As mentioned earlier, MQ
problem is NP hard and Gro¨bner basis algorithms behave much better for such dense random
systems. But, the equations derived from cryptosystems are often not random (see [FB09] for
the huge difference between a random system and the algebraic representation of cryptographic
protocols). What we mean here is that, if for some small number of rounds ElimLin performs well
but then it fails for more rounds, we can increase the number of samples and it will become effective
again. The bottleneck is having an efficient data structure for implementing ElimLin together with
a rigorous theory behind it to anticipate its behaviour.
Except for two simple theorems by Bard (see Chapter 12, Sec. 5 of [Bar09]), almost nothing has
been done regarding the theory behind ElimLin. As ElimLin can also be used as a pre-processing
step in any algebraic attack, building a proper theory is vital for improving the state of the art
algebraic attacks. We are going to shed some light on the way this ad-hoc algorithm works and
the theory behind it.
In this chapter, we show that the output of ElimLin is invariant with respect to any variable
ordering. This is a surprising result, i.e., while the spaces generated are different depending on
how substitution is performed, we prove that their intersection is exactly the same. Furthermore,
we prove that no affine bijective variable change can modify the output of ElimLin.
In Sec. 10.2, we elaborate the ElimLin algorithm. Then, in Sec. 10.2.1, we give a toy example
on ElimLin. We remind some basic theorems on ElimLin in Sec. 10.3. As our main contribution
(Theorem 10.2), we prove in Sec. 10.4 that ElimLin can be formulated as an intersection of vector
spaces. We also discuss its consequences in Sec. 10.4.2 and remind a theorem regarding the
evolution of linear equations in Sec. 10.4.3. We perform some attack simulations on LBlock and
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PRESENT block ciphers in Sec. 10.5. In Sec. 10.6, we compare ElimLin and F4.
10.2 ElimLin Algorithm
ElimLin stands for Eliminate Linear and it is a technique for solving polynomial systems of mul-
tivariate equations of low degree d mostly: 2, 3, or 4 over a finite field specifically GF(2). It is
also known as an “inter-reduction” step in all major algebra systems. It was proposed as a single
tool in [CB07] to attack DES. It broke 5-round DES. Later, it was applied to analyze the resis-
tance of Snow 2.0 stream cipher against algebraic attacks [CD08]. It is a simple but a powerful
algorithm which can be applied to any symmetric cipher and is capable of breaking their reduced
versions. There is no specific requirement for the system, except that there should exist at least
one degree one term, otherwise ElimLin trivially fails. The key question for such an algorithm
is to predict its behavior. Currently, very similar to most other types of algebraic attacks such
as [Vie07, DS09, DS11], multiple parts of the algorithm are heuristic, so it is worthwhile to prove
which factors can improve its results, i.e., makes it generate more linear equations, make it run
faster or does not have any influence on its ultimate result. This will yield a better understanding
of how ElimLin works.
ElimLin is composed of two sequential distinct stages, namely:
– Gaussian elimination: All the linear equations in the linear span of the initial equations are
found. They are the intersection between two vector spaces: The vector space spanned by
all monomials of degree 1 and the vector space spanned by all equations.
– Substitution: Variables are iteratively eliminated in the whole system based on the linear
equations until there is no linear equation left. Consequently, the remaining system has fewer
variables.
This routine is iterated until no linear equation is obtained in the linear span of the system.
See Algorithm 10.1 for a more precise definition of the algorithm. We say that ElimLin succeeds if
it can eliminate all the variables in the system, and it fails if it stops before doing so. If the system
of equations represents the algebraic structure of a cipher, the success of ElimLin is equivalent to
the cipher being broken. We also give a toy system of equations in the next section and solve it
with ElimLin.
Clearly, the algorithm may depend on the ordering strategies to apply in step 5, 11 and 12 of
Algorithm 10.1. We will see that it is not, i.e., the span of the resulting SL is invariant.
We observe that new linear equations are derived in each iteration of the algorithm that did
not exist in the former spans. This phenomenon is called avalanche effect in ElimLin and is the
consequence of Theorem 10.2. At the end, the system is solved linearly (when SL is large enough)
or ElimLin fails. If the latter occurs, we can increase the data complexity (for instance, the number
of plaintext-ciphertext pairs) and re-run the attack.
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Algorithm 10.1 ElimLin algorithm.
1: Input : A system of polynomial equations S0 = {Eq01, . . . ,Eq0m0} over GF(2).
2: Output : A system of linear equations SL.
3: Set SL ← ∅ and ST ← S0 and k ← 1.
4: repeat
5: Perform Gaussian elimination Gauss(.) on ST with an arbitrary ordering of equations and
monomials to eliminate non-linear monomials.
6: Set SL′ ← Linear equations from Gauss(ST ).
7: Set ST ← Gauss(ST ) \ SL′ .
8: Set flag.
9: for all ` ∈ SL′ in an arbitrary order do
10: if ` is a trivial equation then
11: if ` is unsolvable then
12: Terminate and output “No Solution”.
13: end if
14: else
15: Unset flag.
16: Let xtk be a monomial from `.
17: Substitute xtk in ST and S ′L using `.
18: Insert ` in SL.
19: k ← k + 1
20: end if
21: end for
22: until flag is set.
23: Output SL.
10.2.1 A Toy Example of ElimLin
Let’s assume that we have the following overdefined system of multivariate equations over GF(2)
with 5 variables x1, . . . , x5 and 6 equations:
x1x2 + x1x3 + x2x5 + x3x5 + x2 + x4 + x5 + 1 = 0
x1x3 + x1x4 + x2x3 + x2x4 = 0
x1x4 + x2x3 + x3 + 1 = 0
x1x4 + x1x5 + x2x5 + x1 = 0
x1x5 + x2x3 + x3x5 + x1 + x3 + x4 = 0
x1x5 + x2x3 + x3x5 + x5 + x4 + x2 + 1 = 0
We perform Gaussian elimination on the system, and obtain:
x1x2 + x2x4 + x2x5 + x3x5 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 = 0
x1x3 + x2x4 + x3 + 1 = 0
x1x4 + x2x3 + x3 + 1 = 0
x1x5 + x2x3 + x3x5 + x1 + x3 + x4 = 0
x2x5 + x3x5 + x4 + 1 = 0
x1 + x2 + x3 + x5 + 1 = 0
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The linear equation we obtain is used for the substitution of the variable x5 = x1 + x2 + x3 + 1.
Then, we perform Gaussian elimination on the system again. We derive:
x2x4 + x1 = 0
x1x4 + x2x3 + x3 + 1 = 0
x1x2 + x1 + x3 + x4 = 0
x1x3 + x1 + x3 + 1 = 0
x4 + x3 + x1 = 0
The new linear equation is used for the substitution of the variable x4 = x3 + x1. After the
substitution, we perform Gaussian elimination again and obtain:
x2x3 + x1 = 0
x1x3 + x3 + 1 = 0
x1x2 = 0
x1 = 0
We derive a new linear equation x1 = 0. Consequently, we perform a substitution and Gaussian
elimination, which yields: {
x2x3 = 0
x3 + 1 = 0
The new linear equation we obtain is x3 = 1. After the substitution of this variable, we obtain
x2 = 0. Hence, we have gathered 5 linear equations in 5 variables as follows, which can be simply
solved by: 
x1 + x2 + x3 + x5 + 1 = 0
x1 + x3 + x4 = 0
x1 = 0
x3 + 1 = 0
x2 = 0
leading to x1 = x2 = x5 = 0 and x3 = x4 = 1.
10.2.2 Optimization
ElimLin running time is highly dependent on the method to achieve the row echelon form and
how to perform the substitution. It is necessary to use ad-hoc strategies to preserve the sparsity.
Although the algorithm is very simple, an efficient implementation of it is hard to obtain and we
used various heuristics in our implementation to preserve the sparsity and to make the algorithm
fast, like the choice of the leading variable to eliminate and the method to perform the Gaussian
reduction.
Gaussian elimination can be performed in various ways. What is often done is to pick a
monomial ordering for equations and eliminate the leading monomial of the active row. This
approach does not have any effect on preserving the sparsity. Consequently, we mention several
sparsity preserving heuristics:
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– create a list of monomials, together with the number of times they have occurred in the sys-
tem and try to eliminate those which are repeated less first. This will preserve the sparsity
and speculated to make the Gaussian reduction process faster. In this approach, as the inter-
mediate key variables are those which are repeated the most, they will be eliminated after all
other intermediate variables are omitted. Therefore, gathering some “statistics” is required
in the implementation phase. Moreover, the number of times the statistics should be updated
and a method for an effective implementation affect the speed of ElimLin dramatically.
– another strategy is to eliminate the equation which is smaller in size called pivot equation
first. This technique is referred to as “naive Gaussian elimination” or “structured Gaussian
elimination” [Bar09]. It has effectively been used in SAGE [Ste] algebra system for sparse
matrix elimination over GF(2).
– the two previous methods can be merged: take an equation with a monomial which repeats
less and if two monomials are repeated the same number of times, eliminate the equation that
is smaller in weight. It turned out that this approach is the fastest in our implementation of
ElimLin algorithm.
In the substitution layer, if the weight of the linear equation to be substituted is smaller, it
is more probable that the sparsity is preserved. Hence, the basis acquired by performing ElimLin
may not be the most appropriate required for substitution.
– An effective, but expensive algorithm using “Gray code” and “rapid subspace enumeration”
was proposed by Bard in [Bar09] for constructing a low weight basis.
Moreover, substitution can be performed in different ways. Our implementation showed that
the direct method is quite slow. We found a better representation of the substitution stage which
is represented in Lemma 10.1.
10.3 State of the Art Theorems
The only theoretical analysis of ElimLin was done by Bard in [Bar09]. He proved the following
theorem and corollary for one iteration of ElimLin:
Theorem 10.1 ([Bar09]). All linear equations in the linear span of a polynomial equation system
S0 are found in the linear span of linear equations derived by performing the first iteration of
ElimLin algorithm on the system.
The following corollary (also from [Bar09]) is the direct consequence of the above theorem.
Corollary 10.1. The linear equations generated after performing the first Gaussian elimination
in ElimLin algorithm form a basis for all possible linear equations in the linear span of the system.
This shows that any method to perform Gaussian elimination does not affect the linear space
obtained at an arbitrary iteration of ElimLin. All linear equations derived from one method exist
in the linear span of the equations cumulated from another method. This is trivial to see.
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10.4 Algebraic Representation of ElimLin
10.4.1 ElimLin as an Intersection of Vector Spaces
We also formalize ElimLin in an algebraic way. This representation is used in proving Theorem 10.2.
Firstly, we define some notations.
We call an iteration a Gaussian elimination preceding a substitution; The system of equations
for ElimLin can be stored as a matrixMα of dimension mα×Tα, where each mα rows represents an
equation and each Tα columns represents a monomial at iteration α. Also, rα denotes the rank of
Mα. Let nα be the number of variables at iteration α. We use a reverse lexicographical ordering of
columns during Gaussian elimination to accumulate linear equations in the last rows of the matrix.
Any arbitrary ordering can be used instead. In fact, we use the same matrix representation as
described in [Bar09].
Let K = GF(2) and x = (x1, . . . , xn) be a set of variables. We denote by K[x] the ring of
multivariate polynomials over K. For S ⊂ K[x], we denote Span (S) the K-vector subspace of
K[x] spanned by S. Let γ = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γn) be a vector in Nn and γ is referred to as a “power
vector”. The term xγ is defined as the product xγ = xγ11 × xγ22 × · · · × xγnn . The total degree of xγ
is defined as deg(xγ)
def
= γ1 + γ2 + · · · + γn. Let Ideal (S) be the ideal spanned by S and Root (S)
be the set of all tuples m ∈ Kn such that f(m) = 0 for all f ∈ S. Let
Rd = Span (monomials of degree ≤ d) /Ideal
(
x21 − x1, x22 − x2, . . . , x2n − xn
)
Let Sα be ST after the α-th iteration of ElimLin and S0 be the initial system. Moreover, nαL
is the number of non-trivial linear equations in SL′ at the α-th iteration. Trivial equations are
equations in the form 0 = 0 or 0 = 1. We denote SαL the SL after the α-th iteration. Also,
Cα
def
= #SαL
Let’s assume that S0 has degree bounded by d. We denote by Var(f) the set of variables
xi occurring in f . Let xt1 , . . . , xtk be the sequence of eliminated variables. We define Vk =
{x1, . . . , xn}\{xt1 , . . . , xtk}. Also, let `1, `2, . . . , `k be the sequence of linear equations as they are
used during elimination (step 16 of Algorithm 10.1). Hence, we have xtk ∈ Var(`k) ⊆ Vk−1.
We prove the following crucial lemma which we use later to prove Theorem 10.2.
Lemma 10.1. After the α-th iteration of ElimLin, an arbitrary equation Eqαi in the system (Sα∪SαL)
for an arbitrary i can be represented as
Eqαi =
m0∑
t=1
βαti · Eq0t +
Cα∑
t=1
`t(x) · gαti(x) (10.1)
where βαti ∈ K and gαti(x) is a polynomial in Rd−1 and Var(gαti) ⊆ Vt.
Proof. Let xt1 be one of the monomials existing in the first linear equation `1(x) and this specific
variable is going to be eliminated. Substituting xt1 in an equation xt1 · h(x) + z(x), where h(x)
has degree at most d − 1, xt1 /∈ Var(h) and xt1 /∈ Var(z) is identical to subtracting h(x) · `1(x).
Consequently, the proof follows by induction on α.
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Now, we prove the inverse of the above lemma.
Lemma 10.2. For each i and each α, there exists β′αti ∈ K and g′αti (x) such that
Eq0i =
mα∑
t=1
β′αti · Eqαt +
Cα∑
t=1
`t(x) · g′αti (x) (10.2)
where g′αti (x) is a polynomial in Rd−1 and Var(g
′α
ti ) ⊆ Vt.
Proof. Gaussian elimination and substitution are invertible operations. We can use a similar
induction as the previous lemma to prove the above equation.
In the next lemma, we prove that SαL contains all linear equations which can be written in the
form of Eq. (10.1).
Lemma 10.3. If there exists ` ∈ R1 and some βt and g′′t (x) such that
`(x) =
m0∑
t=1
βt · Eq0t +
Cα∑
t=1
`t(x) · g′′t (x) (10.3)
at iteration α, where g′′t (x) is a polynomial in Rd−1, then there exist ut ∈ K and vt ∈ K such that
`(x) +
Cα∑
t=1
ut · `t(x) =
mα∑
t=1
vt · Eqαt
So, `(x) ∈ Span (SαL).
Proof. We define uk iteratively: uk is the coefficient of xtk in
`(x) +
k−1∑
t=1
ut · `t(x)
for k = 1, . . . , Cα. So, Var(`(x) +
∑k
t=1 ut · `t(x)) ⊆ Vk. By substituting Eq0i from Eq. (10.2) in
Eq. (10.3) and substituting ut and g
′′
t in g
′α
ti , we obtain
`(x) +
Cα∑
t=1
ut · `t(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊆V1
=
mα∑
t=1
vt · Eqαt︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊆V1
+
Cα∑
t=1
`t(x) · g′t(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=⇒ ⊆V1
(10.4)
with g′t(x) ∈ Rd−1. All g′t(x) where t > 1 can be written as g¯t(x) + xt1 · g¯t(x) with Var(g¯t) ⊆ V1,
Var(g¯t) ⊆ V1 and g¯t(x) ∈ Rd−2. As,
`1(x) · g′1(x) + `t(x) · g′t(x) = `1(x) ·
(
g′1(x) + `t(x) · g¯t(x)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
new g′1(x)
+ `t(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊆V1
· (g¯t(x) + g¯t(x) · (xt1 − `1(x)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(new g′t(x)) ⊆V1
we can re-arrange the sum in Eq. (10.4) using the above representation and obtain Var(g′t) ⊆ V1
for all t > 1. Also, xt1 only appears in `1(x) and g
′
1(x). So, the coefficient of xt1 in the expansion
of `1(x) · g′1(x) must be zero. In fact, we have
`1(x) · g′1(x) = (xt1 + (`1(x)− xt1)) · (g¯1(x) + xt1 · g¯1(x))
= xt1 · (g¯1(x) · (1 + `1(x)− xt1) + g¯1(x)) + g¯1(x) · (`1(x)− xt1)
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So, g¯1(x) = g¯1(x) · (xt1 − `1(x)− 1) and we deduce,
g′1(x) = g¯1(x) · (`1(x) + 1)
over GF(2). But, then
`1(x) · g′1(x) = 0
over R, since `1(x) · (`1(x) + 1) = 0. Finally, we iterate and obtain
`(x) +
Cα∑
t=1
ut · `t(x) =
mα∑
t=1
vt · Eqαt
From another perspective, ElimLin algorithm can be represented as in Algorithm 10.2. In fact, as
a consequence of Lemma 10.1 and Lemma 10.3, Algorithm 10.2 presents a unique characterization
of Span (SL) in terms of a fixed point:
Algorithm 10.2 ElimLin algorithm from another perspective.
1: Input : A set S0 of polynomial equations in Rd.
2: Output : A system of linear equations SL.
3: Set S¯L := ∅.
4: repeat
5: S¯L ← Span
(S0 ∪ (Rd−1 × S¯L)) ∩R1
6: until S¯L unchanged
7: Output SL: a basis of S¯L.
Lemma 10.4. At the end of ElimLin, Span (SL) is the smallest subset S¯L of R1, such that
S¯L = Span
(S0 ∪ (Rd−1 × S¯L)) ∩R1
Proof. By induction, at step α we have S¯L ⊆ Span (SαL), using Lemma 10.3. Also, SαL ⊆ S¯L
using Lemma 10.1. So, S¯L = Span (SαL) at step α. Since S¯L 7→ Span
(S0 ∪ (Rd−1 × S¯L)) ∩ R1 is
increasing, we obtain the above equation.
ElimLin eliminates variables, thus it looks very unexpected that the number of linear equations
in each step of the algorithm is invariant with respect to any variable ordering in the substitution
step and the Gaussian elimination. We finally prove this important invariant property. Concretely,
we formalize ElimLin as a sequence of intersection of vector spaces. Such intersection in each
iteration is between the vector space spanned by the equations and the vector space generated by
all monomials of degree 1 in the system. This implies that if ElimLin runs for α iterations (finally
succeeds or fails), it can be formalized as a sequence of intersections of α pairs of vector spaces.
The final sequence of intersections of these vector spaces only depends on the vector space of the
initial system.
Theorem 10.2. The following relations exist after running ElimLin on a polynomial system of
equations Q:
1. RootS0 = Root(ST ∪ SL)
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2. There is no linear equation in Span
(ST ).
3. Span (SL) is uniquely defined by S0.
4. SL consists of linearly independent linear equations.
5. The complexity of ElimLin is O
(
nd+10 m
2
0
)
, where d is the degree of the system and n0 and
m0 are the initial number of variables and equations, respectively.
Proof. 1. Due to Lemma 10.1 and Lemma 10.2, S0 and (ST ∪SL) are equivalent. In fact, a solution
of S0 is also a solution of (ST ∪ SL) and vice versa.
2. Since ElimLin stops on ST , the Gaussian reduction did not find any linear polynomial.
3. Due to Lemma 10.4.
4. SL is a basis for S¯L. So, it consists of linearly independent equations.
5. n0 is an upper bound on #SL due to the fact that SL consists of linearly independent linear
equations. So, the number of iterations is bounded by n0. The total number of monomials is
bounded by
T0 ≤
d∑
i=0
(
n0
i
)
= O
(
nd0
)
The complexity of Gaussian elimination is O(m20T0), as we have T0 columns and m0 equations.
Therefore, overall the complexity of ElimLin is O
(
nd+10 m
2
0
)
.
10.4.2 Affine Bijective Variable Change
In the next theorem, we prove that the result of ElimLin algorithm does not change for any affine
bijective variable change.
Theorem 10.3. Any affine bijective variable change A : GF(2)n0 → GF(2)n0 on a n0-variable
system of equations S0 does not affect the result of ElimLin algorithm, implying that the number of
linear equations generated at each iteration is invariant with respect to an affine bijective variable
change.
Proof. In Lemma 10.4, we showed that Span (SL) is the output of the algorithm in Algorithm 10.2,
iterating
S¯L ← Span
(S0 ∪ (Rd−1 × S¯L)) ∩R1
We represent the composition of a polynomial f1 with respect to A by Comp(f1). We then
show that there is a commutative diagram
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S0 Comp(S0)
S¯L Comp(S¯L)
Comp
ElimLin
Comp
ElimLin
We consider two parallel executions of the algorithm in Algorithm 10.2, one with S0 and the
other with Comp(S0). If we compose the polynomials in S0 with respect to A, in the above relation
Rd−1 remains the same. As the transformation A is affine,
Comp(Span
(S0 ∪ (Rd−1 × S¯L)) ∩R1) = Span (Comp(S0) ∪ (Rd−1 × Comp(S¯L))) ∩R1
So, at each iteration, the second execution has the result of applying Comp to the result of the
first one.
10.4.3 Linear Equations Evolution
An open problem regarding ElimLin is to predict how the number of linear equations evolves in the
preceding iterations. The following theorem gives a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a
dense overdefined system of equations to have an additional linear equation in the next iteration
of ElimLin. See [SSV12] or [Sep08] for the proof, proving a similar result for a sparse system is not
straightforward.
Theorem 10.4. If we apply ElimLin to an overdefined dense system of quadratic equations over
GF(2), for nα+1L > n
α
L to hold, it is necessary to have
bα
2
− aα < nαL <
bα
2
+ aα
where bα = 2nα − 1 and aα =
√
b2α−8nαL
2 .
10.4.4 Does ElimLin Find All the Linear Equations?
We give an example that illustrates that elimlin does not reveal all hidden linear equations in the
structure of the cipher up to a specific degree:
Assume that there exists an equation in the system which can be represented as `(x)g(x)+1 = 0
over GF(2), where `(x) is a polynomial of degree one and g(x) is a polynomial of degree at most
d − 1. Running ElimLin on this single equation trivially fails. But, if we multiply both sides of
the equation by `(x), we obtain `(x) · g(x) + `(x) = 0. Summing these two equations, we derive
`(x) = 1. Indeed, (`(x) · g(x) + 1)(`(x) + 1) = `(x) + 1. This hidden linear equation can be simply
captured by the XL algorithm, but can not be captured by ElimLin. There exist multiple other
examples which demonstrate that ElimLin does not generate all the hidden linear equations. To
generate all such linear equations, the degree-bounded Gro¨bner basis can be used.
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10.5 Attack Simulations
In this section, we present our experimental results against LBlock and PRESENT block ciphers
using ElimLin and F4 algorithms. All the simulations were run on an ordinary PC with a (2.8 Ghz
CPU with 4 GB RAM) and a (2.0 Ghz CPU with 1 GB RAM) respectively.
In our attacks, we build a system of quadratic equations with variables representing the plain-
text, the ciphertext, the key and the state bits, which allows to express the system of equations
of high degree as quadratic equations. Afterwards, for each sample we set the plaintext and ci-
phertext according to the result of the input/output of the cipher. In order to test the efficiency
of the algebraic attack, we guess some bits of the key and set the key variables corresponding to
the guess. Then, we run the solver (ElimLin or F4) to recover the remaining key bits and test
whether the guess was correct. Therefore, the complexity of our algebraic attack can be bounded
by 2g · C(solver), where C(solver) represents the running time of the solver and g is the number
of bits we guess. C(solver) is represented as the “Running Time” in Table 10.1.
For a comparison with a brute force attack, we consider a fair implementation of the cipher,
which requires 10 CPU cycles per round. This implies that the algebraic attack against t rounds of
the cipher is faster than exhaustive search for the 2.8 Ghz CPU (resp. 2.0 Ghz CPU) iff recovering
c bits of the key is faster than 3.57t · 2c−31 (resp. 5t · 2c−31) seconds. This is already two times
faster than the complexity of exhaustive search. The attack reported in Table 10.1 is faster than
exhaustive search with the former argument. In fact, we consider the cipher to be broken for some
number of rounds if the algebraic attack that recovers (#key−g) key bits is faster than exhaustive
key search over (#key − g) bits of the key.
10.5.1 Simulations Using F4 Algorithm under PolyBoRi Framework
The most efficient implementation of the F4 algorithm is available under PolyBoRi framework [BD07]
running alone or under SAGE algebra system. PolyBoRi is a C++ library designed to compute
Gro¨bner basis of an ideal applied to Boolean polynomials. A Python interface is used, surrounding
the C++ core. It uses zero-suppressed binary decision diagrams (ZDDs) [Gha05] as a high level
data structure for storing Boolean polynomials. This representation stores the monomials more
efficiently in memory and it performs the Gro¨bner basis computation faster compared to other
algebra systems.
We use polybori-0.8.0 for our attacks. Together with ElimLin, we also attack LBlock with F4
algorithm and then compare its efficiency with ElimLin.
10.5.2 Attacking LBlock with ElimLin and F4
LBlock is a new lightweight Feistel-based block cipher proposed at ACNS 2011 [WZ11], aimed at
constrained environments, such as RFID tags and sensor networks. It operates on 64-bit blocks,
uses a key of 80 bits and iterates 32 rounds.
The encryption function of LBlock is illustrated in Fig. 10.1. Let M = X1||X0 denote a 64-
bit plaintext, where each Xi is 32 bits. The data processing function can be expressed as in
Algorithm 10.3, where [K1, . . . ,K32] are thirty two 32-bit round keys and <<< n represents an
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n-bit left cyclic shift operation.
Algorithm 10.3 The encryption algorithm of LBlock.
1: Input: M = X1||X0 and [K1, . . . ,K32]
2: Output: C = LBlock(M, [K1, . . . ,K32])
3: for i = 2 to 33 do
4: Xi = F (Xi−1,Ki−1)⊕ (Xi−2 <<< 8)
5: end for
6: Output C = X32||X33.
2.2 Encryption Algorithm
The encryption algorithm of LBlock consists of a 32-round iterative structure
which is a variant of Feistel network. The encryption procedure is illustrated in
Fig. 1. Let M = X1||X0 denote a 64-bit plaintext, and then the data processing
procedure can be expressed as follows.
1. For i = 2, 3, . . . , 33, do
Xi = F (Xi−1,Ki−1)⊕ (Xi−2 <<< 8)
2. Output C = X32||X33 as the 64-bit ciphertext
X1 X0
<<< 8
!⊕!K1 " F "
#########
$$$$$$$$$
#########
$$$$$$$$$
!
<<< 8
!⊕
!
!K32
" F "
X32 X33
Fig. 1. Encryption procedure of LBlock
Specifically, the components used in each round are defined as follows.
(1) Round function F
The round function F is defined as follows, where S and P denote the con-
fusion and diffusion functions which will be defined later.
F : {0, 1}32 × {0, 1}32 −→ {0, 1}32
(X,Ki) −→ U = P(S(X ⊕Ki))
Fig. 2 illustrates the structure of round function F in detail.
(2) Confusion function S
Figure 10.1: The encryption function of LBlock.
The round function F is defined as follows, where S and P denote the confusion and the
diffusion functions. The S (S-box) non-linear functions are depicted in Figure 10.2. The last two
S-boxes will be used in the key schedule.
F : {0, 1}32 × {0, 1}32 → {0, 1}32
(X,Ki) → U = P (S(X +Ki))
The F function is sketched i Figure 10.3.
The 80-bit master key K is stored in a key register and is denoted as K = k79k78 . . . k0. To
generate the round keys, LBlock goes through the Algorithm 10.4.
We break 8 rounds of LBlock using 6 samples deploying an ordinary PC by ElimLin. Our
results are summarized in Table 10.1. In the same scenario, PolyBoRi crashes due to running out
of memory.
Our goal is to show that multiple instances of a system of equations using distinct samples
are in fact not independent. On one hand, having multiple instances of the system increases the
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2.4 Key Scheduling
The 80-bit master key K is stored in a key register and denoted as K =
k79 k78 k77 k76 ...... k1k0. Output the leftmost 32 bits of current content of register
K as round subkey K1, and then operate as follows:
1. For i = 1, 2, . . . , 31, update the key register K as follows:
(a) K <<< 29
(b) [k79 k78 k77 k76] = s9[k79 k78 k77 k76]
[k75 k74 k73 k72] = s8[k75 k74 k73 k72]
(c) [k50k49k48k47k46]⊕ [i]2
(d) Output the leftmost 32 bits of current content of register K as round
subkey Ki+1.
where s8 and s9 are two 4-bit S-boxes, and they are defined in Table 1.
1
Table 1. Contents of the S-boxes used in LBlock
s0 14, 9, 15, 0, 13, 4, 10, 11, 1, 2, 8, 3, 7, 6, 12, 5
s1 4, 11, 14, 9, 15, 13, 0, 10, 7, 12, 5, 6, 2, 8, 1, 3
s2 1, 14, 7, 12, 15, 13, 0, 6, 11, 5, 9, 3, 2, 4, 8, 10
s3 7, 6, 8, 11, 0, 15, 3, 14, 9, 10, 12, 13, 5, 2, 4, 1
s4 14, 5, 15, 0, 7, 2, 12, 13, 1, 8, 4, 9, 11, 10, 6, 3
s5 2, 13, 11, 12, 15, 14, 0, 9, 7, 10, 6, 3, 1, 8, 4, 5
s6 11, 9, 4, 14, 0, 15, 10, 13, 6, 12, 5, 7, 3, 8, 1, 2
s7 13, 10, 15, 0, 14, 4, 9, 11, 2, 1, 8, 3, 7, 5, 12, 6
s8 8, 7, 14, 5, 15, 13, 0, 6, 11, 12, 9, 10, 2, 4, 1, 3
s9 11, 5, 15, 0, 7, 2, 9, 13, 4, 8, 1, 12, 14, 10, 3, 6
3 Design Rationale
3.1 Structure
The structure of LBlock is a variant of Feistel network, and its design decisions
contain a lot of considerations about security and efficient implementations (such
as area, cost and performance etc.). In the aspect of implementation, the most
important consideration is the area requirement when implemented in hardware.
Therefore, we try to reduce the number of S-boxes used in each round and also
minimize the size of each S-box used. Hence a Feistel-type structure seems a
1 There are some errors in the contents of s8 and s9 in the original paper, and we
have corrected them here. Note that the other parts of this paper remain unchanged
(including test vectors in Appendix I). The errors are only introduced in our typos.
Figure 10.2: S-boxes of LBlock.
Confusion function S denotes the non-linear layer of round function F , and
it consists of eight 4-bit S-boxes si in parallel.
S : {0, 1}32 −→ {0, 1}32
Y = Y7||Y6||Y5||Y4||Y3||Y2||Y1||Y0 −→ Z = Z7||Z6||Z5||Z4||Z3||Z2||Z1||Z0
Z7 = s7(Y7), Z6 = s6(Y6), Z5 = s5(Y5), Z4 = s4(Y4),
Z3 = s3(Y3), Z2 = s2(Y2), Z1 = s1(Y1), Z0 = s0(Y0).
The contents of eight 4-bit S-boxes are listed in Table 1.
(3) Diffusion function P
Diffusion function P is defined as a permutation of eight 4-bit words, and it
can be expressed as the following equations.
P : {0, 1}32 −→ {0, 1}32
Z = Z7||Z6||Z5||Z4||Z3||Z2||Z1||Z0 −→ U = U7||U6||U5||U4||U3||U2||U1||U0
U7 = Z6, U6 = Z4, U5 = Z7, U4 = Z5,
U3 = Z2, U2 = Z0, U1 = Z3, U0 = Z1.
X
Ki
!
ﬀ⊕
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
s7 s6 s5 s4 s3 s2 s1 s0
######
$$$
%%%
&&&&&&
######
$$$
%%%
&&&&&&
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Fig. 2. Round function F
2.3 Decryption Algorithm
The decryption algorithm of LBlock is the inverse of encryption procedure, and it
consists of a 32-round variant Feistel structure too. Let C = X32||X33 denotes a
64-bit ciphertext, and then the decryption procedure can be expressed as follows.
1. For j = 31, 30, . . . , 0, do
Xj = (F (Xj+1,Kj+1)⊕Xj+2) >>> 8
2. Output M = X1||X0 as the 64-bit plaintext.
Figure 10.3: F function of LBlock.
number of variables, as the state bits are totally different, on the other hand, all the instances
share the same key bits. The number of equations grows faster than the number of variables.
Consequently, we ex ect that at one moment, the syst m totally collapses. We give an example
using LBlock to be more clear. We attack 8-round LBlock with 32 LSB key bits fixed starting
from 1 pair to 8 pairs. As can be observed from Table 10.2 to Table 10.9, the cipher is unbroken
for 5 plaintext-ciphertext pairs, but then 6 pairs are enough to reveal enough linear equations to
completely linearize the cipher, so that the system collapses.
For instance, in Table 11.7 we start with n0 = 8 784 variables and m0 = 27 758 equations. Here,
T is the number of monomials. We then eliminate n1L = 7 528 variables at iteration 1. The variable
elimination is repeated until the iteration 15, when we finish with 2 variables and n15L = 2 linear
equations. As can be observed, at the last iteration the number of cumulative linear equations nc
is the same as the initial number of variables n0. This implies that we only need to solve a linear
system of equations in 8 784 variables and the system is solved. This is not the case for smaller
number of samples. For instance, in Table 11.6, at the last iteration we finish with 499 variables
and no linear equations. This implies that all 499 variables should be guessed.
In fact, for many cryptosystems, we observe that having a sufficient number of pairs is enough
to completely linearize the system by ElimLin. As ElimLin is a polynomial time algorithm
(
O(n50)
)
in the initial number of variables, we believe that proving the former statement can already be
considered as a breakthrough in cryptography.
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Algorithm 10.4 The key scheduling algorithm of LBlock.
1: Input: K = k79k78 . . . k0
2: Output: [K1, . . . ,K32]
3: Output the leftmost 32 bits of K as the first round key K1.
4: for i = 1 to 31 do
5: update the register K as follows:
(a) K <<< 29
(b) [k79k78k77k76] = s9[k79k78k77k76]
(c) [k75k74k73k72] = s8[k75k74k73k72]
(d) [k50k49k48k47k46]⊕ [i]2
(e) Output the leftmost 32 bits of current content of K as the round key Ki+1.
6: end for
Table 10.1: Algebraic attack complexities on reduced-round LBlock using ElimLin and PolyBoRi.
Nr #key g Running Time Data Attack
(in hours) notes
8 80 32 0.252 6 KP ElimLin
8 80 32 crashed 6 KP PolyBoRi
Nr : Number of rounds
g: Number of guessed LSB of the key
KP: Known plaintext
CP: Chosen plaintext
Table 10.2: Attacking 8-round LBlock with
1 pair and 32 LSB key bits guessed.
I n m0 T nL nc
1 2064 5174 4249 1768 1768
2 296 5174 5678 42 1810
3 254 5174 5035 16 1826
4 238 5174 4868 3 1829
5 235 5174 5178 0 1829
Table 10.3: Attacking 8-round LBlock with
2 pairs and 32 LSB key bits guessed.
I n m0 T nL nc
1 3408 8822 7385 2920 2920
2 488 8822 10855 85 3005
3 403 8822 11545 48 3053
4 355 8822 11955 22 3027
5 333 8822 13779 8 3035
6 325 8822 13729 0 3035
10.5.3 Attacking PRESENT with ElimLin and F4
PRESENT is an Substitution Permutation Network (SPN)-based block cipher designed for con-
strained environments, such as RFID tags and sensor networks. It was designed to be particularly
compact and competitive in hardware. PRESENT operates on 64-bit text blocks, iterates 31
rounds and uses keys of either 80 or 128 bits. This cipher was designed by Bogdanov et al. and
was released at CHES 2007 [BKL+07]. Each (full) round of PRESENT contains three layers in
the following order: a bitwise XOR layer with the round subkey; an S-box layer, in which a fixed
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Table 10.4: Attacking 8-round LBlock with
3 pairs and 32 LSB key bits guessed.
I n m0 T nL nc
1 4752 13110 10521 4072 4072
2 680 13110 16032 128 4200
3 552 13110 17495 83 4283
4 469 13110 18190 40 4323
5 429 13110 19913 21 4344
6 408 13110 20547 5 4349
7 403 13110 20843 1 4350
8 402 13110 20725 1 4351
9 401 13110 20561 0 4351
Table 10.5: Attacking 8-round LBlock with
4 pairs and 32 LSB key bits guessed.
I n m0 T nL nc
1 6096 17839 13657 5224 5224
2 872 17839 21209 171 5395
3 701 17839 24035 118 5511
4 583 17839 25396 66 5577
5 517 17839 27955 40 5617
6 477 17839 31106 21 5638
7 456 17839 31611 16 5654
8 440 17839 28934 1 5655
9 439 17839 28717 0 5655
Table 10.6: Attacking 8-round LBlock with
5 pairs and 32 LSB key bits guessed.
I n m0 T nL nc
1 7440 22730 16793 6376 6376
2 1064 22730 26386 214 6590
3 850 22730 30368 151 6741
4 699 22730 33097 91 6832
5 608 22730 37005 55 6887
6 553 22730 39058 35 6922
7 518 22730 37629 16 6938
8 502 22730 35748 1 6939
9 501 22730 35709 1 6940
10 500 22730 35509 1 6941
11 499 22730 34649 0 6941
Table 10.7: Attacking 8-round LBlock with
6 pairs and 32 LSB key bits guessed.
I n m0 T nL nc
1 8784 27758 19929 7528 7528
2 1256 27758 31563 257 7785
3 999 27758 36607 189 7974
4 810 27758 41351 123 8097
5 687 27758 48066 83 8180
6 604 27758 46540 41 8221
7 563 27758 42910 15 8236
8 548 27758 41469 8 8244
9 540 27758 39312 24 8268
10 516 27758 29409 126 8394
11 390 27758 23370 108 8502
12 282 27758 14889 87 8589
13 195 27758 9157 122 8711
14 73 27758 1454 71 8782
15 2 27758 3 2 8784
4 × 4-bit S-box (Table 10.10) is applied 16 times in parallel to the intermediate cipher state; a
linear transformation, called pLayer, consisting of a fixed bit permutation. Only the XOR layer
with round subkeys is an involution. Thus, the decryption operation requires the inverse of the
S-box and of the pLayer. After the 31-st round, there is an output transformation consisting of an
XOR with the last round subkey. One full round of PRESENT is depicted in Figure 10.4.
Let x = (x3, x2, x1, x0) denote an input nibble to an S-box, and y = (y3, y2, y1, y0) denote
its output nibble such that S[x] = y. The algebraic expressions of the yi’s in terms of the xj ’s
and vice versa are depicted in Figure 10.5, where addition and multiplication are performed over
GF(2).
Notice how y0 and x0 are much simpler functions than the other bits. In particular, y0 has
non-linear degree two (quadratic) and depends linearly on x0 and x3. Similarly, x0 has non-linear
degree two and depends linearly on y0 and y2.
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Table 10.8: Attacking 8-round LBlock with
7 pairs and 32 LSB key bits guessed.
I n m0 T nL nc
1 10128 32815 23065 8680 8680
2 1448 32815 36740 300 8980
3 1148 32815 42889 228 9208
4 920 32815 48974 157 9365
5 763 32815 58471 111 9476
6 652 32815 55476 47 9523
7 605 32815 51967 20 9543
8 585 32815 47625 25 9568
9 560 32815 36163 141 9709
10 419 32815 27254 126 9835
11 293 32815 16116 145 9980
12 148 32815 4960 142 10122
13 6 32815 8 6 10128
Table 10.9: Attacking 8-round LBlock with
8 pairs and 32 LSB key bits guessed.
I n m0 T nL nc
1 11472 37945 26201 9832 9832
2 1640 37945 41917 343 10175
3 1297 37945 47974 268 10443
4 1029 37945 55084 186 10629
5 843 37945 65625 129 10758
6 714 37945 63385 57 10815
7 657 37945 57671 22 10837
8 635 37945 50898 21 10858
9 614 37945 40883 161 11019
10 453 37945 30905 144 11163
11 309 37945 19850 160 11323
12 149 37945 5108 145 11468
13 4 37945 6 4 11472
SSS S S S S S S S SS S S SS
Figure 10.4: One full round of PRESENT.
PRESENT accepts a key of either 80 or 128 bits. Firstly, we focus on the version with 80-bit
keys. The user-supplied key is stored in a key register K and is represented as k79k78 . . . k0. At
round i, the 64-bit round key Ki = k
′
63k
′
62 . . . k
′
0 consists of the 64 leftmost bits of the current
contents of the register K. Thus, at round i we have: Ki = k
′
63k
′
62 . . . k
′
0 = k79k78 . . . k16. After
extracting the round key Ki, the key register K = k79k78 . . . k0 is updated as follows:
1. [k79k78 . . . k1k0] = [k18k17 . . . k20k19]
2. [k79k78k77k76] = S[k79k78k77k76]
3. [k19k18k17k16k15] = [k19k18k17k16k15]⊕ r
where r is the round counter. Thus, the key register is rotated by 61 bit positions to the left, the
left-most four bits are given to the PRESENT S-box and the round counter value i is XORed with
the bits k19k18k17k16k15 of K, where the least significant bit of the round counter is on the right.
For a 128-bit key version of PRESENT, the user-supplied key is stored in a key register K
and is represented as k127k126 . . . k0. At round i, the 64-bit round key Ki = k
′
63k
′
62 . . . k
′
0 consists
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Table 10.10: The 4× 4-bit S-box of PRESENT and the inverse S-box.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
S[x] 12 5 6 11 9 0 10 13 3 14 15 8 4 7 1 2
S−1[x] 5 14 15 8 12 1 2 13 11 4 6 3 0 7 9 10
Figure 10.5: Algebraic expression of output and input bits of the S-box of PRESENT.
S :

y0 = x1x2 + x0 + x2 + x3
y1 = x0x1x3 + x0x2x3 + x0x1x2 + x1x3 + x2x3 + x1 + x3
y2 = x0x1x3 + x0x2x3 + x0x1 + x0x3 + x1x3 + x2 + x3 + 1
y3 = x0x1x2 + x0x1x3 + x0x2x3 + x1x2 + x0 + x1 + x3 + 1
S−1 :

x0 = y1y3 + y0 + y2 + 1
x1 = y0y1y2 + y0y1y3 + y0y2y3 + y0y2 + y1y3 + y2y3 + y0 + y1 + y3
x2 = y0y1y2 + y0y1y3 + y0y2y3 + y0y1 + y0y2 + y1y2 + y0y3 + y1y3 + y3 + 1
x3 = y0y1y2 + y0y2y3 + y0y1 + y0 + y1 + y2 + y3
of the 64 leftmost bits of the current contents of the register K. Thus, at round i we have:
Ki = k
′
63k
′
62 . . . k
′
0 = k127k126 . . . k64. After extracting the round key Ki, the key register K =
k127k126 . . . k0 is updated as follows:
1. [k127k126 . . . k1k0] = [k66k65 . . . k68k67]
2. [k127k126k125k124] = S[k127k126k125k124]
3. [k123k122k121k120] = S[k123k122k121k120]
4. [k66k65k64k63k62] = [k66k65k64k63k62]⊕ r
Thus, the key register is rotated by 61 bit positions to the left, the left-most eight bits are yielded
to two PRESENT S-boxes, and the round counter value i is XORed with the bits k66k65k64k63k62
of K, where the least significant bit of the round counter is on the right.
The designers of PRESENT in [BKL+07] have mentioned that they were unsuccessful in ob-
taining any satisfactory result in reasonable time using algebraic cryptanalysis (F4 algorithm under
MAGMA [Mag]) to break two rounds of a smaller version of the cipher having only seven S-boxes
per round compared to the real PRESENT cipher having sixteen S-boxes per round.
It is a straightforward procedure to demonstrate that every 4×4 S-box has at least 21 quadratic
equations. The larger the number of equations, the weaker the S-box. In fact, the S-box of
PRESENT has exactly 21 equations. Writing the whole 80-bit key variant of PRESENT as a
system of quadratic equations for 5 rounds, we obtained 740 variables and 2169 equations. We
introduce an attack on both PRESENT with key sizes of 80 and 128 bits. Notice that for both
key sizes one pair is not enough to recover the key uniquely and we need at least two pairs.
The summary of our results is presented in Table 10.11. As it is depicted in Table 10.11, the
timing results of ElimLin and PolyBoRi are comparable except the time in which PolyBoRi crashed
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due to running out of memory. As our experiments revealed, in all cases ElimLin used much less
memory compared to F4 under PolyBoRi framework.
Table 10.11: Algebraic attack complexities on reduced-round PRESENT.
Nr #key g Running Time Data Attack
(in hours) notes
5 80 40 0.043 5 KP ElimLin
5 80 40 0.067 5 KP PolyBoRi
5 80 37 0.613 10 KP ElimLin
5 80 37 0.523 10 KP PolyBoRi
5 80 36 3.532 16 KP ElimLin
5 80 36 crashed 16 KP PolyBoRi
5 80 35 1.845 16 KP ElimLin
5 80 35 crashed 16 KP PolyBoRi
5 128 88 0.050 5 KP ElimLin
5 128 88 0.069 5 KP PolyBoRi
Skimming through Table 10.11 reveals that the time it takes to recover 45 bits of the key is
less than that of 44 bits. This seems very surprising at first glance, but it can be justified by
considering that the running time of ElimLin is highly dependent on the sparsity of the equations.
So, our intuition is that as we have picked distinct plaintext and key randomly in each experiment,
by pure accident the former system of equations turns out to be sparser than the latter and it
is also probable that more linear equations are generated due to some combination of randomly
picked plaintexts and keys.
We tried to break 6 rounds of PRESENT by ElimLin and PolyBoRi, but ElimLin did not give
us any satisfactory result and PolyBoRi crashed after a while due to running out of memory for
6-round PRESENT.
10.6 A Comparison Between ElimLin and PolyBoRi
Gro¨bner basis is currently one of the most successful methods for solving polynomial systems of
equations. However, it has its own restrictions. The main bottleneck of the Gro¨bner basis tech-
niques is the memory requirement and therefore, most of the Gro¨bner basis attacks use relatively
small number of samples. It is worthwhile to mention that ElimLin is a subroutine is Gro¨bner basis
computations. But, ElimLin algorithm as a single tool requires a large number of samples to work.
The Gro¨bner basis solves the system by reductions according to a pre-selected ordering, which
can lead to high degree dense polynomials.
ElimLin uses the fact that multiple samples provide an additional information to the solver,
and therefore, the key might be found even if we restrict the reduction to degree 2.
Next, we compare the current state of the art implementation of F4 algorithm PolyBoRi and
our implementation of ElimLin. In the cases where ElimLin behaves better than PolyBoRi, it does
not mean that ElimLin is superior to F4 algorithm. In fact, it just means that there exists a better
implementation for ElimLin than for F4 for some particular systems of equations. F4 uses a fixed
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ordering for monomials and therefore it does not preserve the sparsity in its intermediate steps. On
the other hand, our implementation of ElimLin performs several sparsity preserving techniques by
changing the ordering. This drops the total number of monomials and makes it memory efficient.
Table 10.1 and Table 10.11 show that PolyBoRi requires too much memory and crashes for
a large number of samples. At the same time, our implementation of ElimLin is slightly slower
than PolyBoRi implementation attacking 10 samples of 5-round PRESENT-80 as in Table 10.11.
This demonstrates that our implementation of ElimLin can be more effective than PolyBoRi and
vice versa, depending on memory requirements of PolyBoRi. However, whenever the system is
solvable by our implementation of ElimLin, our experiments revealed that PolyBoRi does not give
a significant advantage over ElimLin because the memory requirements are too high.
While PolyBoRi may yield a solution for a few samples, the success of ElimLin is determined
by the number of samples provided to the algorithm. The evaluation of the number of sufficient
samples in ElimLin is still an open problem.
We often see that preserving the degree by simple linear algebra techniques can outperform
the more sophisticated Gro¨bner basis algorithms, mainly due to the structural properties of the
system of equations of a cryptographic primitive (such as sparsity). ElimLin takes advantage
of such structural properties and uncovers some hidden linear equations using multiple samples.
According to our experiments, PolyBoRi does not seem to be able to take advantage of these
structural properties as would be expected. This results in higher memory requirements than
would be necessary and ultimately failure for large systems, even though it is clearly possible for the
algorithm to find the solution in reasonable time. Finally, we need more efficient implementations
and data structures for both ElimLin and Gro¨bner basis algorithms.
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SAT Solving Techniques with Applications to
Cryptanalysis of KATAN
11.1 Introduction
The area of SAT Solving has seen tremendous progress over the last years. Many problems (e.g.
in hardware and software verification) and in our application in cryptanalysis that seemed to be
completely out of reach a decade ago can now be handled routinely. Beside new algorithms and
better heuristics, refined implementation techniques turned out to be vital for this success. New
SAT solvers can now solve large systems in reasonable time. Since 2002, almost each year a SAT
Race competition [SAT] has been established. In 2007 and 2010 respectively, MiniSat [ES05] and
CryptoMiniSat [NS09] won the Gold prizes. We used these two SAT solvers in our analysis, but
since the timings of MiniSat were faster, we do not report CryptoMinisat results.
An instance of an MQ problem can be simply changed to an instance of a SAT problem. In fact,
both these problems are NP hard for a random system. As mentioned earlier, many cryptographic
protocols can be formulated as a large system of multivariate equations in which their security
is based on the security of the MQ problem. One example is QUAD, a provably secure stream
cipher [BGP06]. Its security is directly determined by the complexity of solving a large multivariate
polynomial system of equations.
In this chapter, we are going to represent the block cipher KATAN [DCDK09] as an instance
of an MQ problem and then change it to an instance of a SAT problem. We propose a new pre-
processing on its system of equations before feeding it to MiniSat. This pre-processing stage makes
the SAT solver run faster and allows us to break a higher number of rounds of KATAN.
The results in this chapter have been published in INDOCRYPT 2010 [BCN+10].
11.2 Algebraic Attacks Using SAT Solvers
To solve polynomial systems of multivariate equations by SAT solvers, the attacker initially con-
verts the system from Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) to Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF). There
is an efficient conversion method due to Bard, Courtois and Jefferson (BCJ) [BCJ07]. The con-
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catenation of these CNFs gives a file with extension .cnf on which we can apply any SAT solver.
11.3 Algebraic Cryptanalysis of KATAN Family of Block Ciphers
KATAN is a family of lightweight, hardware-oriented block ciphers consisting of three variants
with 32, 48 and 64-bit blocks. For all KATAN ciphers, the key size is 80 bits (n = 80) and they all
iterate 254 rounds [DCDK09]. The block size is used as a suffix to designate each cipher member,
as KATAN32, KATAN48 and KATAN64. The design of these ciphers was inspired by the stream
cipher Trivium [DCP08]. The structure of KATAN32 consists of two LFSR’s, called L1 and L2,
loaded with the plaintext and then transformed by two non-linear Boolean functions, fa and fb as
follows (Table 11.1 lists the bit sizes and the indices xi and yj of L1 and L2):
fa(L1) = L1[x1] + L1[x2] + L1[x3] · L1[x4] + L1[x5] · IR + ka
fb(L2) = L2[y1] + L2[y2] + L2[y3] · L2[y4] + L2[y5] · L2[y6] + kb
where IR is the output of an LFSR, i.e., L1[x5] is used whenever IR = 1. The values of IR for each
round is specified in [DCDK09]. For the i-th round, ka = k2i and kb = k2i+1 that is, only two key
bits are used per round. The output of each of these functions is loaded to the least significant bits
(LSB) of the other LFSR, after they are left-shifted. This operation is performed in an invertible
manner (see Figure 11.1).
KATAN and KTANTAN 279
Table 2. Parameters defined for the KATAN family of ciphers
Cipher |L1| |L2| x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
KATAN32/KTANTAN32 13 19 12 7 8 5 3
KATAN48/KTANTAN48 19 29 18 12 15 7 6
KATAN64/KTANTAN64 25 39 24 15 20 11 9
Cipher y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6
KATAN32/KTANTAN32 18 7 12 10 8 3
KATAN48/KTANTAN48 28 19 21 13 15 6
KATAN64/KTANTAN64 38 25 33 21 14 9
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Fig. 1. The Outline of a round of the KATAN/KTANTAN ciphers
registers, they are applied again, using the same subkeys. Of course, an efficient
implementation can implement these two steps in parallel. In KATAN64, each
round applies fa and fb three times (again, with the same key bits).
We outline the structure of KATAN32 (which is similar to the round function
of any of the KATAN variants or the KTANTAN variants) in Figure 1.
Finally, specification-wise, we define the counter which counts the number of
rounds. The round-counter LFSR is initialized to the all 1’s state, and clocked
once using the feedback polynomial x8+ x7 + x5+ x3 +1. Then, the encryption
process starts, and ends after 254 additional clocks when the LFSR returns to the
all 1’s state. As mentioned earlier, we use the most significant bit of the LFSR
to control the irregular update (i.e., as the IR signal). For sake of completeness,
in Table 3 in the Appendix we give the sequence of irregular rounds.
We note that due to the way the irregular update rule is chosen, there are no
sequences of more than 7 rounds that share the pattern of the regular/irregular
updates, this ensures that any self-similarity attack cannot utilize more than 7
rounds of the same function (even if the attacker chooses keys that suggest the
same subkeys). Thus, it is easy to see that such attacks are expected to fail when
applied to the KATAN family.
We implemented KATAN32 using Synopsys Design Compiler version
Y-2006.06 and the fsc0l d sc tc 0.13µm CMOS library. Our implementation
Figure 11.1: The outline of a round of the KATAN/KTANTAN ciphers.
For KATAN48, fa and fb are each applied twice per round, so that the LFSR’s are clocked
twice; however, the same pair of key bits are reused. For KATAN64, each Boolean function is
applied three times per round, again with the same pair of key bits reused three times.
The selection of bits xi and yi in fa and fb are listed in Table 11.1. Plaintext and ciphertext
bits are numbered in right-to-left order starting from 0. Thus, for instance, a plaintext block
for KATAN32 will be numbered as p = (p31, . . ., p0). The key schedule algorithm of all KATAN
ciphers is a linear mapping that expands an 80-bit key K to 508 subkey bits according to
ki =
{
Ki, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 79
ki−80 + ki−61 + ki−50 + ki−13 otherwise
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Table 11.1: Parameters for the fa and fb functions.
Cipher |L1| |L2| x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6
KATAN32 13 19 12 7 8 5 3 18 7 12 10 8 3
KATAN48 19 29 18 12 15 7 6 28 19 21 13 15 6
KATAN64 25 39 24 15 20 11 9 38 25 33 21 14 9
Thus, the subkey of the i-th round is ka||kb = k2i||k2i+1.
After r rounds, at most 2r key bits are mixed with the internal state, as two key bits are
XORed per round. Thus, at least 40 rounds are needed before a complete key diffusion for any
KATAN cipher is achieved. Further details about these ciphers can be found in [DCDK09]. For
analysis purposes, the numbering in the user key in our attacks is K = (K79, . . ., K0).
11.3.1 Straightforward Algebraic Attack on KATAN Using SAT Solvers
One instance of KATAN32 can be represented as 8 620 very sparse quadratic equations with 8 668
variables, KATAN48 as 24 908 equations and 24 940 variables and KATAN64 as 49 324 equations
and 49 340 variables. As can be observed, the system is underdefined. That is because the key size
is larger than the block size for all versions. To have a defined or an overdefined system, we need
multiple samples.
The summary of our results is in Table 11.2. We used the “guess and determine” algebraic attack
initially proposed in [CB07]. This implies that we fix g bits of the key and then we show that
recovering the other 80−g bits is faster than exhaustive search (the same approach as of Chapter 10,
Sec. 10.5). This is represented in the column titled “g” in Table 11.2. In fact, we fix g LSB of
the key, as heuristically we obtained better results than fixing the g MSB of the key. We used the
graph partitioning method by Wong and Bard [WB10] to derive the best state variables to fix, but
it did not bring about anything better than using the heuristic of fixing the least g significant bits
of the key. Note, if we fix g bits, the algebraic attack is solving a system of equations to recover
the 80− g remaining bits. The time to recover this 80− g bits is represented as “Running Time”
in Table 11.2.
We represent the time complexity of the SAT Solver (MiniSat) in seconds using a 3 Ghz CPU.
Note that our algebraic attacks are in a chosen-plaintext scenario, except in some rare cases as
noted. We noticed that chosen-plaintext attack is much stronger against KATAN family than
known-plaintext (KP) attack. In our attacks, we used the following structure for the chosen
plaintexts for KATAN32: pi+1 = ((pi  19) + 1)  19 and pi+1 = ((pi  29) + 1)  29 for
KATAN48 and pi+1 = ((pi  39) + 1) 39 for KATAN64 for i ≥ 1, where pi is the i-th plaintext
we pick and p1 is random. Note that bits 19, 29 and 39 are exactly the bit 0 of L1 register for
KATAN32, KATAN48 and KATAN64 respectively. This choice of the bits makes the SAT solver
run faster. Moreover, we believe it is fair to assume that each round encryption of KATAN takes at
least 5 CPU cycles. This yields a comparison between the complexity of our attacks and exhaustive
key search.
Deploying the straightforward method for converting ANF to CNF and then feeding it to a
SAT solver, we could break up to 75 rounds of KATAN32 and 64 rounds of KATAN48 and 60
rounds of KATAN64. But, we can do better by performing a pre-processing on the system of
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Table 11.2: Attack complexities on KATAN family of block ciphers (memory complexity is negli-
gible).
Cipher Nr Running Time Data g Attack Source
KATAN32 40 11 sec 3 KP 0 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
50 11 sec 3 KP 0 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
60 18 sec 3 KP 0 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
65 1.81 min 3 KP 0 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
66 8.85 min 3 KP 0 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
67 26 sec 3 KP 30 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
68 2.55 min 3 KP 30 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
69 47.76 min 3 KP 35 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
70 1.64 min 10 CP 35 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
71 3.58 min 10 CP 35 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
75 12.50 h 3 CP 35 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
76 1.59 min 20 CP 45 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv./Pre-Pro. Sect. 11.3.2
76 4.1 min 20 CP 43 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv./Pre-Pro. Sect. 11.3.2
76 3.08 min 20 CP 41 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv./Pre-Pro. Sect. 11.3.2
77 18 sec 20 CP 45 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv./Pre-Pro. Sect. 11.3.2
78 5.80 min 20 CP 45 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv./Pre-Pro. Sect. 11.3.2
79 14.72 min 20 CP 45 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv./Pre-Pro. Sect. 11.3.2
KATAN48 40 2 sec 5 CP 40 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
50 7 sec 5 CP 40 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
60 13.18 min 5 CP 40 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
61 7.12 min 5 CP 45 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
62 11.86 min 10 CP 40 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
63 17.47 min 10 CP 45 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
64 6.42 h 5 CP 40 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
KATAN64 40 2 sec 5 CP 40 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
50 12 sec 5 CP 40 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
60 3.17 h 5 CP 40 MiniSat2.2, BCJ conv. Sect. 11.3.1
Running Time: the time to recover 80− g bits of the key.
KP: known plaintext
CP: chosen plaintext
BCJ: the Bard-Courtois-Jefferson converter
Pre-Pro: the pre-processed system of equations
equations before applying it to a SAT solver. Using this pre-processing (see the next section),
we could break 79 rounds of KATAN32. We only tried this method on the KATAN32 equations.
Further research would apply this technique to other members of the family.
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11.3.2 The Pre-processing SAT-Solver Attack
In this section, we use the equations generated as described earlier and solve them with the SAT
solver MiniSat [ES05]. It is simpler to formulate KATAN as a sparse system. But, this may not
be the best representation for a SAT solver. One characteristic of our representation is that there
are many equations of the form x = y, as well as x = 0, y = 1 and more rarely x + y = 1. Also,
in a typical example (78 rounds, 45 key bits fixed and 20 CPs of KATAN32) there are 51 321
total equations. Naturally, one would want to take advantage of these special equations during the
pre-processing to create a smaller system which has fewer variables and equations.
More precisely, the four heuristics of a CNF problem are (1) the number of variables, (2)
the number of clauses, (3) the average number of symbols per clause and (4) the total number
of symbols in the system. The pre-processing algorithm that we describe in the next section is
designed on the principle of primarily reducing (1) and (2) while causing the minimum possible
increase in (3) and (4). To be specific, at each iteration, a substitution will be made and this
substitution reduces (1) and (2) by one and the substitution is selected in the style of the “greedy
algorithm” using (4) as the criterion.
The following pre-processing algorithm is a refinement of the “massaging” algorithm of [CB07]
and so we call it “turbo-massage”. Starting with the equations that were generated, we ran the
pre-processing algorithm; after that, we converted the polynomials into a CNF problem, according
to [CB07] and ran MiniSat on that CNF problem to get a solution. We will explain the pre-
processors here and refer the reader to [CB07] or [Bar09] for the process of converting a polynomial
system into a CNF problem.
11.3.3 The Turbo-Massage Pre-processing Algorithm
As described before, the equations can be thought of as a series of polynomials, named f1(~x) = 0,
f2(~x) = 0, . . .. We define the operation “fully-substitute” as follows: Let f(~x) be a polynomial
with some monomial µ. To fully-substitute f(~x) into g(~x) on µ means to
– Write g(~x) in the form g(~x) = µh1(~x) + h2(~x).
– Write f(~x) in the form f(~x) = µ+ h3(~x).
– Replace g(~x) with h1(~x)h3(~x) + h2(~x), which is mathematically equivalent, because in any
satisfying solution ~x, we would have µ = h3(~x).
– By clever use of data structures, this can be made highly efficient.
Observe that for the four common forms: x = y, as well as x = 0, y = 1 and more rarely
x+y = 1, the “fully-substitute” definition does what one would do if solving a system of equations
with a pencil and paper. For more higher weight f(~x), understanding what it does to g(~x) is more
complex.
We must also use a non-standard definition of the weight of a polynomial f(~x). We define
it to be the number of monomials in f(~x), but excluding the constant +1 from the tabulation.
The reason for this is that if f(~x) has weight w according to this modified definition, then 2w−1
conjunctive normal form clauses of length w will be required to represent the polynomial, assuming
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all the monomials are already defined. The total number of symbols is then w2w−1, and so
minimizing w is crucial in keeping the CNF problem small and thus solvable. This procedure is
represented in Algorithm 11.1.
Algorithm 11.1 The Turbo-Massage Pre-processing algorithm.
1: Input: A system of polynomial equations over GF(2), and a weight-limit wmax.
2: Output: A system of polynomial equations over GF(2) with maximum weight wmax.
3: Mark all polynomials “unused.”
4: while the set of unused polynomials is not empty do
5: Locate the lowest weight unused polynomial f(~x).
6: if f(~x) exceeds wmax then
7: Terminate.
8: end if
9: Mark f(~x) as “used”.
10: if f(~x) has weight 1 then
11: select µ to be the only monomial in f(~x).
12: end if
13: if f(~x) has weight 3 or higher then
14: select µ to be the monomial which appears least frequently in the entire system of equa-
tions.
15: end if
16: if f(~x) has weight 2 then
17: select µ to be the monomial which appears most frequently in the entire system of equa-
tions.
18: end if
19: for any polynomial g(~x) containing the monomial µ do
20: “fully-substitute” f(~x) into g(~x) on µ.
21: end for
22: end while
The “turbo-massaging” algorithm will always terminate, because eventually, every polynomial
has been marked used. In practice, it will terminate early, where all unused polynomials are of
weight wmax or higher. If there are n “used” polynomials, then there will be n monomials which
appear nowhere in the entire system, except in exactly one polynomial. This is of course the
monomial µ which was chosen when that polynomial was getting used. In our system of equations,
it was almost always the case (by an overwhelming margin) that µ was degree one. And so, each
used polynomial effectively amputates one variable from the polynomial system of equations.
The special case of weight 2 deserves an explanation. When f has weight 1, there is no decision
to be made, but it is noteworthy that the weight of g will decrease. When f has weight 2, then the
weight of g will not change during the “fully-substitute” operation, except in some odd cases like
substituting x = y into zx+ zy + w + x+ y = 0, where the weight goes from 5 to 1 instantly. As
the weight is not likely to change and we are eliminating a monomial, it makes sense to eliminate
a common monomial. When the weight of f is 3 or more, then the weight of g will increase. If we
choose µ to be very popular, appearing k times, then the total weight of the system will increase
by k(w − 2). Thus, it makes sense to keep the weight growth bounded and choose µ to be rare.
This heuristic was found after an enormous number of iterations of “trial-and-error”.
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For example, in the 78-round, 20 CP, 45-bit-key case of KATAN32, the weight went from
110 726 to 101, 516 after 47 032 polynomials got used. Furthermore, the “fully substitute” function
was called 330 587 times. There were 50 033 equations at this point, down from 51 321, representing
1 288 equations that became 0 = 0. In other words, the original system was not full rank. The
average weight of a polynomial, using the modified definition of weight, was roughly 2.02898.
The system had 53 993 distinct monomials, plus 2 005 variables which appeared only in degree 1
monomials and ended with a CNF problem of 55 398 variables and 156 010 clauses. The conversion
process, which must be run only once and not 245 times, takes between 20 and 29 minutes in all
the cases explored here.
It should be noted that in other polynomial systems, it might be the case that µ is often
quadratic or higher degree. It remains open if one should force µ to be linear when possible. This
is a question that the authors hope to investigate shortly. As it comes to pass, wmax = 2 turned
out to be slightly better than wmax = 3 for this problem, but in other cases up to wmax = 5 has
been used.
A minor note for algebraic geometers familiar with the concept of a Macaulay matrix [Mac16]
in the Lazard [Laz83] family of algorithms (including F4 [Fau99], XL and their variants [CSPK00,
Cou08]) is that this algorithm is like a Gaussian Elimination on that matrix, but stopping early.
The pivoting strategy used is reducible to the Markowitz pivoting algorithm [Mar57]. However,
the “fully-substitute” is not the same in this case, as adding x = y to zx+zy+w+x+y = 0 would
result in zx+ zy+w = 0. On the other hand, fully-substituting x = y into zx+ zy+w+x+y = 0
would result in zx+zx+w+x+x = 0 which turns into w = 0. As can be seen, full-substitution is
distinct from adding and is very similar to what a mathematician would do when solving a system
of polynomial equations with a pencil and paper.
11.3.4 Better Cryptanalysis Results on KATAN32
The first result was 76 rounds, 20 CP and 45 (fixed) key bits of KATAN32, broken faster than by
brute force. To extend this result, we explored using fewer key bits and more rounds. First, we
conducted the above process for 20 CPs and for 76, 77, 78, 79 and 80 rounds. Every case was run
50 times.
Because we fixed 45 bits of the key, and so assuming one nano-second per round for a brute
force attacker using a 3 Ghz CPU, our attack against r rounds is faster than brute force, if and
only if it runs in t seconds with 245t < r28010−9 or more plainly t < r23510−9 ≈ r(34.3597 · · · ).
We also ran trials with 43 bits of the key fixed for 76 rounds and there the threshold would be 4
times greater or 137.439r seconds and for 41 bits of the key 549.755r seconds.
The running times are given in Table 11.3. Observe the enormous variance in each trial. In
some cases, the fastest run is 1000× faster than the slowest. This is very typical in SAT-solver-
based cryptanalysis. We excluded the three fastest and slowest trials, and took the mean and
standard deviation of the remaining 44 trials.
The running time of 245 executions, all added together, is the sum of 245 samples from indepen-
dent random variables. Therefore, the central limit theorem applies and regardless of the actual
distribution of the running times, if the mean is m1 and the standard deviation (stdev) is σ1, the
sum of 245 of them will be normally distributed and have a mean of 245m1 and a standard deviation
of 222.5σ1. As σ/m is an important instrument in gauging the reliability of a normal sample, it
is interesting to note here that σ/m (for the sum of 245 execution times) would be 2−22.5(σ1/m1)
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which is phenomenally tiny. Thus, the running time of the real-world attacker would be essentially
constant.
Notice, that we claim that the 245 running times are independent, but we do not claim that
they are identically distributed. On the other hand, one could conceive a cipher where one key bit
was ignored by the cipher, in which case the running times for two keys, which differ only in that
bit would be highly dependent. These cases are of pedagogical interest only because no cipher
designer would ever do that.
As can be seen in Table 11.3, we are between 80.75 and 2.39 times faster than brute force
search for up to and including 79 rounds. In the case of 80 rounds, out of 50 trials, 29 of them
timed-out after 1 hour. As this is a majority, it is not possible that the mean is less than the
required 2 748.77 seconds, and so we are not faster than brute-force for 80 rounds. For 43 key
bits and 41 key bits, the attack becomes vastly more efficient. But, we cannot test 39 key bits,
as the time-out value would have to be set to 167,125 seconds or roughly 46 hours, for each of 50
processes.
In addition to MiniSat, we ran all 50 instances with CryptoMiniSat [NS09], a SAT-Solver
constructed specifically for cryptography by Mate Soos. However, it was consistently slower than
MiniSat. We suspect that this is the case because CryptoMiniSat was intended to minimize
the impact of long-XORs, which are normally very damaging to the running time of SAT-solver
methods; however, we have no long-XORs in our equations, in fact, no sum was longer than 5
symbols after pre-processing, excluding the constant monomial.
11.3.5 The Gibrat Hypothesis
In [CB07], [CM03] as well as [Bar09], Bard hypothesized that the true distribution of the running
times of a CNF-problem in a polynomial-system-based SAT problem follows the Gibrat distribu-
tion. That is to say, that the logarithm of the running time is normal. The running times here
were such that their standard deviations exceeded the mean. If the distribution of the running
time was normal, having σ > µ would imply a very significant fraction of the running times would
be negative. Therefore, it is not possible that the running time is normally distributed. On the
other hand, we also tabulated the mean and standard deviation of the logarithm.
The ratio of the mean and standard deviation of the logarithm of running times is much more
reasonable. The kurtosis is the typical measurement of the “normalness” of a distribution and the
kurtosis of the logarithms of the running times are far closer to 1 (and are in fact within ±1) than
the kurtosis of the running times themselves (which had kurtoses over 9). So the hypothesis that
the running times are Gibrat, from [CB07], seems well-justified for these examples.
11.3.6 A Strange Phenomenon
We were perplexed to discover that solving 77 rounds was far easier than solving 76 rounds or 78
rounds of KATAN32. Therefore, we ran the experiments again, with both sets of results listed in
Table 11.3 as the first batch and the second batch. As can be seen, in both cases, 77 rounds is
much easier than 76 or 78 and with a very large margin. Moreover, this remained true as well
in our experiments with CryptoMiniSat. As random variables, the i-th iteration of the 76 round
attack and the i-th iteration of the 77 round attack had absolute correlation of 0.060419 . . . and
likewise between 77 and 78 it was −0.09699 · · · . These extremely low correlations make it safe to
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hypothesize that the running times are independent and this removes the possibility that the effect
is an artifact of some methodology error. Note that the formula for correlation that we used is
Cor(X,Y ) =
E[(X − µx)(Y − µy)]
σxσy
as is standard. Moreover, we observed the same behaviour when dealing with the size of the vertex
separator in the variable-sharing graph representation of the polynomial system of equations of
KATAN32 using the strategy described in [WB10]. For KATAN32, the size of the vertex separator
is not increasing with the number of rounds, and as a matter of fact, it fluctuates. We offer no
explanation to the cause of the weakness of the 77-round version of KATAN32.
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Table 11.3: Running time and some statistical results for different number of rounds of the pre-
processed equations for KATAN32 (The running times are in second).
Nr 76 77 77 78 79 80 76 76
g 45 45 45 45 45 45 43 41
(1st batch) (2nd batch)
1 2.89 1.00 2.43 11.04 17.05 59.62 1.50 1.75
2 3.15 2.16 3.69 11.54 24.97 64.61 5.48 1.91
3 3.39 2.25 4.01 14.51 26.86 100.28 15.75 3.36
4 3.39 3.39 4.12 15.83 28.82 135.34 25.88 3.77
5 4.61 3.93 4.40 19.17 54.27 157.10 34.81 5.17
6 6.73 4.16 4.44 24.99 57.02 166.41 39.92 5.65
7 8.29 4.22 4.65 51.46 60.72 230.60 39.97 8.64
8 8.46 4.58 4.72 63.04 64.08 277.04 45.06 11.35
9 11.54 4.81 5.07 86.06 70.34 353.45 50.19 21.71
10 13.15 4.84 6.41 89.89 89.17 354.07 50.79 35.31
11 17.19 4.96 6.81 109.21 109.86 402.56 52.09 41.71
12 17.62 5.44 10.08 115.86 130.28 423.76 60.94 53.7
13 23.64 5.62 14.54 141.19 137.77 433.73 75.35 55.77
14 26.60 5.74 15.03 148.91 145.05 463.78 102.91 61.6
15 27.69 5.83 18.16 161.49 210.29 516.65 116.01 78.29
16 37.32 6.80 18.51 163.23 217.28 687.88 121.89 84.18
17 38.04 7.64 19.51 206.66 269.08 1163.48 123.25 87.51
18 39.67 8.38 21.31 218.43 326.69 1591.56 123.36 104.76
19 48.68 9.54 21.35 230.86 402.61 2180.93 124.39 108.29
20 50.63 10.08 21.57 236.17 408.39 3261.20 131.54 128.62
21 56.51 11.32 22.06 241.45 537.16 3274.25 132.67 138.37
22 62.53 13.81 22.41 248.64 547.32 29 timeouts 134.03 166.93
23 66.03 15.72 22.63 256.66 718.58 207.34 170.14
24 81.25 16.69 27.15 293.66 780.44 208.48 182.83
25 88.88 17.47 28.45 319.31 873.25 233.40 183.9
26 101.43 17.86 32.39 377.06 893.29 258.52 185.41
27 115.13 19.19 45.27 455.50 949.06 300.38 200.08
28 127.09 19.63 49.92 504.97 1007.55 326.94 223.6
29 176.33 22.76 54.80 593.65 1223.91 374.62 246
30 200.26 24.29 54.82 822.36 1244.11 387.17 248.05
31 224.75 29.68 73.71 854.80 1388.40 444.42 254.58
32 243.36 30.09 82.72 880.31 1436.00 449.31 256.05
33 258.53 33.27 85.42 1111.59 1632.59 542.73 263.13
34 278.53 34.02 85.56 1118.54 1838.31 829.13 275.75
35 294.99 35.62 97.22 1197.05 1864.98 905.35 304.75
36 353.49 35.94 97.76 1388.38 1875.87 954.94 305.1
37 407.02 43.33 103.34 1449.29 2031.08 1217.79 305.18
38 423.38 43.65 111.18 1514.89 2038.93 1367.94 328.86
39 475.98 48.18 118.48 1517.73 2167.55 1390.52 352.89
40 506.67 48.22 119.15 1533.10 2262.50 1618.79 356.23
41 687.95 49.96 184.91 1538.97 2369.57 2234.32 403.7
42 842.95 73.62 222.26 1689.96 2413.38 2455.77 407.63
43 942.88 106.69 226.48 1894.40 2495.42 2668.97 418.7
44 2387.95 133.21 335.07 2031.93 2641.90 3246.26 427.04
45 2400.12 186.39 456.45 2375.14 2960.11 3326.73 429.21
46 3722.62 201.89 662.92 2682.71 3460.90 3530.63 555.35
47 4471.28 302.66 815.38 2837.97 4023.81 7157.16 577.3
48 > 6000 344.63 976.94 3731.61 4129.64 9378.05 6248.59
49 > 6000 433.70 2378.61 > 6000 4212.65 > 10, 000 6763.91
50 > 6000 524.56 > 6000 > 6000 > 6000 > 10, 000 9655.8
Threshold-time 2611.34 2645.70 2645.70 2680.06 2714.42 2748.78 10445.35 41781.40
# faster 47 50 49 48 49 21 48 50
Median 95.16 17.67 30.42 348.19 883.27 n/a 245.96 184.66
Mean of all but 6 463.21 38.98 100.88 768.47 1146.77 n/a 868.70 205.97
Stdev of all but 6 957.09 60.29 168.93 786.56 1054.09 n/a 1381.91 154.29
Kurtosis of all but 6 9.51 9.19 9.30 0.17 -0.12 n/a 9.33 -0.46
Times faster 5.64 67.87 26.23 3.49 2.37 n/a 12.02 202.85
than brute force
Mean of log 4.648 2.914 3.650 5.938 6.369 n/a 5.706 4.810
Stdev of log 1.820 1.185 1.421 1.380 1.396 n/a 1.513 1.319
Kurtosis of log -0.582 -0.470 -0.620 -0.514 -0.985 n/a -0.985 0.867
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Algebraic Cryptanalysis of ARMADILLO1
12.1 Introduction
ARMADILLO cipher is a hardware oriented multi-purpose cryptographic primitive designed by
ORIDAO [Ori] and presented at CHES’10 [BDN+11]. It was built for RFID applications. It can
be used as a PRF/MAC, for example for challenge-response protocols as a MAC and also as a hash
function for digital signatures or a PRNG for constructing a stream cipher. It has two versions,
named ARMADILLO subsequently denoted by ARMADILLO1 and ARMADILLO2.
Due to the attack described in this chapter against ARMADILLO1 and also to shrink the design,
multiple intermediate versions of ARMADILLO were designed [SSV11]. Finally, ARMADILLO2 was
adopted.
We introduce a generalized version ARMADILLOgen which covers all distinct versions of AR-
MADILLO and we explain when the key recovery attack is possible.
The attack against ARMADILLO1 is polynomial and has complexity O(c2 log c), where c is the
size of the key. In fact, it can be performed “by hand“, as the actual key recovery algorithm is very
simple. There exist multiple other polynomial time key recovery and forgery attacks on distinct
versions of ARMADILLO. The interested readers can refer to [SSV11] for more details.
The results in this chapter were published in CHES 2010 [BDN+11] and CARDIS 2011 [SSV11].
In [ABNP+11], the authors found an attack against ARMADILLO2 based on parallel matching.
The key recovery attack against FIL-MAC application of ARMADILLO2-A and ARMADILLO2-E
using single challenge-response pair is 27 and 218 times faster than exhaustive search respectively.
Finally, ARMADILLO2 was practically broken recently in [NPP12].
12.2 Description of ARMADILLO
ARMADILLO relies on data-dependent bit transpositions. Given a bitstring x with bit ordering
x = (x`‖ · · · ‖x1), fixed permutations σ0 and σ1 over the set {1, 2, . . . , `}, a bit string s, a bit
b ∈ {0, 1} and a permutation σ, define xσs = x when s has length zero and xσs‖b = xσs◦σb , where
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xσ is the bit string x transposed by σ, that is,
xσ = (xσ−1(`)‖ · · · ‖xσ−1(1))
The function (s, x) 7→ xσs is a data-dependent transposition of x. The function s 7→ σs can be
seen as a particular case of the general semi-group homomorphism from {0, 1}∗ to a group G.
Notations. Throughout this chapter, ‖ denotes the concatenation of bitstrings,
⊕ denotes the bitwise XOR operation, x denotes the bitwise complement of a bitstring x; we
assume the little-endian numbering of bits, such as x = (x`‖ · · · ‖x1).
In this section, we give the description of two variants ARMADILLO1 and ARMADILLO2. Then,
we introduce a common generalized version ARMADILLOgen and show how it relates to all versions.
12.2.1 ARMADILLO1
ARMADILLO1 maps an initial value C and a message block U to two values (see Figure 12.1) .
(VC , VT ) = ARMADILLO1(C,U)
ARMADILLO1 works based on a register Xinter. By definition, C and VC are of c bits, VT as
well as each block Ui are of m bits, Xinter is of k = c+m bits. ARMADILLO1 is defined by integer
parameters c, m and two fixed permutations σ0 and σ1 over the set {1, 2, . . . , 2k}. Concretely, we
consider m ≥ 40 and k = c+m. To initialize ARMADILLO1, Xinter is set to C‖0m, where 0m is a
null padding block and C is an initial value. ARMADILLO1 works as follows (Figure 12.1).
1: in the i-th step, replace the rightmost m-bit block of Xinter by the block Ui;
2: set a ` = 2k bits register x = Xinter‖Xinter;
3: x undergoes a sequence of bit permutations which we denote by P . The output of this sequence
of bit permutations is truncated to the rightmost k bits, denoted S, by
S = tailk((Xinter‖Xinter)σXinter)
4: set Xinter to the value of S ⊕ Xinter.
5: after processing the last block Un, take (VC‖VT ) = Xinter as the output.
12.2.2 ARMADILLO2
For completeness, we now provide the description of ARMADILLO2 [BDN+11] here. ARMADILLO2
is mostly based on ARMADILLO1b (to be defined later) with an additional pre-processing mech-
anism. We note that the pre-processing step outputs a sequence of bits that defines the data
dependent permutation and ensures that the data dependent permutation σXinter cannot be easily
controlled by the attacker (see Figure 12.2).
1: in the i-th step, replace the rightmost m-bit block of Xinter by the block Ui;
2: set a ` = k bits register x = Xinter;
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Figure 12.1: Scheme of ARMADILLO1.
3: x undergoes a sequence of bit permutations, σ0 and σ1 and a constant γ addition, which we
denote by P . In fact, P maps a bitstring of m bits and a vector x of k bits into another vector
of k bits as P (s‖b, x) = P (s, xσb ⊕ γ), where b ∈ {0, 1} and xσb is a permutation of bits of x
(transposition). The output of this sequence of k bit permutations and constant addition is
denoted Y = P (Ui, x). We call this step pre-processing, as it is used to define the permutation
for the consequent step.
4: x undergoes a sequence of bit permutations and constant addition P defined by Y . The output
of this sequence of k bit permutations and constant addition is denoted S = P (Y, x).
5: set Xinter to the value of S ⊕ Xinter.
6: after processing the last block Un, take (VC‖VT ) as the output.
12.3 General ARMADILLOgen Algorithm
In [SSV11], the authors defined various intermediate versions of ARMADILLO. In fact, these distinct
versions revealed the design rationale behind the structure of ARMADILLO2. All these versions
are based on a data-dependent permutation P . They all can be covered under ARMADILLOgen as
a parametrized version of distinct variants and by setting the corresponding parameters, we obtain
ARMADILLO1, ARMADILLO1b, ARMADILLO1c, ARMADILLO1d and ARMADILLO2.
ARMADILLOgen is defined as
ARMADILLOgen(X) = T4(P (T1(X), T2(X)), X)
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Figure 12.2: Scheme of ARMADILLO2.
where
P (s‖b, Y ) = P (s, T3(b, Y ))
P (λ, Y ) = Y
λ denotes the empty string, T1, T2 and T4 are some linear functions and T3 in its most general
form is
T3(b, Y ) = L(Y )σb ⊕ γ
where L is linear and γ is a constant.
Then, ARMADILLO1 is defined as ARMADILLOgen for
T1(X) = X
T2(X) = X‖X
T3(b,X) = Xσb
T4(X,Y ) = tailk(X)⊕ Y
ARMADILLO2 is defined as ARMADILLOgen for
T1(X) = P (tailm(X), X)
T2(X) = X
T3(b,X) = Xσb ⊕ γ
T4(X,Y ) = X ⊕ Y
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ARMADILLO1c is defined as ARMADILLOgen for
T1(X) = X
T3(b,X) = L(X)σb ⊕ γ
for a linear transformation L with arbitrary linear T2 and T4.
ARMADILLO1d is defined as ARMADILLOgen for
T1(X) = Xpi
T3(b,X) = Xσb ⊕ γ
for a fixed permutation pi and with arbitrary linear T2 and T4.
12.3.1 ARMADILLO1b: Shrinking the Xinter Register
ARMADILLO1b is a compact version of ARMADILLO1 which prevents the preservation of Ham-
ming weight by adding a constant. However, it does not prevent the attack against ARMADILLO1.
According to [BDN+11], the ARMADILLO1 design prevents a distinguishing attack based on a con-
stant Hamming weight by having a double sized internal register and a final truncation, assuming
the output of the P transposition looks pseudo-random. We see later in this paper (see section
12.4) that this proof does not hold in standard attack model and ARMADILLO1 can be broken
in polynomial time. First, we define ARMADILLO1b and then demonstrate an attack against this
version and explain how the same attack can be used against ARMADILLO1.
ARMADILLO1b is defined as ARMADILLOgen for
T1(X) = X
T2(X) = X
T3(b,X) = Xσb ⊕ γ
T4(X,Y ) = X ⊕ Y
In the design of ARMADILLO1b the state size is reduced to k bits to save more gates. So, there
is only the register Xinter and not its complement and there is no truncation. To avoid Hamming
weight preservation, after each permutation, there is an XOR of the current state with a constant
γ (see Figure 12.3).
12.4 Key Recovery Attack on ARMADILLO1 and ARMADILLO1b
In this section, we describe an attack against two versions of ARMADILLO. We first explain
the attack on ARMADILLO1b and then by setting γ = 0 and extending the initial state to
(Xinter‖Xinter) = (C‖U‖C‖U), the same attack can be directly used against ARMADILLO1.
As ARMADILLO has more than one applications, we briefly explain how it is deployed in the
challenge-response application. We refer the reader to [BDN+11] for more details. The objective
is to have a fixed input-length MAC. Suppose that C is a secret and U is a one block challenge.
The value VT is the response or the authentication tag. We write
VT = ARMADILLO(C,U)
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Figure 12.3: Scheme of ARMADILLO1b.
As can be seen from the description of the algorithm, there is no substitution layer. This means
that for a fixed key C, the permutation σC is fixed (but unknown). As we see later in this chapter,
it can be easily recovered. For the attack, it suffices to recover the mapping σC of a single index,
for instance we recover σC(j) = n for some value j. If we can recover the mapping σC(j), we then
take the challenges Ui so that j-th bit of P (Ui, C‖Ui) contains different bits of the key. This allows
us to recover the secret key from literally reading the key from the output of ARMADILLO1b. More
precisely, we consider
T1(X) = X
T3(b,X) = Xσb ⊕ γ
with arbitrary linear T2 and T4. This includes ARMADILLO1 and ARMADILLO1b.
The attack is based on the fact that a bit permutation is linear with respect to an XOR
operation, i.e., for a permutation σ, X and Y be two vectors, we have (X ⊕ Y )σ = Xσ ⊕ Yσ.
Lemma 12.1. For any T3, C and U , we have
P (C‖U,C‖U) = P (C,P (U,C‖U))
Proof. We easily prove it by the induction on the size of C.
Lemma 12.2. For T3(b,X) = Xσb ⊕ γ, there exists a function f : 2|X| → 2|X| such that for any
Y = (yk‖ . . . ‖y1) and X, we have
P (Y,X) = XσY ⊕ f(Y )
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Proof. Let’s rewrite
P (Y,X) =
(((
Xσy1 ⊕ γ
)
σy2
⊕ γ
)
σy3
⊕ γ . . .
)
σyk
⊕ γ
Let’s define the prefix of Y as
prefix(Y ) = {Yj ; Yj = (yk‖ . . . ‖yj), 1 ≤ j ≤ k}
Thus, P can be rewritten as
P (Y,X) = (X ⊕ γ)σY ⊕ γ ⊕
⊕
p∈prefix(Y )
γσp = XσY ⊕ P (Y, 0)
Now we apply the above results to ARMADILLOgen with T1(X) = X and T3(b,X) = Xσb ⊕ γ.
ARMADILLOgen(C‖U) = T4(P (C‖U, T2(C‖U)), C‖U)
= T4(P (C,P (U, T2(C‖U))), C‖U)
= T4(P (C, (LU (C)σU ⊕ f(U))), C‖U)
= T4
(
(LU (C)σU ⊕ f(U))σC ⊕ f(C), C‖U
)
where LU (C) = T2(C‖U) and f(U) is given by Lemma 12.2. The first equality is coming from the
definition, the second from Lemma 12.1 and the last two from Lemma 12.2. So, we can write
ARMADILLOgen(C‖U) = L
(
(LU (C)σU ⊕ f(U))σC ⊕ g(U)⊕ h(C)
)
for some linear function L and some functions g and h. For all the variants we consider, L is either
the identity function or consists of dropping a few bits. For ARMADILLO1b and ARMADILLO1
the function h(C) = f(C) ⊕ (C‖0m), g(U) = (0c‖U). Similarly, L(X) = X and L(X) = tailk(X)
respectively.
In what follows, we consider an arbitrary i and take a vector ei such that ei ·L(X) = X[i], i.e.,
the i-th bit of register X. So, we obtain
ei · ARMADILLOgen(C‖U) = (LU (C)σU ⊕ f(U))σ−1C (i) ⊕ g(U)i ⊕ h(C)i
Clearly, there exists a j = σ−1C (i) such that
ei · ARMADILLOgen(C‖U)⊕ g(U)i = LU (C)σ−1Ut (j) ⊕ f(U)j ⊕ h(C)i (12.1)
In chosen-input attacks against the PRF mode, we assume that the adversary can compute
ei · ARMADILLOgen(C‖U)
for a chosen U and a secret C. In the challenge-response application, we only have access to VT , but
in all considered variants, ei has Hamming weight one, so we just need to select i so that this bit
lies in the VT window. We introduce an attack (see Algorithm 12.1) which only needs this bit of the
response for n = k log k queries. This algorithm has complexity O(k2 log k) to recover the secret C
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(also see Figure 12.4). In fact, the attacker can simply recover the permutation Y = P (Ui,Xinter),
as she has control over Ui’s. Now, her goal is to find out how P (C, Y ) maps the index j to i. The
goal of the algorithm is to find this mapping and to recover C. It is exploiting the fact that fixing
i, then h(C)i is fixed for all challenges and the left side of Eq. (12.1) can be computed directly
by the adversary. Then, it recovers C by solving an overdefined linear system of equations and
check whether it has a solution. If so, it checks whether the recovered C is consistent with other
samples.
Algorithm 12.1 The key recovery algorithm against ARMADILLO1 and ARMADILLO1b.
1: Pick a random i from 1 to m.
2: for t from 1 to n = k log k do
3: collect a challenge-response pair (Ut, ei · ARMADILLOgen(C‖Ut))
4: compute bt = ei · ARMADILLOgen(C‖Ut)⊕ g(Ut)i.
5: end for
6: for j from 1 to ` do
7: for each β ∈ {0, 1} do
8: set h(C)i = β.
9: for t from 1 to n do
10: compute LUt(C)σ−1Ut (j)
= bt ⊕ f(Ut)j ⊕ β for all c bits.
11: end for
12: solve the system of n linear equations LUt(C)σ−1Ut (j)
13: if no solution then
14: break
15: end if
16: derive C
17: if C is consistent with samples then
18: output C.
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
The Attack complexity. The first for loop runs ARMADILLO algorithm k log k times . The
second loop runs ` times, where ` = 2k for ARMADILLO1 and ` = k for ARMADILLO1b. We
perform up to 2k log k simple arithmetic operations in the second loop to compute the values
LUt(C)σ−1Ut (j)
. Solving the system of n linear equation requires O(n3) in general case. However, in
the case of ARMADILLO1 and ARMADILLO1b, every line contains only one variable of secret C,
which comes from Lemma 12.2. As we have k log k equations in c variables, if the mapping i→ j
is not guessed correctly, we have a high probability to obtain a contradiction in line 13. So overall,
we have complexity of O(k2 log k) for attacking both ARMADILLO1 and ARMADILLO1b.
The Probability of success. We first choose k log k challenges Ut randomly and compute the
function ARMADILLOgen(C‖Ut). That is because according to coupon collector problem [KJV07],
the expected number of challenges so that every bit of C is mapped to the i-th bit of the output
is k log k. Therefore, among k log k challenges all the bits of the challenge and all the bits of the
secret key are mapped to a single bit of the output. The attacker can derive an equation for the
j-th bit of P (Ut, C‖Ut) and for k log k distinct challenges Ut the set of equations will have full
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Figure 12.4: Scheme of the key recovery algorithm against ARMADILLO1 and ARMADILLO1b.
rank. These equations do not change through the fixed mapping σC , only the constant term might
change due to the term P (C, 0). Therefore, if the attacker guess j → i correctly, the set of k log k
equations in c variables has a solution, otherwise the set of k log k equations in c variables has no
solution with probability at least 1− 2−n.
143

Chapter13
Conclusion
We shed some light on the theory behind the ElimLin algorithm. This yielded a better understand-
ing of how this algorithm works. But, there is still a lot of work to be done to evaluate the security
of the ciphers against this simple algorithm. Then, we evaluated the security of several block
ciphers using ElimLin. We showed that it might not be a fair measure to compare the lightweight
block ciphers with respect to the number of gates, and throughput when they do not provide the
same level of security encountering various types of attacks. Next, we proposed a pre-processing
technique applied to the algebraic representation of the ciphers before yielding it to a SAT solver.
This pre-processing is somehow equivalent to running F4 for a while and then stopping and de-
livering the system to a SAT solver. We finally proposed a practical attack on the multi-purpose
cryptographic primitive ARMADILLO1. We showed that the key can be recovered in a matter of
seconds.
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AppendixA
Probability Distributions
A.1 Quadratic Forms in Normal Random Variables
The cumulative distribution function (cdf) of standard normal distribution is represented as ϕ
function and is defined as
ϕ(λ) =
1√
2pi
∫ λ
−∞
e−
x2
2 dx =
1
2
erfc
(
− λ√
2
)
In particular, ϕ(−λ/√2) = 12erfc(λ2 ).
LetXi’s be r independent, normally distributed random variables with means µi’s and variances
σ2i ’s. Then, the random variable
T =
r∑
i=1
(
Xi
σi
)2
is distributed according to the non-central χ2 distribution. It has two parameters: r which specifies
the number of degrees of freedom (i.e. the number of Xi’s), and λ which is related to the mean of
the random variables Xi’s by
λ =
r∑
i=1
(
µi
σi
)2
λ is called the noncentrality parameter.
Note. For the probability density function of non-central χ2 distribution, see any book on prob-
ability.
A quadratic form in independent normal random variables can be expressed as the linear combi-
nation
Q =
k∑
i=1
aiXi + a0X0
where Xi’s are independent and follow non-central χ
2 distribution with ni degrees of freedom and
non-centrality parameter α2i for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and X0 has a standard normal distribution. There
is no closed formula for the density function of this distribution, but there are several methods
to compute the distribution of Q (see Chapter 29 of [JK70] for instance). A numerical method
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was also suggested by Imhoff [Imh61]. Programs in Fortran and in C were written by Robert
Davies [Dav80b] to compute this probability distribution numerically. We call the distribution of
Q the Generalized χ2 distribution. The characteristic function of this distribution is given by
ϕQ(u) = E(e
iuQ) =
e
iu

k∑
j=1
ajα
2
j
1− 2iuaj

− 1
2
u2a20
k∏
j=1
(1− 2iuaj) 12nj
If E(Q) is finite, following Gil-Pelaez [GP51] the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of this
random variable can be computed using the characteristic function as
FQ(q) = Pr(Q < q) =
1
2
−
∫ ∞
−∞
Im
(
ϕQ(u)e
−iux
2piu
)
du
A.2 Some Further Probability Distributions and Functions
Gamma Function. The gamma function over complex numbers is an extension of the factorial
function and is defined as
Γ(x) =
∫ ∞
0
tx−1e−tdt
for Re(x) > 0.
Beta Function. The beta function, also called the Euler integral of the first kind, over complex
numbers is defined by
B(a, b) =
∫ 1
0
ta−1(1− t)b−1dt
for Re(a) > 0 and Re(b) > 0.
Incomplete Beta Function. The incomplete beta function is a generalization of the beta func-
tion and is defined as
B(x; a, b) =
∫ x
0
ta−1(1− t)b−1dt
Regularized Incomplete Beta Function. The regularized incomplete beta function is defined
in terms of the incomplete beta function and the complete beta function as
Ix(a, b) =
B(x; a, b)
B(a, b)
Negative Binomial Distribution. We say that X has a negative binomial distribution if it has
probability mass function:
Pr[X = x] =
(
x+ r − 1
x
)
(1− p)rpx
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where r is a positive integer and p is real.
r and p are both parameters of this distribution. Extending this definition by letting r to be
real positive, the binomial coefficient is then defined by the multiplicative formula and can also be
rewritten using the gamma function:
Pr[X = x] =
Γ(x+ r)
x!Γ(r)
(1− p)rpx
This generalized distribution is called the Po´lya distribution. We also have
E(X) =
pr
(1− p) and V (X) =
pr
(1− p)2
The cdf of this distribution can be computed using regularized incomplete beta function. In fact,
we have
FX(x) = Pr(X ≤ x) = 1− Ip(x+ 1, r)
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